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1Executive summary
The theme of this study is how organisational framework conditions within the People’s
Republic of China (P.R.C.) influence the implementation of environmental technology projects
in the country. This is empirically documented and analysed through a case study of factors
influencing the implementation status of a Sino-Norwegian technological co-operation project
for prevention and control of oil spills, included in China’s Agenda 21 (CA21). Both Chinese
and Norwegian actors involved in the project initially seemed to give it high priority. However,
the Sino-Norwegian co-operation ended in 1998, after nearly four years of preparations.
Chinese authorities have implemented a limited version of the project, which has left both sides
in the co-operation at loss both economically and in terms of capacity building.
The report focuses on what role domestic organisational conditions in China plays for the
implementation of environmental technology projects there. The fact that other types of
domestic factors influencing project implementation (economic, financial, technological,
cognitive, etc.) should not be interpreted as downplaying the role of such factors.
The focus is on China’s Agenda 21 Project 6-8 in Yantai, Shandong Province, and not (only)
the Sino-Norwegian co-operation aspects of this project. Thus, reasons for less successful
project implementation related to Sino-Norwegian relations and/or domestic conditions in
Norway are dealt with only to a very limited extent in this report. Again, this should not be
interpreted as downplaying the role of such factors in securing successful project implemen-
tation. Furthermore, it should be emphasised that while the Sino-Norwegian co-operation was
not particularly productive in this particular project, Norway and China has a long record of
environmental co-operation. Nor does the report imply that Sino-Norwegian co-operation
within the field of oil spill prevention and control as such is problematic. This report should be
taken as constructive input to this co-operation in order to make it even more successful in the
future.
The main theoretical argument in the report is the following: the more horizontally and
vertically fragmented authority is among the governmental actors involved in the implemen-
tation of the case project, the less likely it is that the implementation status of the case project
is positive. Given that authority is fragmented horizontally and vertically: the weaker the
agencies implementing the project are, compared to organisational opponents of the project, the
less likely it is that the implementation status of the project is positive.
While not integrated in the analytical framework, a linkage is also suggested between the
prevalence of horizontal and vertical fragmentation of authority, relative organisational weak-
ness of implementing agencies, and two types of actor strategies. In this way, the analytical
framework comes closer to establishing clear-cut causal mechanisms from independent to
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dependent variables in the sense that it incorporates both structures and the actions of actors
influenced by these structures.
It was suggested that the less successful implementing agencies are in individual-cum-
organisational relation building with strategic partners, and in tactically translating the
technology to be used in the project to suit their own organisational purposes, the less likely it
is that the implementation status of Project 6-8 in Yantai (or “the Yantai project”, as it will
often be called throughout the report) is positive.
The implementation status of Project 6-8 in Yantai is judged as sub-optimal (but not as a total
failure) for four reasons. First, the project site and main technological focus have been moved
during the implementation process. Second, the capacity component of the project has been
given much less attention than the hardware part. Third, the Sino-Norwegian co-operation has
been discontinued. Fourth, a comprehensive and co-ordinated follow-up of the pilot project
seems unlikely given the organisational framework conditions in which it is embedded.
The implementation process of the Yantai project has been characterised by horizontal
fragmentation, for five reasons. First, not all the central planning bureaucracies having been
given the responsibility for co-ordinating China’s Agenda 21 (CA21) have been sufficiently
involved in its co-ordination in practice. Second, the environmental protection bureaucracy has
been ostracised from the CA21 process, and has therefore implemented parallel and/or
competing initiatives. Third, as the foreign economic co-operation bureaucracy has also been
excluded from the CA21 process, the division of responsibilities between this bureaucracy and
the CA21 administration has remained unclear in the implementation of the CA21 priority
projects. Fourth, Local Agenda 21 initiatives have not been sufficiently co-ordinated with the
implementation of CA21 priority projects on the central level. This is closely related to a fifth
and more general point, namely that the implementation of CA21 priority projects has not to a
sufficient extent been co-ordinated with the CA21 administration. Sixth, the division of
responsibilities between the local marine safety administration in the case study area on the one
hand, and the local government on the other does not seem to have been clarified.
The implementation process of Project 6-8 has been vertically fragmented as well. Partly
because it has been top-down initiated, it has not been anchored locally to a sufficient extent.
Furthermore, a clearly defined CA21 administrative structure is lacking of on lower levels of
government. Provincial and local-level subsidiaries have their own agenda, separate from of
central-level bureaucracies; this manifested itself in rivalry among different Ministry of
Communications (MOC) subsidiaries for the case project.
Because the implementation process of both CA21 at large and CA21 Project 6-8 in particular
has been vertically and horizontally fragmented, and because the agencies most closely
associated with CA21 have been organisationally weak, the Ministry of Communications
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(MOC) has been able to position itself within the issue area of marine oil pollution through
formulating and implementing the case project. The communications bureaucracy is still
organisationally stronger in relative terms along all parameters than its opponents (the oceanic
administration, and the environmental protection bureaucracy).
The planning, foreign economic co-operation and science and technology bureaucracies have
all been substantially weakened in absolute terms regarding jurisdiction after the 1998
restructuring, but still have considerable strength relative to their organisational opponents
regarding authority over CA21 administration. The strengthening of the CA21 administrative
centre itself in absolute terms has so far had minor implications for the CA21 administration.
This is true even for the environmental protection bureaucracy, although it has been
strengthened in relative terms both compared to the CA21 administration and the area of
marine oil pollution on all measured parameters.
The discontinuation of the Sino-Norwegian technology co-operation project in Yantai is
mainly explained by:
· Lack of integration of planning and foreign financing bureaucracies in CA21 at large and
the Yantai project in particular, and the subsequent lack of priority given to the project by
these bureaucracies.
· The central-local dimension of the fight for foreign funding.
· The lack of relation building with possible local funding sources, especially local
authorities, on the part of the local marine safety bureaucracy in the case area.
The project’s focus has seemingly narrowed from technology towards technicalities, due to the
local marine safety administration’s excessive focus on technical aspects of technology co-
operation (as opposed to MOC).
The changed technological (and geographic) profile of CA21 Project 6-8 seems to have been
caused by
· Lack of co-ordination between the CA21 administration and the implementing agency, as
well as the CA21 administration’s lack of capacity to follow up the project locally.
· The relative organisational strength of the communications bureaucracy compared to its
opponents in the issue area of marine oil pollution.
· The tactical translation of technology by MOC.
· Differing technological frames among the actors implementing the project.
A comprehensive and co-ordinated follow-up of the Yantai project is rather unlikely. Some of
the reasons are:
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· Lack of co-ordination between the CA21 administration and implementing agencies.
· Lack of co-ordination between Local Agenda 21 initiatives and CA21 priority projects.
· CA21 lacks an administrative structure on lower administrative levels.
· The separate agenda of MOC’s local satellite, Yantai Maritime Safety Superintendent
Bureau (YMSSB), and its rivalry with other harbours for the Yantai project.
· The relative organisational strengthening of the environmental bureaucracy, which has
been ostracised from the CA21 process.
· The operative responsibilities in an emergency situation between YMSSB directly under
the central government, and the local government, seem unclear.
5“China’s success in implementing its Agenda 21
is clearly critical to its own future, as it has been
widely recognised, but it is also critical, indeed,
imperative, to the future of all of us”
Maurice F. Strong, Secretary General of UNCED,
opening ceremony 1 st High Level Round Table
Conference for China’s Agenda 21, 7-9 July 1994.
1 Introduction
The theme of this study is the implementation of environmental technology projects in China.
The case is a project for prevention and control of oil spills, included in China’s Agenda 21
(CA21).1 The analysis will concentrate on organisational framework conditions in China
influencing the implementation status of the project.
1.1 Background
In 1992, more than hundred heads of state, among them China’s former Premier Li Peng,
convened in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The reason for this largest gathering of state leaders ever
was the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). This was the
first international conference to address urgent problems of environmental protection and
socio-economic development within one single framework. The Earth Summit, as it was also
called, agreed inter alia on the principles of Agenda 21 (A21), a seven hundred-page plan
containing thirty-four chapters with more than two thousand recommendations for action to
achieve sustainable development in the 21st century.2
                                                
1 A project is a planned set of activities with the aim of attaining specific objectives within a given budget and
time frame, using limited human, financial and physical resources (Dale 1998: 20). A programme  is defined
here as a group of projects or initiatives directed towards similar or related overall objectives within a sector or a
region.
2 The concept of sustainable development is used several times in this thesis. While the vagueness of the concept
may be a political strength, it is criticised for being all-encompassing, thus allowing for countless and often
inconsistent interpretations (Svarstad 1991, Lélé 1991). Is sustainability to be interpreted literally, as sustaining
anything that has been, e.g. economic growth; ecologically, as ecologically sustainable development; or socially,
as sustaining the social basis of human life? Should development be understood as a process (of growth?
change?) or as an objective (satisfaction of basic needs or less fundamental needs?)? The World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED 1987: 43), defines it as development that “meet[s] the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”, has been recognised by
most of the world’s governments and thus is a very important reference point in the debate on environment and
development. This definition, which is used in this thesis, also incorporates the view of the Third World
countries including China that poverty alleviation must be an important component in a sustainable development
strategy.
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Now, this century has begun, and a number of points have become increasingly clear. First,
reaching the goal of sustainable development will not only require that the North reduces its
level of production and consumption, but also demands that the South, including China,
chooses a more environmentally friendly development path than did the North (Brown
1998:12-14).3 Second, a window of opportunity might exist; developing environmental
technology solutions could be less difficult in the South than in the North, as the former’s
technological and institutional infrastructures are still not established to the same extent
(Jansen 1994: 516, Buen 2000c: 26). However, within a few decades, this opportunity will
probably be lost. Third, countries in the South will not be capable of making the necessary
environmental quantum leap unless they can take advantage of environmental technology
transferred from the North (Agenda 21 1992, UNCSD 1997). Finally, their capacity to do so
has not improved since A21 was launched (UNCSD 1997: 28).
Agenda 21 (1992) refers to institutional capacity building as an important stepping-stone
towards sustainable development. Southern countries are more vulnerable to environmental
damage than are Northern countries (see e.g. Murvoll 1997: 10). One way for countries in the
South to reduce their vulnerability is to strengthen their ability to implement environmental
technology projects. For that to happen, bi- and multilateral aid authorities as well as decision-
makers in the countries in question must have knowledge of the most important organisational
factors influencing this kind of capacity. This study seeks to contribute to generate such
knowledge.
The global Agenda 21 called on national leaders to implement Agenda 21 in their home
countries. There has been a tremendous growth in environmental initiatives in the years since
the Rio Conference. Many governments have made comprehensive, long-term and integrated
national plans; created new institutions to implement these plans; and issued reports on
implementation progress (Meadowcroft 1999: 223-225). Nevertheless, “the momentum gene-
rated in Rio dissipated quickly”, resulting in “a very large implementation gap between its
rhetoric and reality” (Scherr and Barnhizer 1997: 33).
The efforts for the transfer of environmental technology are no exception in this regard
(Odegard 1998, ENB 1997). Agenda 21 emphasised that “access to and transfer of environ-
mentally sound technologies (…) will be essential to increase the capabilities, in particular of
countries in the South, to achieve sustainable development”.4 However, there are at present few
                                                
3 The reason for using the terms ”North” and ”South”, and not ”developed/developing countries” or ”the first/third
world”, unless citing authors specifically using other terms, is that the two last-mentioned terms are value-laden
and politicised. Another reason is that it is hard to find a common denominator for the countries relevant here,
that is, countries squeezed between pressing environmental problems and an even stronger pressure for
economic and social development. Most of these countries are situated in the Southern Hemisphere. However,
although this categorisation is judged more fruitful, it too is very imprecise, somewhat value-laden, and hides
enormous differences, both regarding conditions for economic and social development and the seriousness of
environmental problems.
4 Agenda 21, Chapter 34, points 34.5-34.7.
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signs that the South is actually getting the environmental technology needed to solve its
pressing problems.
The Earth Summit +5 in 1997 concluded that “the level of technology and technology-related
investments from public and private sources in developed countries directed towards
developing countries has not (...) been realised as envisaged at UNCED” (UNCSD 1997).
Furthermore, the lack of transfer of environmental technology was highlighted as a central
bottleneck in the implementation of A21. The Earth Summit +5 Final Document states that
“[t]here is an urgent need for developing countries to acquire greater access to environmentally
sound technologies, if they are to meet the obligations to UN and international conventions”
and that “it is important to identify barriers and restrictions to the transfer of publicly and
privately owned environmentally sound technologies, with a view to reducing such
constraints”.5
In the wake of strict environmental regulations, especially in the North, strong pressure from
non-governmental organisations, and increasing public and private willingness to finance
research and development within this sector, the environmental technology industry in the
North is growing faster than most other industrial sectors. In 1994, the environmental
technology industry in Europe employed 600.000 people. The global environmental market in
2000 has been estimated to be between 300 and 580 billion US dollars (OECD 1996, Barton
1998), and the annual growth of this market between 1990 and 2000 has been estimated at 5.5
per cent (EC 1994, Barton 1998).
If both environmental technology industries and decision-makers in the North as well as in the
South acknowledge the urgent need for environmental technology to be transferred to and
utilised in Southern countries, why is not this happening?
From the very first global conference on the environment in Stockholm in 1972, via UNCED
and the Earth Summit +5 to the ongoing climate negotiations, problems of co-ordination within
and between donor countries and organisations as well as barriers to technology transfer
inherent in the international economic system have been strongly emphasised.6,7 Countries in
the South very often see initiatives from the North for global environmental co-operation as a
strategy to maintain control over resources, technology and economic power. Thus, the
countries in the South attempt to link economic and trade issues with environmental issues,
most importantly through the issue of technology transfer (Porter and Brown 127-134). Dr.
                                                
5 Earth Summit+5, Final Document, point 88 (UNCSD 1997).
6 For an overview of problems marring international financial transfers for the environment, see Keohane and
Levy (eds.) (1996), especially chapters 1-3, 9 and 10. While this study will not focus upon the impact of bi- and
multilateral aid organisations on technology development in countries in the South like China, a reasonably
good overview of this field taking roughly the same theoretical departure as this study is Olsen (1995).
7 For discussions of international economic barriers to technology co-operation relevant for the topic at hand, see
Lorentzen (1988: 1-6), Barnett (1995), or Odegard (1998).
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Song Jian, then State Councillor of the People’s Republic of China, probably represented the
opinion of many countries in the South when he said at Earth Summit +5 that (Song 1997):
[O]ne important condition for any progress in international environment- and development co-operation
is the provision of financial resources and transfer of technology to developing countries. Till now, most
developed countries have not made good their commitments. The percentage of their ODA [overseas
development aid] in GNP has dropped to the lowest level in 25 years. What is more worrisome is that
some developed countries are pursuing new trade protectionism under the pretext of environmental
protection, which has a very negative impact on the external environment for the sustainable
development of developing countries.
A21 lists a number of means to facilitate environmental technology transfer. However, little or
nothing is said about how these principles should be put into practice in a specific social,
cultural and political context. Hence the present study is founded on the assumption that donor
commitment and favourable international conditions for environmental technology transfer are
not sufficient conditions for implementation of environmental technology projects in a
particular developing world socio-cultural setting. Thus, more focus should be granted to the
domestic (national and sub-national) framework conditions and strategies affecting the
implementation of environmental technology projects.
1.2 Research question and delimitation of case study
This report examines how factors within the recipient country influence the implementation of
environmental technology projects resulting from North-South technology co-operation, taking
China as a point of departure.
The Chinese government was a pioneer in the follow-up of the A21. An extensive White Paper
(ACCA21 1994c) and a list of priority projects intended to operationalise the objectives set
forth in the White Paper were published in 1994, less than two years after the Rio Summit.8
China has the opportunity – and the burden – of meeting all the environmental challenges
facing countries in the North until this date, simultaneously. Whether or not the country will
succeed in carving out a coherent, comprehensive and foresighted environmental policy
enabling it to leapfrog many of the environmental problems associated with industrialisation
will be of extraordinary importance both for the country itself and for the global environment.9
                                                
8 Key documentation on China’s Agenda 21 can be found in ACCA21 (1994a, b, c, 1995a, b, 1996a, b, 1997a, b),
and SPC/SSTC (1994a, b). Two very good analyses of organisational aspects of China’s Agenda 21 are
Finamore and Holcombe (1994) and Gan L. (1999, see Gan L. 1998 for more details). UNCSD (1994),
Mohamed and Kikula (1996), Wong (1999) and Xi (1999, 2000) also contain some interesting viewpoints.
9 For overviews of China’s environmental challenges, see Edmonds (1994, 1999), and Smil (1994, 1997). For a
particular focus on environmental policy and its implementation, see Chan et al. (1995), Economy (1994),
Heggelund (1993), Hills and Man (1998), Jahiel (1994, 1997, 1998), Lieberthal (1997), Ross (1984, 1988,
1992), Sinkule (1993), Sinkule and Ortolano (1995), and Tang et al. (1997). In addition, China Quarterly, Issue
156 (December 1998) concentrates exclusively on China’s environmental problems and its efforts to tackle
them.
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Kenneth Lieberthal, one of the leading scholars in the area of Chinese politics, and (until
recently) Special Advisor for U.S. President Bill Clinton, leaves no doubt about how strenuous
China’s way towards sustainable development will be. He states that “environmental cata-
strophes are reaching the point where they threaten to unbalance the current population
distribution and spatial economy of China, with potentially massive consequences”. He
continues: “A matter of increasing importance will be whether the political system can respond
effectively to these challenges to prevent them from producing large-scale population migra-
tions, major social distress, and possibly catastrophic economic and health consequences.”10 In
suggesting solutions to this problem, Lieberthal emphasises that China must “devote sub-
stantial resources to development of basic technological capabilities, including (…) nurturing
the ability to absorb and rapidly disseminate new technologies” (Lieberthal 1991: 75-76).
A21 is still developing, and one could therefore contend that it is premature to analyse possible
problems related to its implementation on the national and sub-national level. The problem
with such an argument is that we just cannot afford to postpone analyses of A21 until the time
has come for the benefit of hindsight (Scherr and Barnhizer 1997). The fact that the Earth
Summit +5 in 1997 was held in the first place, is proof good enough that world leaders regard
it both necessary and feasible to evaluate national follow-ups of A21 after only five years. As
China’s Agenda 21 (CA21, 1994) was the first national follow-up of the global A21, an
analysis of the implementation of CA21 is the place to start building on the conclusions
reached at the Earth Summit +5.11 As Finamore and Holcombe (1994: 1) note, such an analysis
could provide valuable lessons for A21 implementation – and the study of such – in other
countries as well.
This study examines how organisational conditions have influenced the strategies of the
bureaucratic actors involved in the implementation of CA21, and particularly Project 6-8 in the
1994 Priority Programme for CA 21 (SPC/SSTC 1994b).12,13 At its most general, the research
question of this study is thus:
How do organisational framework conditions within the People’s Republic of China
influence the implementation of environmental technology projects in the country?14
                                                
10 An overview of China’s energy and environmental problems is given in Buen (1998b).
11 It should be noted, however, that the Netherlands launched a very thorough National Environmental Policy Plan
in 1989, followed by NEPP2 in 1994. The United Kingdom also launched a comprehensive plan for follow-up
of Agenda 21 in 1994.
12 Hereafter, the 1994 Priority Programme for CA 21 will be called PPCA21 1994. CA21 Project 6-8 will also be
called “Project 6-8” and “the Yantai project” in the text. See Ch. 4 for further elaboration.
13 The term “bureaucratic” may both describe (a part of) public administration, or an adjective with negative
connotations, synonymous with “red tape” or “paper mill”. In this thesis, the former meaning of the word is
used.
14 See Section 1.3 for a preliminary definition of organisational framework conditions. For a more thorough
discussion of this term, see Section 2.2.
10 Jørund Buen
This question is, as indicated, to be elaborated through studying the implementation process of
the CA21 Project 6-8. Thus, it is hoped that the study can contribute to the understanding of the
above-mentioned subject by answering a more manageable and specific research question:
How have organisational framework conditions influenced the implementation status
of China’s Agenda 21 Project 6-8?
To answer this question, a closer look will be taken at the characteristics of the organisations
implementing CA21 Project 6-8. Central questions to be answered are: To what extent has the
implementation process of CA21 Project 6-8 been horizontally and vertically fragmented or
integrated? How and why has the extent of such fragmentation influenced the implementation
status of the project? How strong are the implementing organisations relative to the organ-
isational opponents of the project? How and why has the relative strength of implementing
agencies influenced the implementation status of the project?
The combination of a rapidly growing economy, increasing the purchasing power of
individuals and private enterprises in particular, and a deteriorating environment, makes China
one of largest potential markets for environmental technology in the world. It should therefore
be interesting for Norwegian representatives from business, government and research active in
China to achieve a better understanding of how and why this happened, through the story of the
Sino-Norwegian co-operation project included in CA21 that came closest to being imple-
mented. It is also hoped that this report can contribute to providing other private and public
environmental technology actors active in China with a framework within which they can
better understand their own projects. This may enable them to do more realistic long-term
planning of their activities, which is a necessity if projects are to succeed in China.
The study is largely taking a structural approach, but ends by integrating actor perspectives. As
the study focuses on framework conditions within China for environmental project
implementation, the analysis will mainly concentrate on the interaction between different
Chinese bureaucracies involved in implementing the project. Possible contributions from
factors related to the A21 process on the international level are not considered. For the same
reason, the interaction between Chinese bureaucratic organisations and the Norwegian actors
involved in the project will only be included to the extent that this contributes to deciding the
values on the variables in the report, which exclusively focuses upon Chinese bureaucratic
actors, the relationship between them, and their strategies. Characteristics of the Norwegian
bureaucratic and business actors involved in environmental technology policy and projects
related to China will not be analysed in this report.
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1.3 Some initial conceptual clarifications
A number of concepts are used repeatedly throughout this study. Apart from one (technology
transfer, which will not be used further on), they will all be defined more thoroughly at a later
stage; however, some initial definitions are given in order to avoid misunderstandings.
By the term “China’s Agenda 21” is meant the People’s Republic of China’s official program
for implementing the global Agenda 21 (A21) agreed upon at UNCED in 1992, through the
formulation of “China’s Agenda 21 – White Paper on China’s Population, Environment and
Development in the 21st Century” in 1994. A CA21 project is therefore defined here as a
project included in the Priority Programme for China’s Agenda 21 (PPCA21 1994 for short;
SPC/SSTC 1994b) and/or the revised Priority Programme issued in 1996. The study therefore
naturally covers the period from the last part of 1992, when China started to prepare its
national follow-up of the Rio Conference, until mid-1999.15,16
The word “technology” is derived from the Greek word technologia, consisting of the words
techne (art, skill, craft) and -logia (-logy),17 meaning “the systematic treatment of an art”.18
There are many approaches to the understanding of what technology is and what its function in
society is.19 The traditional definition of technology, closely related to classical economic
theory, sees it as “encompassing the machines and equipment necessary for transforming raw
materials to finished products” (Levin 1997: 298).
However, the fundamental argument on which all hypotheses in this study are based, is that
technology not only is nuts and bolts, but also the organisational and institutional elements
                                                
15 While the fieldwork was conducted in the summer of 1999, the other parts of the case study have been updated
until late 2000, so this is somewhat conservative. However, as the case study project is currently being
implemented, and the dependent variable of the study is implementation status, it is very important to be precise
in this regard, therefore I choose to be extra observant of the fact that most of the most important documents
studied were produced before mid-1999.
16 It could be argued that any sustainable development project in China that maintains the ideas of CA21 is a
CA21 project. If so, my approach would be under criticism for being too static and narrow. However, this view
has not been aired by any of the Chinese interviewees, and has therefore not been regarded as relevant for my
research design (however, one of the Norwegian interviewees was of this opinion (Interview PNG6).
Furthermore, in such a large country as China, it is clearly the case that many sustainable development
initiatives are pursued outside the CA21 framework (most prominently, perhaps, China’s population control
programme).
17 Even though the word is of Greek origin, it has never been part of the Greek vocabulary, and only dates back to
1856.
18 WWWebster Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Online, URL: http://www.m-w.com/.
19 Apart from the SCOT approach and the classical economic approach, at least the following approaches can be
discerned out (see e.g. Tjora 1997: 11-14). The marxist approach sees technology as forming part of a
dialectical relationship between means of production (capital, technology) and society (Winner 1977, Feenberg
1991). The functionalistic approach regards technology as having certain (un-)intended consequences or
(manifest/latent) functions (Merton 1968). The structurational approach  is based on an understanding of
structure as rules and resources (Giddens 1984). This is related to the idea of technology as being both
prescriptive and permissive – that is, both directing/correcting human actions, and extending current practices
to new realms (Galegher and Kraut 1990, cited in Tjora 1997: 12). The ethnographical approach analyses
technology as situated practice.
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necessary for a particular technology to function properly. Technical systems are also social
systems, and thus power relations and cultural conditions may decide whether a particular
environmental technology project is successfully implemented or not.
Therefore, it is necessary to base the argument on a broad definition of technology, as the
artefact;20 the knowledge21 and skills needed to make, use, service and further develop it; the
organisational and institutional elements needed in order for artefacts, knowledge and skills to
be properly used;22,23 and the end product of the technology implementation process.24
Environmental technology will in this report be taken to mean technology advancing
sustainable development by avoiding environmental harm; minimising resource and energy use
and thereby also waste; monitoring or assessing the state of the environment; controlling
existing problems; and/or remediating or restoring past environmental damage.25
The concept of technology transfer suggests that the process of interest is one-way, that it
includes a superior supplier/donor and a subordinate recipient, and that technology only
consists of nuts and bolts that can be transported from the donor to the recipient. The
technology transfer concept is also founded on the assumption of a linear process lasting from
                                                
20 Similarly, Edquist and Edquist (1979: 9) use the term “techniques for development”, understood as “material or
physical elements in production: equipment, tools, instruments and machines” (see also Edquist (1980)).
21 See e.g. Teece (1977), Perlmutter and Sagafi-nejad (1981), Rosenberg and Frischtak (1985), Burgelman and
Maidique (1988: 32), and Metcalfe (1994, 1995).
22 See e.g. Müller (1984), Goldhaber (1986), Street (1992), Lall (1993), and Granerud (1996).
23 Some, among them Goldhaber (1986), Akrich (1992), MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985) and Tjora (1997), argue
for including the use of technology in the definition of technology itself; however, such definitions, in my
humble opinion, blur the distinction between an artefact and an actor making use of this artefact. Furthermore,
including this dimension in the definition of technology does not make much sense in a study whose focus in on
the implementation process preceding use of a given technology. Some also regard technology as a profession
or a field of study. However, this meaning of the word seems less relevant in our discussion of technology co-
operation. Therefore, it is not incorporated in my own definition of the concept. Technology is also often
regarded as the application of scientific research (see e.g. American Heritage Dictionary, Dictionary.com), but
the causal relationship may in many cases also be the other way around: technological breakthroughs resulting
from incremental improvements may initiate research (personal communication with Atle Chr. Christiansen
1999). This confusion is illustrated by the fact that the web dictionary WordNet defines technology as both “the
practical application of science to commerce or industry” and as “the discipline dealing with the (…) science of
applying scientific knowledge to practical problems”. A good rule of thumb is that technology is concerned
with change in the material environment, while the ultimate purpose of science is to understand nature, URL:
http://atschool.eduweb.co.uk/trinity/watistec.html (25 July 2000).
24 See e.g. Müller (1984), and Fransman (1984).
25 Several types of technology may be regarded as subtypes of this definition of environmental technology.
Control technologies render hazardous substances harmless before they enter the environment. Remediation
and restoration technologies make harmful or hazardous substances harmless after they enter the environment.
Monitoring and assessment technologies are used to monitor the conditions of the environment, including
releases of pollutants and other natural or anthropogenic harmful materials. Avoidance technologies are
technologies that avoid the production of environmentally hazardous substances or alter human activities in
ways that minimise damage to environment. These categories may also be regarded as stages in environmental
technology development. See U.S. White House (1994, 1995) and Brattebø (1997: 13) for detailed discussions
on the matter.
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the search for and choice of technology, through utilisation and replication, incremental
improvements and adaptation to local conditions, to fundamental changes and new solutions.
Thus, the concept of technology co-operation is used in this report instead of technology
transfer (wherever possible), acknowledging that both partners in technology co-operation
might learn from the process, and that this process can – and indeed should – involve partners
of an equal standing (Heaton et al. 1994: vii, Martinot et al. 1997: 362-3). It is acknowledged
that technology co-operation is a complex and rarely linear process, frequently including perio-
dic setbacks and fundamental redefinitions. Most importantly, the concept acknowledges, as is
the point of departure for this report, that it is fruitful to understand technology broadly (see
above).
Technology co-operation may occur both across and within countries, and may involve a broad
set of actors, including public and private sector entities, NGOs (non-governmental
organisations) and research/education institutions (IPCC 2000). This report concentrates on the
role of public entities within one of the countries taking part in international technology co-
operation.
An inclusive definition of implementation will be used in this report, namely “the decision or
process by which a particular innovation is introduced into society” (Street 1992: 19). Imple-
mentation for our present purpose thus should be taken to mean the decision and process by
which technology for prevention and control of oil spillage at sea was introduced at the project
site. This definition reflects that policy-making and implementation on China is not only
authoritarian – which justifies a decision-oriented approach – but also fragmented, signalling
that important dimensions may be lost unless implementation is studied from a process-
oriented point of view as well. The concept of implementation status is employed because the
project of study was not fully implemented at the time of study (see Sections 2.1 and 3.5 for
more details).
An organisation is understood as a material entity, in contrast to an institution, which is
regarded as a recognised pattern of behaviour (Young 1994:3). By framework conditions is
meant the underlying structural characteristics of a society influencing its capacity to
implement a certain policy, i.e. the opportunity structure of the proponents of a particular
policy.
1.4 Outline of study
In Chapter (Ch.) 2, the analytical framework is presented. It is mainly based on theories on
environmental policy implementation in China. First, different approaches to the understanding
of implementation status (the dependent variable) are discussed, and criteria for successful
implementation suggested. Then, three framework conditions (independent variables) believed
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to influence the implementation of environmental projects in China are suggested: horizontal
fragmentation, vertical fragmentation and relative organisational strength. On the basis of the
elaborations on dependent and independent variables, hypotheses about organisational factors
influencing the implementation of environmental technology projects in China are forwarded.
The study is directed towards explaining the empirical phenomenon of the implementation of
environmental technology projects in China – or, rather, its limited extent. The challenge of a
study this kind is to select independent variables helping to answer the empirical question, and
to provide a thorough, theoretically based argument for the selection of these variables. Thus,
in this study, theories are utilised eclectically to underpin the choice of explanatory variables,
and the formulation of hypotheses.26
The case study method has been employed in collecting data for the report. Ch. 3 deliberates on
the epistemological merits of this type of research design; criteria for the choice of case;
methods of data collection; and cross-cultural challenges related to studies like this one. It
finishes off with a discussion on the robustness of the study’s findings to empirical and
theoretical choices (in terms of reliability, construct validity, internal validity and external
validity, respectively).
Ch. 4 introduces the reader to China’s formidable sustainable development challenges and its
efforts to tackle them through China’s Agenda 21, as a background to the empirical and
analysis chapters.
Ch. 5, the first empirical chapter, provides an introduction of the case study, CA21 Project 6-8.
The main part of the chapter consists of a description of Project 6-8 according to the
effectiveness criterion for successful project implementation suggested in Section 2.1.
Ch. 6 is the second empirical chapter. It documents the values on independent variables
(organisational framework conditions) employed in the report (horizontal and vertical
fragmentation, and relative organisational strength, respectively), according to the indicators
specified in the analytical framework.
In Ch. 7, the empirical analysis, the relationship between the above-mentioned organisational
framework conditions and the implementation status of Project 6-8 will be explored, taking the
analytical framework in Ch. 2 and the empirical documentation provided in Chs. 5 and 6 as
points of departure. Based on a discussion of the balance between structure and agent
perspectives in analyses of policy implementation – as well as fragmentary empirical material
– Ch. 8 suggests integrating actors’ strategies with organisational framework conditions in a
                                                
26 This, however, does not preclude a concluding analysis of the implications for theory development (see Ch. 9.2
below).
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broader analytical framework, where the influence from framework conditions is mediated
through actors’ strategies in the implementation of a particular project.
Based on the analysis of the implementation process of CA21 Project 6-8 until mid-1999, Ch. 9
summarises the main characteristics of domestic organisational conditions believed to
influence the implementation of environmental technology projects in China. A short note on
the prospects of China’s Agenda 21 follows, as well as a set of suggested success factors for
the implementation of environmental technology projects in China. Following this is a short
reminder of the implications China’s “Western development strategy” and its World Trade
Organisation (WTO) accession will have for the implementation. Then follows some
implications from the implementation process of Project 6-8 for greenhouse gas abatement
projects in China and other countries in the South related to the Clean Development
Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol. The chapter ends with some thoughts on what implica-
tions new types of environmental technology will have for the organisation of development
aid, inspired by Project 6-8.
Ch. 9.2 focuses on which implications the study has for research on environmental technology
policy implementation in China. Furthermore, the possibilities of linking research on
international environmental commitments and domestic environmental technology politics are
explored, based on the agent-structure debate.
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“The real worry of the world is not that we do not have
enough laws and regulations, but that the laws and
regulations are not carried out assiduously.”
Chinese aphorism
2 Analytical framework: Explaining implementation – a multi-
disciplinary approach27
This chapter suggests an analytic framework within which to understand organisational factors
influencing the implementation of environmental technology projects in China, and the
implementation status of CA21 Project 6-8 in particular. Key concepts are operationalised, and
arguments forming the basis of hypotheses are presented. The arguments are multidisciplinary
in the sense that they are derived from a broad range of theories on environmental policy
implementation in China. This is based on the belief that assumptions about factors influencing
implementation must be based not only on general theories, but also on theories specifically
addressing the organisational, institutional, technical, economic and cultural characteristics of
the socio-technical system of study, and on empirical studies of this system.
Figure 2.1 Preliminary causal model
                                                
27 A rudimentary version of the analytical framework was presented as Buen (1999). A later version of the chapter
has been presented as Buen (2000e). Parts of the analytical framework have also been used in Buen (2000d).
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The chapter starts out with a clarification of the dependent variable, implementation status.
This discussion also includes a definition of when implementation status should be judged
successful or unsuccessful, respectively (see above). Following this, three types of organisa-
tional framework conditions believed to influence the implementation status of Project 6-8 are
distinguished, and causal pathways through which this influence may take place are proposed
(see Section 2.2).
2.1 Defining and operationalising the dependent variable: Aspects of
implementation
On the surface, policy implementation seems very straightforward. A legitimate public body
formulates policy goals, specifies criteria as to how these goals are to be reached, and requests
an agency to organise a program for practical implementation of the policy. This agency, in
turn, identifies program objectives, specifies measures to be undertaken, acquires funding and
other relevant resources, and decides which activities are to be carried out by whom.
Nevertheless, projects and programs continue to yield outcomes diverting from initial goals – if
they are implemented at all – taking more time than planned, or costing more than expected in
terms of money and other resources. Theories of policy implementation aim to explain why
policy outcomes so often are at odds with what policy designers intended.
As the definition of implementation is central to the debate between different approaches to the
study of implementation, there are almost as many suggestions as to what implementation
should mean as there are researchers studying the phenomenon.28 Van Meter and van Horn’s
(1975: 447-8, emphasis added) view that “policy implementation encompasses those actions by
public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set
forth in prior policy decisions” is widely cited. Najam (1995: 31, emphasis added), on the other
hand, defines implementation as “[a] dynamic process of negotiation between multiple actors,
operating at multiple levels, within and between multiple actors” (a concise definition of
implementation adapted to this particular study is given below).
Implementation should be distinguished from compliance. While implementation refers to
intentional follow-up of commitments and policy initiatives, compliance covers all implemen-
ted policies that coincide with commitments, regardless of whether this is a result of political
                                                
28 This unfortunately limits the scope for a comparative conclusion of this study. However, for a thorough and
systematic summary of the debate on implementation, see Najam (1995b).
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intentions or external factors as economic recession or technological development (Rosendal
1999: 15-16).29
Domestic policy implementation can be categorised into three stages (Rosendal 1999: 17):
output, outcome and impact. Implementation output is policies, programs, laws, regulations,
and institutions that governments employ in contending with policy problems. Implementation
outcome refers to the enforcement of these policies leading to corresponding behaviour change
in target groups at sub-national level, while impact means genuine environmental problem
solving.
This study concentrates upon implementation outcome. However, the analysis will necessarily
be deeply influenced by implementation output. Whether sub-national target groups alter their
behaviour to a large extent depends on the content of national policies and the organisational
context in which they are being enforced, in this case through the process of formulating and
implementing the CA21 programme. As the process of implementing A21 is still in its infancy,
also in China, it is too early to study impact. Furthermore, studying impact requires natural
science expertise.
The vast amount of literature on policy implementation relevant for the study of environmental
policy implementation in China includes at least:
· General literature on policy implementation, mainly concerned with public policy
implementation in liberal-democratic countries in the North.30
· Literature concerning environmental policy implementation in particular – again mostly
focusing on liberal-democratic countries in the North.31
· Literature on public policy implementation in the former Communist countries and the
South.32
· Literature on policy implementation in China, including some contributions focusing on
environmental policy implementation in particular.33
                                                
29 The reader should note that there is disagreement in the literature on the relationship between compliance and
implementation. For example, Brown Weiss and Jacobson (1999: 18) claim that “compliance goes beyond
implementation” because “it refers to whether countries in fact adhere to the agreement’s provisions and to the
implementing measures that they have instituted”. They also distinguish compliance from effectiveness, as
“[a]country may comply with an agreement but the agreement may nonetheless be ineffective at achieving its
objectives” (see also footnote 36).
30 See e.g. Pressman and Wildawsky (1973), Van Meter and van Horn (1975), Hjern and Porter (1981),
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981, 1983), Sabatier (1986), Weale (1992a), Najam (1995), Underdal (1995), and
Skjærseth (1999).
31 Surprisingly enough, there are very few studies specifically concentrating on the implementation of
environmental policy in the developed world – however there are a large number of studies treating subjects
that are closely related to this topic. See e.g. Vogel and Kuhn (1987), Weale (1992a), and Jänicke and Weidner
(eds.) (1995).
32 See e.g. Grindle (ed.) (1980), Wildawsky (1982), Migdal (1988), Triantafillou (1995), and Rosendal (1999).
33 See footnote 9.
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This study will mainly focus on the latter category, since the contributions in this category
largely build upon studies in the former three categories, and have adapted these insights to a
uniquely Chinese context.
Traditionally a line has been drawn between “top-down” and “bottom-up” perspectives on
implementation. However, Kjellberg and Reitan (1995: 132) argue that these labels accentuate
ideological and normative differences at the expense of the analytical. They suggest an alterna-
tive distinction, namely between  “decision-oriented” and  “process-oriented” approaches. The
differences between the two approaches are illustrated in the table on the next page:34
Thus, both approaches have obvious advantages as well as clear drawbacks. Therefore, the best
solution seems to be to choose factors eclectically from the two approaches in a balanced way,
as Kjellberg and Reitan (1995: 165) suggest. The empirical focus of the study also merits such
an approach.
Since this study aims to delineate organisational factors explaining the outcome of a particular
project, project implementation from central level decision to local operationalisation will be
analysed. However, as decisions have a somewhat different status in Chinese politics than in
politics in the countries in the North, it will be analysed more in terms of processes than single,
authoritative decisions. Perhaps surprisingly, given China’s authoritarian traditions, the
analysis will combine elements of top-level control on the one hand and fragmentation,
negotiation and compromise on the other. As regards criteria for successful implementation, a
compromise between the two approaches is sought as well (see also Ch. 3).
Thus, the definition of implementation provided by Street (1992: 19), namely “the decision or
process by which a particular innovation is introduced into society”, seems to be most
appropriate for the focus of this report. Policy-making and implementation in China is not only
authoritarian – which justifies a decision-oriented approach – but also fragmented, signalling
that important dimensions can be lost if implementation is not studied from a process-oriented
point of view as well (see also Section 2.2.1). The definition not only balances the decision and
process approaches to implementation, however. It also incorporates the re-innovation aspect
of international technology co-operation (see Section 8.2.2 below). Implementation for our
present purpose should thus be taken to mean the decision and process by which technology for
prevention and control of oil spillage at sea has been and is introduced in Project 6-8.
                                                
34 The typology is rather broad-brushed. Thus, few contributions will fall neatly into the specified categories.
Nonetheless, it is believed that the differentiation is useful. While the table is adapted from Kjellberg and
Reitan (1995: 162), it is also based on the reading of important decision-oriented contributions (Pressman and
Wildawsky 1973, Van Meter and Van Horn 1975, Sabatier 1986), as well as contributions taking a more
process-oriented view (Fudge and Barrett 1981, and Hjern and Hull 1982).
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Table 2.1 Dimensions of difference between decision-oriented and process-oriented
approaches to implementation
DIMENSION OF DIFFERENCE DECISION-ORIENTED APPROACH PROCESS-ORIENTED APPROACH
Definition of implementation Narrowly: phase between central-level
decision and local operationalisation.
Broadly: total politico-administrative
process related to a programme or
policy.
Empirical departure An authoritative decision. Decision as part of larger context of
political processes related to relevant
problem area(s) or target group(s).
Organisational setting of
implementation
Stable structures, formal relations of
authority and institutionalised decision-
making processes.
Informal structures and inter-
organisational networks between actors
of equal status.
Perspective on implementation
process
Direct control by top-level units over their
subordinate units viewed from the
perspective of the initial policymakers in
the centre.
Adaptation through negotiations and
compromise.
The importance of setting goals Important to formulate clear goals that all
relevant actors know about and agree
upon.
Goals may be formulated, and changed,
according to means at disposal.
Aspects of implementation process
stressed
Characteristics of the implementing
organisation(s), procedural aspects.
Behavioural aspects.
Criteria for successful
implementation
Degree of correspondence between goals
and local arrangements.
Degree of correspondence between
intended social change and ability of
policy to promote this change.
Main goal of research Understand what contributes to effective
public policy and management.
Understand how to successfully obtain
practical adaptation of public policies.
Typical criticism 1) Goals intentionally formulated
vaguely, to resolve conflicts later
through compromise.
2) Decisions often made even though
necessary information lacking.
3) Policy often symbolic purpose.
4) Due to need to/wish for
decentralisation, state non-
interference or weak central state
apparatus, lower administrative levels
or non-governmental actors often
given authority to clarify goals.
5) Too focused on formal decisions.
Elite bias.
6) The objectives of granting
implementers extensive decision
making authorities and distinguishing
clearly between decision and its
implementation, are irreconcilable.
1) Lack of focus on authoritative
decisions may blur the origin of the
policy implementation process
studied.
2) Focus on the informal and
spontaneous veils how
organisational and institutional
characteristics define relations
between actors and their
possibilities for action.
3) Deliberate aspect of
implementation is lacking – hard to
distinguish implementation from
compliance.
4) Hard to distinguish analytical
arguments from normative
recommendations (e.g.
decentralisation, flat decision
making structures) –  contenders
rarely discuss this.
Adapted from Kjellberg and Reitan (1995: 162).
There exist no agreed-upon general criteria for evaluating whether implementation output or
outcome has been successful or not – even less so in countries in the South (Morell and
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Poznanski 1985: 151-152, Jänicke 1997: 2, Rosendal 1999: 18). Bartlett (1994: 184) notes that
success and failure in environmental policy “are wholly dependent on their terms of reference
for meaning, and dangerous in their potential for abuse”. Different actors in a particular
implementation process will emphasise different criteria for successful implementation. Thus,
such an evaluation will inevitably be subjective, and its results will depend on which factors
(e.g. environmental, economic, social, or political) are given priority.
However, the following set of criteria for successful environmental technology co-operation
projects are often mentioned in the literature (Enos and Park 1988: 12-14, Aase 1989, Berlage
and Stokke 1992: 5-6, Ho 1997: 87, Dale 1998: 41-45):35
· Effectiveness: Comparing project implementation status so far with originally stated
project objectives (in this case, in PPCA21 1994), and examining to what extent the
planned outputs and expected effects (immediate objectives) are being or have been
produced or achieved (Dale 1998: 42).36
· Efficiency: The amount of outputs created and their quality in relation to the resources
(money, equipment, materials, expert advise, personnel) invested in the project, and the
distribution of these investments.37 Has the project been implemented within the agreed
time and budget limits, and have the investments been distributed between the
implementing actors as stated in the project description? 38
· Relevance: To what extent the programme or project is or has been addressing prob-
lems of high priority, seen mainly from the stakeholders’ point of view. Could the
resources spent on the project have been spent on alternative and more advantageous
purposes?
· Sustainability: What is the likeliness of the maintenance or increase of positive changes
induced by the project after foreign financial, organisational and technical support has
been terminated (e.g. operation and maintenance of physical facilities; the carrying out
of particular management tasks; or adapting, changing and improving technology)? To
what extent is it feasible to replicate the project or parts of it in another context (at a
                                                
35 Yet other criteria for successful implementation may be found in the literature, e.g. the assumptions underlying
project implementation, and externalities (personal communication with Regine Andersen, researcher, the
Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 29 November 1999). Furthermore, some studies suggest separate criteria for
sustainability and replicability (see e.g. Dale 1998).
36 It is of course possible that project objectives are reached because of other factors than the specified outputs, but
these are disregarded in this study. Dale also includes intended impacts (development objectives) in his
definition of effectiveness. However, as this study focuses on outcome and not impacts, assessing this would be
outside the scope of this thesis. Interested readers should also confer the debate on the effectiveness of
international environmental regimes (see e.g. Wettestad (1995, 1999), for overviews). However, definitions of
international regimes – and the effectiveness of such regimes – vary, and some include implementation as well
as compliance among the categories of effectiveness criteria (Wettestad 1995: 6-7).
37 The problem, of course, is to decide the amount reasonable to produce the documented outputs, as such criteria
are scarcely provided in the project plan documents (Dale 1998: 42).
38 The importance of rapid implementation should be weighed against possible benefits from longer projects in
terms of organisational learning and a correspondingly increased future capacity to innovate (Ho 1997: 87-88).
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later time, somewhere else, or for other groups of people) (Oldham et al. 1987, Aasen
1988)?
Analysing how all four of these aspects of successful implementation relate to each of the three
independent variables specified later on in this chapter, is impossible within the limits of this
study. As indicated in Section 1.3 above, because Project 6-8 was not finished by the time the
fieldwork for this analysis was concluded, the independent variable of the study is
implementation status as of mid-1999, when the fieldwork was ended (see also Section 3.5
below). Therefore, it would seem overly speculative to assess whether the overall project
implementation results correspond to the amount of resources spent (efficiency) – even though
this is often accepted in evaluations of development aid projects (Dale 1998). Although
relevance should be regarded as a very important criterion of successful implementation, it is
difficult to analyse the case project in terms of this criterion. This would have required a very
different type of methodology, namely personal interviews with local stakeholders – mostly in
Chinese. This would have been very costly and would have required a longer fieldwork.
Assessing sustainability will always consider future developments, and thus necessarily
involve a certain amount of speculation, but it was too speculative to include sustainability as a
separate indicator at the time the case study was conducted. Furthermore, the difference
between effectiveness and sustainability becomes somewhat unclear in cases such as Project 6-
8, where sustainability and replicability is among a project’s main planned outputs.
The most well-defined and manageable indicator for successful implementation status in this
study therefore seems to be assessing whether planned outputs and expected effects of Project
6-8 (stated in PPCA21 1994), are being or have been produced through the actual
implementation of Project 6-8. Thus, in the empirical overview, the project implementation
process so far will be assessed solely according to the criteria of implementation effectiveness.
It should be noted that there are a number of methodological questions related to such a choice,
which will be elaborated upon in Ch. 3 below.
2.2 Clarifying the independent variables: Three organisational framework
conditions
Outlined below are three organisational framework conditions believed to influence implemen-
tation of environmental technology projects in China, and the CA21 Project 6-8 in particular:
· horizontal fragmentation,
· vertical fragmentation, and
· the relative strength of relevant governmental actors.39
                                                
39 The sections containing the arguments on which the two first-mentioned variables are based, will necessarily be
more extensive than that containing the third. The reason is that these chapters both provide necessary
background information for the reader and together provide an overview of the Chinese political system on
which the third variable is based.
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According to Jänicke (1997: 8), “the capacities for the environment are constituted by the
strength, competence and configuration of organised governmental and non-governmental
proponents of environmental protection and (…) framework conditions”. He operates with
three main categories of such framework conditions, meaning “factors that determine the
relevant actors’ opportunity structure”. Cognitive/informational framework conditions describe
the conditions under which environmental knowledge is produced, distributed, interpreted and
applied.40 Economic and technological framework conditions include economic performance,
technological standard, sectoral composition (state vs. private), access to raw materials,
financing and ability of capital, the pricing of natural resources, intellectual property rights and
patent policies, and scientific and technological education. Political-institutional framework
conditions describe “the constitutional, institutional and legal structure, the institutionalised
rules and internalised norms, constituting the framework for interaction” (Jänicke 1997:7).41
Dictionaries define “framework” among other things as “an underlying structure supporting
something else”. “Condition” can be defined as “that which must exist as the occasion or
concomitant of something else”, or “that which is requisite in order that something else should
take effect”.42 However, these definitions are imprecise, as they suggest that framework
conditions are both necessary and sufficient conditions for the successful implementation of
environmental policy. Rather, each of the framework conditions should be understood as
necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for a programme or policy to be implemented. Even
positive values on all framework conditions specified in this report would not guarantee a
successfully implemented programme or project. The reason is that, as technology and
competence utilised in environmental projects and programmes is rarely from China only, their
success is also very often dependent on conditions in donor countries and in the international
economic system (see Ch. 1).43
I choose to divide Jänicke’s term “economic-technological framework conditions” into two
terms, namely technical and economic framework conditions, respectively. Combining e.g.
economic performance and the financing and ability of capital with technological standard
seems analytically imprecise. Furthermore, as technology has been defined as encompassing
                                                
40 For analyses of the increasing impact of cognitive-informational framework conditions on Chinese energy-
environmental policy, see Buen (1998a, 1998b).
41 There is a growing literature focusing on “barriers” for environmental technology. However, the barrier concept
in my opinion has an element of prejudice to it. The term “framework condition“ is more balanced, as it does
not preclude the possibility that a certain factor may both act as a dynamic force in – and a barrier to – policy
implementation. For an excellent overview of theories of barriers to energy-environmental policy initiatives,
although mainly focusing on energy efficiency, see Weber (1997). He distinguishes between institutional,
organisational, market and behavioural barriers, but points out that in practice, every “real life” barrier
incorporates elements of all the above.
42 Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1998) cited in Dictionary.com, URL: http://www.dictionary.com.
43 Another reason why framework conditions are treated as necessary but not sufficient variables is that there are
also other types of domestic variables that are essential to integrate in more comprehensive analyses than this
study (see Section 8.2 below).
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organisational elements, using the category “technological” as well as organisational
framework conditions (see below for elaboration of this term) would have been problematic.
One of the characteristics of China’s political system is the personalisation of politics and the
meshing of politics and administration (see e.g. Pye 1995b, and Ch. 7). Therefore, although
unintended, Jänicke’s term “political-institutional framework conditions” seemingly fits the
characteristics of the Chinese political system pretty well (in analyses of political systems
where a relatively clear line can be drawn between politics and administration, and between the
political and the private, this would not have been the case). Nevertheless, I have chosen to
employ the term “organisational framework conditions” instead, as indicated above.
While refraining from ending up in endless debates of organisation theory or institutional
theory, there are three reasons for this change: first, the organisational aspects of policy
implementation are in my opinion not reflected in the term as it originally stands. Secondly, the
term “political” is vague. The political has been taken to mean everything from all social
relations involving power, rule and authority, to public decision-making and the framework
guiding the actions of individuals and groups towards public decisions (Østerud 1993: 15). A
third point, closely related to the first, is that the term “political-institutional framework
conditions” does not adequately separate the political (actors and their strategies) from the
frameworks defining it (structure). According to dictionaries, the term “political” may be
interpreted both as “dealing with the structure (…) of government, politics, or the state”; as
“relating to (…) [or] involving (…) politicians”; or as “relating to (…) the making as
distinguished from the administration of governmental policy”.44 Employing this framework,
proponents of a given environmental policy would have a hard time deciphering the difference
between the strategies of their opponents and the political framework conditions they are
supposed to be a result of. Using the term “organisational” instead may reduce this problem.
Institutions should be understood as persistent and connected sets of formal or informal rules,
habits, constitutions, laws, conventions and/or codes of conduct defining and constraining
social practices through assigning roles to – and structuring the interactions among – the
participants in these practices (Young 1982: 18, 1994: 3, Haas et al. 1993: 4-5, Scott 1995: 33,
Schreurs and Economy 1997: 4).45 An organisation, on the other hand, “is a material entity
possessing attributes such as office, personnel, a budget, equipment and so forth“ (Young
1994: 3). Contrary to institutions, organisations are agents that have preferences and objectives
                                                
44 The first two interpretations are taken from Dictionary.com (2000), and The American Heritage Dictionary of
the English Language (1992), while the last is taken from WWWebster Dictionary (2000). The italics are mine.
45 The weakness of this definition is that it does not incorporate the fact that actors’ actions in turn influence
structures (institutions). However, as this study is only focusing on the influence of organisational-institutional
framework conditions on strategies, and, in turn on project implementation, and not the feedback on structures
from actors’ actions, this does not constitute a problem for our purpose.
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(Khalil 1995). It is therefore sensible to make a distinction between organisational framework
conditions on the one hand, and institutional such on the other.46
Jänicke’s categorisation of framework conditions seemingly faces other validity problems as
well. It seems difficult to analyse the strength of proponents of environmental policy as a
separate variable, isolated from the three categories of framework conditions. The reason is
that it is not meaningful to analyse the strength of an actor without taking into account the
relative strength of other actors (see Section 2.2.3 for further elaboration). Furthermore,
Jänicke chooses to distinguish between capacity and the utilisation of this capacity, and treats
actors’ strength as part of capacity while actors’ will and skills are treated as part of the
utilisation of this capacity. Admittedly, the strength of an actor can be documented in a
meaningful by concentrating on other elements than its wills and skills – as is the case in this
study; however, it does not seem possible to exclude wills and skills from a definition of
relative organisational strength as such. Thus, I choose to regard the relative strength of
relevant administrative actors as part of organisational framework conditions.47
Apart from framework conditions, strategies and actors’ strength, Jänicke includes two other
factors – the structure of the environmental problem at hand, and the situational context – in his
framework. As was the case with the strength of relevant actors, it is hard to see how these two
variables are separated analytically from the three (or, in my case, five) categories of
framework conditions. This could perhaps have been possible (if not very practical), had
Jänicke distinguished clearly between framework conditions on a very general level, and
situational context and structure of the problem on a very specific level. However, he leaves
the reader to decide where to draw the line between either of these two factors and framework
conditions. For example, can an environmental problem be of an organisational and/or
institutional character, or should it only be defined in terms of impact on nature? If the latter is
correct: is this impact man-induced? If so: how can organisational and institutional aspects be
excluded from the problem definition? Or is the problem of a technical nature? etc. In the case
of climate change or transboundary pollution, treating the structure of the problem as a separate
                                                
46 Admittedly, such a distinction would also be vulnerable to the criticism that such a categorisation makes it hard
for actors to distinguish between the strategies of their opponents and the political framework conditions these
strategies are supposed to be a result of. According to Jänicke (1995: 8), institutions encompass “routinised
rules and internalised norms”; however, norms and rules may often be hard to distinguish from actors’
strategies – especially if they are of a long-term character, as Jänicke prescribes. Furthermore, the distinction
between cognitive/informational framework conditions and institutional framework conditions would also need
to be defined more clearly in order for the framework to become more internally consistent. However, this does
not pose a serious problem in this thesis, as all independent variables are organisational framework conditions.
47 There are two additional problems with Jänicke’s categorisation, although of less relevance to this study. The
first is whether research and development within e.g. political science should be included in the category of
organisational framework conditions, or if all research and development should be placed in the category
economic-technological framework conditions. Further complicating the problem is the fact that it is very hard
to make a clear distinction between research on the one hand and administration on the other in China (Buen
2000d). The second is that it remains unclear whether fiscal policies affecting the implementation of
environmental technology projects in China should be included in the political-institutional or the economic-
technological category.
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variable has some merit. On the other hand, if the structure of a problem refers to the fact that it
is of a transboundary character, what exactly is the problem? Is it only the fact that pollution
spreads over a large area, or is it also the fact that this area is divided by man-made borders?
Similarly, defining the situational context as a separate variable may be useful when analysing
unique crises, e.g. a blow out, or an oil spill accident. In our case, there is no such specific
situational context to analyse, as an implementation process is studied. Therefore, in this study,
it is deemed more sensible to include these factors in the “framework conditions” category.
After all, the raison d’être of a model is its simplicity.
2.2.1 Horizontal fragmentation
Environmental problems often affect a broad range of actors in society, and the remediation of
such problems may demand action from yet other actors. Compartmentalised administrative
apparatuses thus often do not match the comprehensive nature of environmental problems
(Weale 1992a: 52-53, Andresen et al. 1995: 48).48 Jänicke (1997: 14) highlights that environ-
mental policy innovation is enhanced by “a co-operative policy style” and that “if the
environmental policy goal is grounded in a broad consensus, implementation will be easier and
more successful”. Andresen et al. (1995: 47-48) assume “inter-ministerial power and interest
struggle” to be central in explaining implementation differences, and argue that implementation
proceeds more smoothly when all or most of the relevant ministries have taken part in policy
formulation.
I suggest to modify the assertion about the importance of organisational participation some-
what in the case of China: the more relevant actors included in policy formulation, the better
the chances of successful policy implementation, but the lesser the chance for the policy to be
implemented without many modifications, due to fragmentation, bargaining and consensus-
building. Moreover, while China no longer fits the description of a centrally planned economy
in all regards, the top leadership is still in many cases perfectly able to implement very
controversial policies if it makes a determined drive to do so.49
There is a consensus among analysts that there is a large “implementation gap” in Chinese
environmental policy (Ross 1984, 1987, 1988, Ross and Silk 1987, Chan et al. 1995, Jahiel
1997, Zheng and Qian 1998).50 The difference between national goals as specified in laws and
regulations and actual policies is wide. A consensus seems to exist among researchers of
Chinese politics that the fundamental reason is that the Chinese governmental structure is too
                                                
48 This aspect could perhaps be studied taking the structure of the problem as the point of departure as well, cf. the
discussion above, but this falls outside the scope of this thesis.
49 The gigantic Three Gorges dam project is a prominent example.
50 A translation of Zheng and Qian’s very interesting book is available at the web site of the U.S. Embassy in
Beijing (see U.S. Embassy Beijing 1999b)
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fragmented (Lieberthal 1997). Politics and administration in China is characterised by the co-
existence of a very strong power elite that meets few formal constraints in the form of laws or
institutions, and an extremely complex organisation of power on lower administrative levels.
The duplication of both Party and government structures on all levels of the Chinese
bureaucracy creates a complex matrix where authority is fragmented along vertical (functional)
bureaucracies and horizontal (territorial) co-ordinating bodies.51
New policy initiatives affect a myriad of bureaucratic actors with vaguely defined and
sometimes overlapping jurisdictions, conflicting interests, and complex, distinct structures of
authority (Lampton 1987a, b, Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, Lieberthal 1992, Lieberthal and
Lampton (eds.) (1992), Economy 1994, Lieberthal 1995, Gan L. 1998). All have to be
consulted and supportive if policies are to move forward (Livernash and Mock 1994, Zhao
1995). Key decisions are therefore often a result of a series of reinforcing compromises made
in a number of only loosely co-ordinated decision-making bodies over a long period
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). The result is that any major project or policy requires a
gradual and protracted process of consensus and alliance building among competing
bureaucracies at each level to gain support both vertically and horizontally in the bureaucratic
system.
This problem is aggravated by the fact that the rising generation of younger leaders derive most
of their power from bureaucratic rank within a particular multi-layered, functionally defined,
vertically integrated system (xitong), and not from revolutionary deeds in the period before
1949 like their predecessors. Therefore, the new generation may have less personal power vis-
à-vis bureaucratic interests than do elders. Thus, only incremental policy changes may be
possible.
However, each organisation, having its own agenda and world view (Fingar 1987, Ross 1988:
23), generally proceeds independently. It continuously negotiates and builds alliances both
upwards and sideways in the system, collects and protects its own information (Halpern 1992),
and creates its own programmes (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, UNDP 1993, Lieberthal
1995:169, Lieberthal 1997).
Bargaining and consensus building is claimed to be especially true of funding issues, cross-
sectoral issues and issues that are highly complex (Ross 1988: 191). The complex, competitive
and cross-sectoral character of environmental technology policy in China should therefore
make it more prone to bargaining than most other sectors. As is the case for any other country,
Chinese environmental technology policy involves struggle to reconcile environmental and
developmental goals. It is also an arena for an intense struggle for foreign financing – and the
status attached to it – between several cash-strapped bureaucratic sectors.
                                                
51 This “matrix problem” also forms an important part of the problem of vertical fragmentation (see Section 2.2.2
below), but it is treated mainly in this section, for the sake of chronology.
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One territorial level contains within it several bureaucratic ranks. A unit cannot issue binding
orders to another unit at the same bureaucratic rank, not even if it is at a higher territorial level.
China’s State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), for example, heads a xitong of
Environmental Protection Bureaux (EPBs) in each of China’s thirty-one provinces (including
three municipalities), more than six hundred cities (of which the case project site is one), and
over two thousand counties. Even some of the about one hundred thousand townships, not to
mention the more than one million (!) villages, have EPBs. However, as a ministry, SEPA has
the same rank as the government of a province, and therefore must ask the State Council (the
highest level of the central government) or a supraministerial commission (the second highest
level of government) to give orders to provinces.
Because of the fragmentation of authority, it is very often necessary to achieve consensus
among several bureaucratic bodies, of which none has authority over the others. Each territorial
unit still has considerable power to control the unit one level down; therefore, bureaucrats at
every level spend a lot of time negotiating for more flexibility. This means that there are
numerous reporting lines throughout the system – through party, functional as well as terri-
torial organs – with resultant problems of governance, or what Lieberthal (1995: 169) calls
fragmented authoritarianism.
The fragmented authoritarianism approach to the analysis of Chinese politics owes much to
Allison’s (1969, 1971) explanation of the Cuban missile crisis from a bureaucratic politics
point of view (Christiansen and Rai 1996). This approach is attractive for a study of policy
implementation in China not only because it explains how organisations work and decisions
are made, but because it draws upon China’s strong bureaucratic traditions.
Allison analyses how standard operating procedures and bureaucratic structure constrain
decision making, and challenges the notion that a URA (unitary, rational actor) model fully
describes the forces shaping the making and implementation of policy. The central idea of
Allison’s bureaucratic (or governmental) politics model is that governmental decisions and
actions are not chosen by rational, unitary actors; they are rather products of compromise,
conflict and confusion – or, in one word, bargaining.
Allison’s models were originally constructed to further the understanding of foreign security
policy. While foreign security policy (and especially the Cuban Missile crisis) is “high
politics”, environmental politics usually is considered to be within the realm of “low
politics”.52 Allison (1971: 276) acknowledges that Essence of Decision is “biased by focusing
on this high-level crisis rather than on the more routine behaviour of governments”. However,
to a larger extent than Allison’s other two models,53 the bureaucratic politics model analyses
                                                
52 Climate politics, directly targeting the greenhouse gas emissions of national key industries and the
transportation sector, may be an exception in this regard.
53 The Unitary Rational Actor model and the Organisational Process model, respectively.
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the domestic bureaucratic politics of foreign policy (Allison 1971: 258, 276). Furthermore, the
author himself acknowledged the possibility of – and the need for – applying his models to
“other areas of public policy” (Allison 1971: 272).54 Therefore, there are few reasons not to
seek inspiration from Allison’s bureaucratic politics model in constructing theories of Chinese
environmental politics.
The fragmented authoritarianism approach also has a bias towards high politics. It has only to a
very limited extent been tested in other functional areas of Chinese politics than the economic,
or, more precisely, large investment decisions. This is partly due to the fact that such decision
making processes are more accessible for foreign researchers, and the results more tangible
(Lieberthal 1992: 5). The most prominent example is Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s (1988)
research on the decision making process relating to the building of the Three Gorges Dam.
However, this study also touches upon environmental politics. Furthermore, Lieberthal’s 1997
study of structure and process in environmental politics has indicated that the model is
applicable in this area as well.
A number of other approaches to the understanding of Chinese politics exist,55 but fragmented
authoritarianism is generally acknowledged, perhaps especially within the field of policy
implementation. The approach is challenged on theoretical grounds mainly in terms of the
degree of centralisation ascribed to the Chinese political system. This critique comes from two
different directions, namely the bureaucratic and the market-oriented, leaving fragmented
authoritarianism in a middle position.
Hamrin and Zhao (1995) find that the fragmented authoritarianism approach overstates the
weakness of the centre in describing delegation of authority as an uncontrolled process. They
prefer the term “bureaucratic authoritarianism”, as this in their opinion describes better the
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) attempt to incorporate all organisations in society in the
party-state structure, claiming unlimited authority.
Lester Ross (1984: 489-95, 1988: 1-24), on the other hand, places more emphasis on the
emerging role of the market in environmental policy implementation. He distinguishes between
three implementation  alternatives that all have been employed in Chinese environmental
policy. Bureaucratic-administrative implementation shares much of the observations and
                                                
54 Perhaps another reason why Allison’s models have formed the foundation for theories of structure and process
in Chinese politics is that Allison explicitly refers to Sinology (the study of China and the Chinese) in the first
chapter of his book (Allison 1971: 23-24).
55 Brødsgaard (1989), Zhao and Hamrin (1995), Christiansen and Rai (1996) and Dittmer (1996) all offer well-
written and brief introductions to other models employed in research on Chinese politics throughout the Mao
and Deng periods, including totalitarianism, factionalism, two-line struggle, clientelism, interest group politics,
political culture, tendency analysis, and civil society, respectively.
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analyses of fragmented authoritarianism. 56 As Ross points out himself, ideological campaign
implementation has been weakened in the post-1978 reform period (see also Zhang 1999). On
the contrary, Ross sees a growing understanding and usage of regulated market implemen-
tation, at the expense of campaigns and state intervention, implying that a limited scope of
economic decision-making is transferred from government and Party planning offices to
households, private enterprises and other local actors.57 Nevertheless, he emphasises that the
Party ultimately decides whether the role of markets in implementation should increase, and
that such decisions require “strong, unified leadership to prevail against inertial forces” (Ross
1988: 22).
Based on the insights from the literature on environmental policy implementation in China, and
particularly the fragmented authoritarianism approach, the following empirical proposition will
be investigated in the empirical analysis to follow:
Hypothesis 1: The more horizontally fragmented authority is among the governmental
actors involved in the implementation of Project 6-8, the less likely it is that the
implementation status of the project is positive.
It is the task of the empirical chapter to substantiate whether authority among relevant bureau-
cratic actors in fact has been horizontally fragmented, and the task of the empirical analysis to
decide whether the extent of such fragmentation has influenced the outcome of the particular
project in question so far.
In the actual measurement of the degree of horizontal fragmentation the following dimensions
will be focused upon:
· The number of actors involved in decisions related to the implementation of the project.
· The extent – if any at all – of competing and/or overlapping jurisdictions among the
organisations involved in the implementation of the project.
· The extent – if any at all – of cross-sectoral co-ordination of initiatives between the
governmental actors involved in the project, e.g. through meetings and information-
sharing.
                                                
56 Ross (1984: 491) defines implementation as “activities directed toward putting a program into effect”,
indicating that his contributions should be categorised within the decision-oriented approach to policy
implementation. His distinction between the three implementation alternatives may therefore have a
corresponding orientation.
57 In Ross (1988), the three approaches are termed “bureaucratic-authoritative”, “campaign-exhortation” and
“market exchange”, respectively.
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2.2.2 Vertical fragmentation
“Those at the top have their measures,
and those below have their countermeasures.”
Chinese aphorism
While policy formulation in China is highly centralised, policy implementation is increasingly
left to agencies at lower territorial levels (Lieberthal 1995). Chinese economic reforms are
founded upon a tacit deal of bureaucratic level-by-level flexibility (Lieberthal 1997), making
the picture of horizontal fragmentation painted above even more complex: Each territorial level
of government gives the level below it some elbow room, provided that this produces
economic growth and thereby social and political stability. This means giving increased
priority to the horizontal (territorial) line of authority over the vertical (functional), resulting in
decentralisation.
Vertical fragmentation is taken to mean that a central-level bureaucracy loosens and/or looses
control of its replicates at lower territorial levels. This definition serves to highlight the fact
that decentralisation may either be a planned process, an unplanned such, or something in
between. From a the point of view of the decision-oriented approach to implementation,
vertical fragmentation may be regarded as a sign that the state lacks the capacity to control
local level affiliates (see e.g. Migdal 1988), resulting in these affiliates distorting decisions
taken on higher levels. From a process-oriented perspective, on the other hand, such a
development may seem praiseworthy, as it seemingly moves decision-making closer to the
people being influenced by decision-making. However, both approaches miss the target
somewhat. On the one hand, this decentralisation process happens in a highly centralised
country; this may therefore have its upsides in terms of devolution of power and increased
participation. On the other hand, increased decentralisation should neither be confused with
democratisation nor with a more dynamic environmental policy, as will become obvious
below.58
The fact that a cash–strapped central government has delegated a larger part of revenue–raising
to local governments, transfers more political power to lower levels in the system (Knup 1997).
It has created strong entrepreneurial incentives for local governments. The term “local state
corporatism“ has been used to describe how local authorities act as the “corporate
headquarters” for different local enterprises (Shue 1988: 62, 70, 143, Oi 1992:100, Lin 1995,
Lieberthal 1997, Edin 1998, Walder 1998).59
                                                
58 For a short but easily understandable piece on vertical fragmentation in Chinese environmental policy-making
and implementation and its consequences, see Wu and Robbins (2000).
59 Thus, implementation of Chinese environmental policy may be an example of the fact that decentralisation is
not necessarily an indubitable good for the environment. This counters much of the research done both before
and after the signing of the global Agenda 21 in Rio.
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As lower-level actors are granted more economic decision-making authority and more financial
independence, they become more attractive for foreign investors, be it public or private. This
leaves central level actors even more cash-strapped, and bereaved of the privileges attached to
doing business with foreigners. They therefore engage in a fight for foreign financing with
actors on lower territorial levels.
More economic freedom does not necessarily imply more money, however. Local governments
are faced with budgetary constraints. Facing a discrepancy between resources and obligations,
many seek administrative and financial independence through activities other than their “core
business” – and become so-called  “independent kingdoms” (Lampton 1987b, Sinkule 1993,
Hills and Man 1998).
According to the fragmented authoritarianism approach, of which some elements were briefly
presented in the section on horizontal fragmentation above, there is a potential conflict between
vertical lines (tiao) and horizontal pieces (kuai) of authority, that is, between a unit’s
bureaucratic function and the needs of the locality. This is to some extent resolved by a
distinction between dominant and non-dominant bureaucratic actors, seen from the perspective
on a particular bureaucratic entity. The actor having priority has a so-called lingdao guanxi
(leadership relationship) with the bureaucratic actor in question, while other actors have yewu
guanxi (professional relationships) with this actor. However, as soon as a problem requires
action by more than one xitong, or by different territorial actors within one xitong (e.g.
different environmental protection bureaux), the complexity becomes overwhelming.
Government and Party authority structures running in parallel, in addition to territorial co-
ordinating bodies, lead to a situation that the Chinese call popo duo (“too many mothers-in-
law”): Organisations in a particular xitong, for example the EPBs at provincial, city, county,
and township level under SEPA, may have to report to (at least) two “mothers in law”, namely
the government at each organ’s territorial level, and the office one level up in its environmental
xitong. This creates huge problems of governance, especially if funding comes from the local
level, as is the case with SEPA’s local-level replicates.
In his analysis of the Chinese technology transfer system, Ho (1997: 103) echoes these
conclusions, in stating that administrative decentralisation as part of economic reform further
worsens the problem of lacking central co-ordination. He ascribes this problem to a lack of co-
ordination between central and local decision making bodies; localities lacking experience in
international technology co-operation; and localities promoting projects in their own interest at
the expense of projects benefiting the nation as a whole.
Thus, while this is probably true for any country, environmental policy implementation in
China is very dependent upon the capacity and commitment of local implementers. Many
observers in today’s China regard the town and village level as the most important arena in
policy implementation, as here one deals with tangible resources, and not only with other
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officials (Lieberthal 1995). Similarly, Holstius and Ma (1995:24), in a study of Chinese
environmental technology policy, find that the end user perhaps is the most important actor in
environmental technology co-operation with China. Empirical evidence from pollution control
(Dasgupta et al. 1997) and family planning (Zhang 1999: 229) exemplify how local officials
find official environmental policies ineffective, and therefore implement them in a “softer“
way, or do not implement them at all.
As Downs (1972) has demonstrated, such a “leakage of authority” is common when centrally
initiated policies are implemented locally. The reasons are that the goals of different
bureaucratic actors vary, that they will interpret top-level orders according to their own
context, and that they have independent power bases. Thus, where the decision leaves room to
move for the organisations implementing it, they will seek to maximise their interest within
these constraints. Similarly, Hanf and Underdal (1998: 157) find that vertical disintegration of
policy – “a state of affairs where the aggregate thrust of ‘micro-decisions’ deviates more or less
substantially from what higher-order policy goals and ‘doctrines’ would seem to require” – is
often a problem during domestic implementation of international environmental commitments.
If lower-level officials have not taken part in the formulation of a certain policy, they are
probably less committed to its implementation (Andresen et al. 1995: 44), as a failure will not
imply a loss of prestige for them. The larger the number of lower-level actors that can
potentially influence implementation, the lesser implementation will reflect the original top-
level decision on the issue. It should also be noted that many Chinese local level officials are
unfavourably disposed toward environmental values, have low political legitimacy, and lack
institutional support from higher levels (Chan et al. 1995, see also Gan L. 1999: 325).
It is reasonable to believe that the degree of vertical fragmentation is issue-dependent. It is, for
example, probable that localities are more positively geared towards centrally initiated policies
whose aim is to protect “their” natural resources than e.g. policies to protect some intangible
common property resource whose extraction or degradation would not have serious
consequences for the locality in question (Andresen et al. 1995: 48). The attitude of local
authorities is expected to be more co-operative the more visible and unambiguous the
environmental problem in question is for them and their constituency.
On the basis of insights from the literature on environmental policy implementation in China,
and particularly the fragmented authoritarianism approach, the following empirical proposition
will be investigated in the empirical analysis to follow:
Hypothesis 2: The more vertically fragmented authority is within the organisations
implementing Project 6-8, the less likely it is that the implementation status of the project
is positive.
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In the empirical chapter we will need to document whether authority within implementing
agencies in fact has been vertically fragmented. The empirical analysis will discuss whether the
extent of such fragmentation has so far influenced the outcome of the particular project in
question.
In the actual measurement of the degree of vertical fragmentation, the following dimensions
will be focused upon:
· The extent – if any at all – of co-ordination (e.g. through meetings and information-
sharing) between different levels of the organisations implementing the project.
· The relative influence of central and local bureaucracies, respectively, on the
implementation of the project.
2.2.3 Relative strength of implementing agencies
If the Chinese political system is characterised by a high degree of horizontal and vertical
fragmentation, as argued above, the relative organisational strength of implementing agencies
should be of even larger importance for the success of policy implementation in China than in
countries with less fragmented decision-making structures. In bureaucratic infighting and
consensus building alike, those organisational actors that do not have enough political clout
will often lose ground (Lunde et al. 1995, O’Brien 1994).
Thus, to understand the relative strength of relevant governmental actors is a central pre-
condition for comprehending the dynamics of Chinese environmental politics. Nevertheless,
explicit theoretical discussions as to which parameters for the strength of bureaucratic actors in
China are most important and/or easiest to measure empirically, seem to be nearly absent in the
literature. However, implicit arguments and suggested indicators can be found in a few
contributions, and there are lessons to learn from implementation literature in general and
implementation in developing countries in particular.
While Jänicke’s (1997: 6) theory on environmental capacity focuses on the strength of
proponents of environmental policy, it seems to neglect the role of opponents (Rosendal 1999).
Therefore, by emphasising relative organisational strength, I want to underline the importance
of not only the proponents of a proactive environmental technology policy, but their
opportunity structure, constituted most importantly by the strength of the opponents of their
policies and proposals. By “opponent” is meant not only organisations having other subjective
interests in a particular project. The organisational “competitors” of the bureaucracies
implementing the project are also included, for example, organisations that do not take part in
implementation, but compete with the Ministry of Communications (MOC) for influence
within the area of marine oil pollution. The importance of the power relationships between
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implementing organisations and competing actors have been emphasised by other contributors
as well (Najam 1995: 38-39, Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1999).
Similarly, although we are not primarily focusing on environmental agencies, it is worth noting
Triantafillou’s (1995: 234-37) observation that environmental agencies in Asian countries
(including China) often are incapable of implementing environmental policies. He blames this
on “objective” organisational constraints, like inferior levels of technical and administrative
capacity, or political constraints, in terms of resistance from technocratic elites within powerful
ministries dealing with economic development. Triantafillou concludes that “institutionalisa-
tion of the predominant form of political legitimacy – developmentalism” is a crucial obstacle
“to the formulation and implementation of tough environmental policies” (Triantafillou 1995:
245).
As touched upon in the two sections above, in the literature on fragmented authoritarianism,
rank and the (professional or leadership) relationship to higher- and lower-level bureaucratic
organisations can be taken as an indicator of the strength of a particular bureaucratic actor (see
e.g. Lieberthal 1995: 157-171, 1997). Fragmented authoritarianism also implicitly focuses on
linkages to and support from key personalities or bureaucratic actors domestically and
internationally; (lack of) access to information; and organisational jurisdiction as indicators of
strength (see e.g. Fingar 1987: 216-223, Economy 1994: 52). Another obvious indicator of
relative organisational strength is how other bureaucracies perceive a particular bureaucracy in
terms of some or all the above-mentioned indicators.
A number of the general contributions to the study of implementation highlight organisational
characteristics of the bureaucracies responsible for implementation as an important variable in
explaining implementation outcomes. However, few relate this explicitly to a discussion on
relative organisational capabilities. One exception is Andresen et al. (1995: 47) who suggest
that  “administrative/budgetary strength” of the ministry of environment compared to that of
“traditionally ‘sceptical’ ministries” is a reason why environmental policy implementation
success differs between countries. Jänicke (1995: 17) suggests “growth of staff, budget, and
scientific competence” as a relevant indicator, while Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) propose
the number – and competence – of an organisation’s personnel, and its access to political
resources. Another proposed indicator, as touched upon earlier on, is the personal will and skill
of leaders (Jänicke 1995: 7, Jänicke and Weidner 1995: 22).
Among general contributions on policy implementation in developing countries, the book
Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World is of most interest. Grindle (1980: 12)
states that goals of actors related to implementation will be in conflict, and that “the outcome
of this conflict and consequently, of who gets what, will be determined by the strategies,
resources and power positions of each of the actors involved”. She continues by suggesting that
“[a]nalysis of the implementation of specific programs therefore may imply assessing the
‘power capabilities’ of the actors”. She concretises this by stating that “[t]here may be, for
Beyond nuts and bolts 37
example, differences in the capacity of various bureaucratic agencies to manage programs
successfully. Some will have more active, expert, and dedicated personnel than others, some
will enjoy greater support of political elites and have greater access to resources, and some will
be more able to cope with the range of demands made upon them.”
In the same volume, Cleaves (1980) concludes that “political and administrative actors need to
mobilise sufficient power to execute a policy design, and their ability to do so depends on the
influence and predilections of others in the political environment”. He continues, “[p]olitical
power can be understood as a variable that directly affects implementation because the amount
of resources that can be mobilised in favour of or in opposition to a specific policy is vital to
estimating its chances for implementation”.
Mainly on the basis of insights from the literature on environmental policy implementation in
China and other developing countries, the following empirical proposition will be investigated
in the empirical analysis to follow:
Hypothesis 3: Given that authority is fragmented horizontally and vertically; the more
inferior the agencies implementing Project 6-8 are compared to organisational opponents
of the project in terms of organisational strength, the less likely it is that the implemen-
tation status of the project is positive.
It is the task of the empirical chapter to substantiate whether the agencies implementing Project
6-8 are in fact organisationally weaker than the organisational opponents of the project, and the
task of the empirical analysis to decide whether the relative strength of implementing agencies
have influenced the outcome of the project so far.
As obvious from the above, there are numerous possible ways of indicating an organisation’s
strength relative to organisations having opposing interests. While many contributions focus on
the resistance from opposing ministries, the real point of interest here is the “weight” they can
put behind this opposition. At least five indicators of this “weight” can be discerned: personnel,
the quality and scope of competence, rank, financial resources, and national and international
organisational linkages. As it is not possible to map all relevant organisations along all these
five dimensions, it is reasonable to limit the documentation to one indicator of administrative
capacity (personnel), one indicator of the network a particular organisation can rely on and
employ when necessary (national and international organisational linkages), as well as
organisational jurisdiction and rank.
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implementation
effectiveness
FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS (INDEPENDENT VARIABLES)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
2.3 Summary and conclusion
This chapter started by defining implementation as the decision and process by which
technology for prevention and control of oil spillage at sea has been and is introduced in
China’s Agenda 21 Project 6-8. As this project was not fully implemented at the time of study,
the dependent variable to be studied in this report is implementation status. It was further
suggested that implementation status should be examined according to the criterion of imple-
mentation effectiveness. Subsequently, independent variables – three framework conditions
believed to influence the implementation of environmental technology projects in China – were
suggested. It was hypothesised that the project would have less chance of being successfully
implemented if authority were fragmented horizontally and vertically. In such a situation,
chances of successful implementation would be reduced further if implementing agencies were
organisationally weaker than their opponents. The suggested causal relationships between the
independent variables and the dependent variable are summarised in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2 Causal relationships between independent variables and dependent variable
In the next chapter, the dependent variable (implementation status) will be documented.
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“If you go to China as a researcher, you will do tourism;
if you go to China as a tourist, you can do research”
Jean Philippe Béja
3 Methodological remarks
The following methodological discussion focuses on the merits of the case study as a research
strategy; reasons for choosing the case of study; methods of data collection (including the role
of fieldwork in this regard); and cultural challenges related to conducting the fieldwork.
Finally, the robustness of the study’s findings to empirical and theoretical choices (including
reliability and validity considerations) is discussed.
3.1 The epistemological merits of the single case study approach
The research strategy employed in this study is a single case study of China’s Agenda 21
(CA21) Project 6-8, “Prevention and Control of Oil Spillage at Sea”. In the following, it will be
explained why this research design was chosen. Potential problems related to using this metho-
dological approach will be discussed, and possible solutions to these problems suggested.
Yin (1994: 13) defines a case study as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon
and context are not clearly evident”. He finds that the case study research strategy is
advantageous “when a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is asked about a contemporary set of events
over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin 1994: 9). The case study research
strategy is therefore ideal to understand the topic of this report; namely how organisational
factors influence the implementation of environmental technology policy in China. This topic
is both contemporary, explanatory (a ‘how’ question is asked), and the examined phenomenon
(implementation of environmental technology projects in China) is not intuitively distinguish-
able from its context (e.g. organisational framework conditions). Another strength of the case
study is that it opens the possibility of using varied sources. Furthermore, case studies may be
applied in a very flexible way; they may be explanatory (as is the case in this report),
descriptive, illustrating or exploratory.
The single case research strategy renders possible a thorough examination of causal
mechanisms through the examination of a broad range of data and information sources. It also
eases the process of obtaining clear operational measures of data (Yin 1994: 42). A consider-
able number of key decision-makers involved either in implementing CA21 as such or the case
project in particular were interviewed during the fieldwork. In this way, a good overview has
been obtained of the different opinions concerning factors influencing project implementation.
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This would probably not have been possible if the scope were to be widened to comparing two
national A21s or including more CA21 projects. Furthermore, the single case study should be
regarded as a departure for further studies.
Single cases may be used to confirm or challenge a theory (the critical case), to present
genuinely new insight (the revelatory case), or to represent an extreme or unique case (Yin
1994: 38-40). As will be returned to below, this as study falls into the latter category.
Yin (1994: 41-44) distinguishes between holistic and embedded single-case studies. The latter
describes studies where (a) subunit(s) within the supraunit of analysis are given attention in
addition to the supraunit. This report is a holistic case study, in the sense that it concentrates on
a project, rather than a programme as well as a project included in this programme. The totality
of a project is studied, instead of studying the project as part of a programme. According to
Yin, holistic single-case studies are advantageous when the theory underlying the case study
itself is of a holistic character. However, there is always a danger that this research strategy
will lead to case studies where no phenomenon is studied in sufficient detail. Furthermore,
while many researchers emphasise the flexibility of the single case study approach as one of its
strengths, a common criticism of holistic single case studies is that their focus changes
underway – be it consciously or unconsciously. If this happens, the original research design
becomes unfit to answer the new questions being asked (Yin 1994: 42).
However, the independent variables open for incorporating aspects of the formulation and
implementation process of the CA21 programme that are relevant for the implementation
status of Project 6-8. Thus, the study aims to combine the strengths of the holistic and
embedded case study. This may make it easier to keep to the original focus of the case study,
while not entirely abandoning the advantages of flexibility. Furthermore, the study avoids a
common pitfall associated with embedded single-case studies, namely that the researcher
focuses only on the subunit level at the expense of the larger unit of analysis.
The case study as a research strategy has had – and still has, in several quarters – a low status
in political science. It is criticised for lack of rigour, and lack of basis for scientific
generalisation. Such arguments are not always based on an adequate understanding of the fact
that case studies are not representative samples. The aim of the case study is analytical, not
statistical, generalisation; the purpose of case studies is to form the empirical basis for theory-
building, not for generalisation to populations or universes (Yin 1994: 10).
The main methodological problem to be aware of in conducting case studies is perhaps that it
may be difficult to test afterwards whether a particular case study has been conducted in a
proper way or not. Conducting Yin’s four design tests (construct validity, external validity,
internal validity and reliability) is a useful way of examining the robustness of the case study to
empirical and theoretical choices (see Section 3.5).
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3.2 Criteria for the choice of case
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, it is relevant to study the implementation of
environmental policy in China because environmental problems threaten China’s social fabric,
and many of these problems have regional and global implications. On the other hand, China is
a potential co-operation partner in the development of the global environmental technology
industry.
The case is relevant, because it is extreme; everything has seemed to be set for successful
implementation. This should imply that if this project does not succeed, a large number of
other projects will fail as well. Norway, one of the countries having the best record of giving
development aid (in terms of per cent of GDP) decided to fund a project in China, the country
that receives the most development aid in the world. Norway had a genuine will to get the
project going, if not for other reasons so at least because of prestige and future business
opportunities. Chinese authorities had generated the project idea themselves, because of
progressively worse marine pollution problems, and therefore had an interest in implementing
the project as well. Furthermore, China had taken the lead among countries the South in
following up the global Agenda 21. The fact that two supraministerial commissions were put in
charge of China’s Agenda 21 signalled that it was given high priority, and this was further
underlined by the publishing of a list of (what was intended to be) ready-to-implement priority
projects.
Other factors also boded well for successful implementation of the project. The project site was
located near the decision-makers in Beijing, in one of the most well-off areas of China. It was
to solve a tangible problem, and was to be implemented in a period when China’s relations to
the outside world were all right, at a time when environmental problems in general were
focused upon, and the Chinese economy rather good.
In addition, the project was chosen because it was the most successful of the four CA21
projects involving Sino-Norwegian co-operation (the four other projects were never
implemented; see section 5.2 below). Then one should suppose that the conditions were better
for realisation in this project than in the other four projects. This means that if there proved to
be problems related to the implementation of this project, there would be a fair chance that
similar problems had been even more prominent in many other CA21 projects, including the
other “Norwegian” ones.
As China was a pioneer in following up the global Agenda 21, experiences from the
implementation of China’s Agenda 21 could be relevant for other countries in the South (and,
indeed, North) implementing their own national Agenda 21. If a project having so high odds
for success as the case of study should not succeed, this ought to have implications for the
design of schemes for North-South technology co-operation. However, it should also have
implications for the arguments countries in the South use for obtaining funding and technology
42 Jørund Buen
from the North. If a project that is strongly supported by a country in the North were not to be
implemented, it would suggest organisational and/or institutional dysfunctions in or among the
implementing agencies in the country in the South.60
As Chinese politics is very complex, both for the researcher and the reader, a deeper
understanding of the dynamics related to environmental technology policy implementation
might be obtained through studying one single project rather than a host of projects – at least as
a starting point. General overviews easily become too abstract to carry meaning. There are
obviously also pragmatic reasons why one particular project within one particular programme
in one particular country is highlighted. The first is the magnitude of the data collection work.
Choosing CA21 as a whole as the subject for the case study would be extremely demanding, as
more than 50 ministries, agencies and department took part in formulation, and even more
actors took part in the implementation of pilot projects – which also covered a very broad range
of environmental problems. Conducting a comparative case study of CA21 and another
national A21 would make it even more difficult to finish the report within the stipulated time-
frame. The same is true for including more CA21 projects to add a comparative dimension to
the single case study.
Second, given that fieldwork is considered necessary to achieve high-quality research on
political and institutional processes like the one studied here, the question whether or not to
expand the study is also a question of financing. Conducting a comparative study of two
national A21s consumes money. This also holds true for studying many different projects in a
large country like China, as they often are located thousands of kilometres apart.
Focusing on one of the CA21 projects involving Norwegian actors has eased the access to
information, as it has been possible to interview many of the people involved in project
implementation without spending too much time and money. All the projects involving
Norwegian actors under the CA21 umbrella were screened through preparatory interviews in
Norway and written documentation (see Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.4), before choosing Project 6-8
as case study. The screening did not reveal any major points of deviation from the conclusions
reached in this report.
3.3 Data collection
Data collection was done through preparatory interviews, fieldwork (including interviews and
direct observation), and examination of written material.
                                                
60 An implementation failure would also strongly suggest that there were such dysfunctions in the development aid
apparatus of the country in the North (in this case Norway), but this is not the focus of this study.
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3.3.1 Preparatory interviews
In the preparatory phase of this study, I had an extensive dialogue with researchers and
representatives from Norwegian environmental technology companies active in China,
especially the companies involved in Project 6-8.
There were a number of reasons why these interviews were conducted. First, although it would
be an exaggeration to call the interviews pilot case studies, they definitely gave access to
detailed knowledge about the case study project, increasing my confidence before travelling to
China that the project was suitable.
Second, the preparatory interviews were crucial in defining which actors were central on the
Chinese side – according to the Norwegian representatives, that is. This made it possible to
map and contact most interviewees before going to China, which was necessary in order to
increase the output of the fieldwork in Mainland China.
Third, these unstructured – and therefore exploratory – interviews were also instrumental in
carving out the analytical framework of the study, the basic elements of which were developed
largely in parallel with these interviews. The interviews were therefore also very important in
narrowing down the scope of the study.
Just before going to Beijing, where most of the interviewees were situated, another type of
preparatory interview was conducted. Several researchers at Hong Kong universities, and
representatives from an environmental NGO in Hong Kong with extremely good connections
to the central government in Beijing, were interviewed about their understanding of the
problems facing implementation of environmental technology policy in China. The interviewed
researchers are dominant in the field, and therefore able to supplement my theoretical
understanding gained from older written sources. These interviews were an important part of
the preparations for the interviews directly relevant to the case study.
3.3.2 Fieldwork
The empirical data on which this study is based, was mainly gathered through fieldwork in the
period 9 June-13 July 1999, in Hong Kong, Beijing and Yantai.61
A case study is not synonymous with conducting fieldwork. The fieldwork is only one out of
many data collection methods that a case study may or may not include, and both qualitative
                                                
61 Detailed information about the interviews conducted and the written material collected during the fieldwork in
Mainland China is included in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, respectively.
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and quantitative methods of data collection may be employed in a case study. Fischer (1985)62
defines fieldwork as “[r]esearch on a group in the environment in which it normally lives,
under which conditions remain ‘natural’, that is, that they are not manipulated for research
purposes. The goal is data collection by the use of different methods and with different
objectives”.63 Fieldwork gives access to alternative perspectives, contact with other
researchers, and dialogue with groups relevant for the research being conducted.
In the analytical framework chapter, I argue that in order to understand properly the national
framework conditions for implementation of environmental technology policy, general theories
should be complemented by theories taking characteristics of the national political system into
account. Using fieldwork as data collection method seems natural in a study making this sort of
argument.
Conducting fieldwork to study Chinese politics also removes a number of information barriers,
as personal relations are more important in China than in many other countries when it comes
to getting access to information.
3.3.3 Interviews
The case study relies heavily on semi-structured interviews with several groups. The interviews
were focused (Yin 1994: 84-85), but still open-ended. The respondents were asked a set of
similar questions (without fixed answering alternatives), based on an interview guide.64 After
this general introduction, they were asked specific questions, varying according to their relation
to China’s Agenda 21 and the case project, and when they were interviewed.65 Some of the
interviewees have been interviewed several times, and therefore may be described as
informants, using Yin’s typology.66
For semi-structured interviews as those conducted in this study, the interview guide should
contain the coarse features of topics to be covered, as well as suggestions for questions (Kvale
1997: 76-78). The use of tape recorders during interviews was limited to a minimum, as this
could easily have resulted in the respondents being less outspoken. Responses were therefore
                                                
62 See also “Doing Fieldwork in the People’s Republic of China”, Reader zum Intensive Erasmus Course, 24-28
June 1991, Heidelberg/Leiden.
63 The original text was: “Forschung im Lebensraum einer Gruppe durch den Untersuchenden unter Bedingungen,
die “natürlich” sind, also nicht für Untersuchungszwecke verändert werden. Ziel ist Datengewinnung mit
unterschiedlichen Methoden und mit unterschiedlicher Zielsetzung.” The translation is mine; the italics are the
author’s.
64 For a complete list of interviewees and interview guide, contact the author.
65 Obviously, respondents interviewed late in the fieldwork were naturally asked questions based on the results
from earlier interviews.
66 Gunnar Mathisen, Erik Sørbye, Stein Erik Sørstrøm, Song Delin and Roald Wie have all played a role close to
the informant’s, as have two of the anonymous interviewees.
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noted down, and transcribed within a day after the interview was conducted, in order to capture
as much as possible of the information from the dialogues while still keeping their dynamic
aspects (Kvale 1997: 78). Of the 62 respondents interviewed (including preparatory inter-
views), 7 wished to remain anonymous.67
During the fieldwork in Mainland China, the following categories of respondents were
interviewed:
· Researchers. Usually this group is more outspoken than others in describing structural
challenges facing the Chinese political system.
· Bureaucrats working with CA21 or environmental technology in the Ministry of
Communications (MOC), the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation
(MOFTEC), the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), State Development
Planning Commission (SDPC), and State Environmental Protection Administration
(SEPA).68
· Bureaucrats from international organisations active in the implementation of CA21, most
prominently UNDP.
· Representatives from Chinese non-state environmental organisations.
· Representatives from Norwegian business and government in China involved in Project 6-8
or similar projects.
· Employees at the Administrative Centre for CA21 (ACCA21). This was perhaps the most
important part of the fieldwork. Many of the employees at ACCA21 had been working with
CA21 since late 1992, and therefore been involved during the whole implementation
process of both Project 6-8 and CA21 as such. This part of the fieldwork also took the
character of direct observation, as the centre is one of the key bureaucratic proponents of
CA21.
· Finally, the fieldwork included a site visit to inspect the case project, currently being
implemented, and interviews with key persons involved in its implementation.
Most questions asked yielded surprisingly open-hearted answers. Actually, the most reserved
interviewees have been other countries’ representatives in China, probably out of fear of
insulting the Chinese government. Apart from the possibility of remaining anonymous, one
reason for the seemingly frank responses from the Chinese may have been that the interviewees
did not fear any repercussions from being cited in a report to be published in a very limited
number of copies in a country far away from China.
                                                
67 For a complete list of interviewees and interview guide, contact the author.
68 After the restructuring of the P.R.C. governmental structure in March 1998, the SPC, the SSTC, and NEPA are
now known as State Development Planning Agency (SDPC), Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), respectively. These abbreviations will be used when
writing about the period after this date.
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Several problems are often associated with personal interviews. As many of the interviewees
are still working with the case project, and it was not fully implemented at the time of study,
the problem of poor recall must be regarded as marginal in this study. Nor should biased
answers constitute a serious problem, as the viewpoints of the Chinese interviewees have been
triangulated against those of other Chinese interviewees with a different institutional affiliation
as well as Norwegian interviewees. However, there is some evidence that respondents answer
according to institutional affiliation. Poor or inaccurate articulation could potentially consti-
tute a problem for the interviews conducted in Mainland China. However, during those
interviews that would have posed problems in this regard, an interpreter assisted me. Two other
potential problems related to conducting interviews are those of complex, vague or leading
questions, and reflexivity (a situation when the interviewee expresses what (s/he believes) the
interviewer wants to hear). Assessing the magnitude of problems like this is hard. However,
most information given by interviewees has been confirmed by other interviewees that do not
know the interviewee in question, and there are few examples of interviewees giving answers
markedly different from the rest. Therefore, unless most or all interviews are biased – which
does not seem likely – the problem is judged to be of minor importance. Even though there
have not been serious methodological problems related to the interviews conducted, the
information collected through the interviews has been compared to information found in
written material to increase its reliability.
3.3.4 Written material
The written material has mainly consisted of
· Material from Chinese sources, particularly from ACCA21, SEPA, and SDPC.69 This
includes research publications on CA21; general information material; newsletters;
newspapers; journals; and material published on web sites.
· Official documents and correspondence related to CA21, the case project and the other
CA21 projects with Norwegian involvement, from archives in Norway. Includes the
Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD), Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of the Environment, and the Norwegian companies involved in the CA21 priority
projects.
                                                
69 Among these are China’s Agenda 21 Update (1995-97), CESTT Newsletter (1998-), and CESTT Policy Digest
(1999-). The ACCA21 web site is perhaps not as extensive as one could wish, given that it is supposed to be an
information clearinghouse for sustainable development in China, but still very useful. Systematic searches for
the period 1993 until fall 1999 have also been conducted in more general sources of updated information on
Chinese politics, as the newspapers China Daily, China Daily Business Review, China Business Review, and
South China Morning Post (the first three are government mouthpieces, but still convey useful information.
While doing my fieldwork in China, I also had a rewarding visit at the China Environment and Sustainable
Development Reference and Research Centre, at the China-Japan Friendship Environmental Protection Centre.
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· Material published in countries other than China on A21 implementation in China. This
includes articles in journals, newsletters and newspapers, web sites, newsgroups, electronic
bulletins and electronic mailing lists.70
· Books, doctoral dissertations, master’s theses and articles containing theories and empirical
evidence on Chinese (environmental) technology policy, (environmental) policy implemen-
tation in China, (environmental) technology transfer to China, and the social construction
of technology.71
3.4 Cross-cultural challenges
Social science, as it is known in countries in the North has a rather short history in China. In
the period between 1978 and 1980, the door was opened for social science research in China,
after a pause of almost thirty years. Sociology had been banned since 1957, while political
science never really had established itself as a discipline in China before the ban was
introduced (Béja 1999). Nevertheless, it is no longer possible to dismiss Chinese social
sciences as Leninist crap (Halskov Hansen 2000). Their quality has improved remarkably the
last ten years or so, as a consequence of the opening up of China to the outside world,
increased accessibility of sources, and less strict censorship.
However, until very recently, researchers from the North were not allowed to conduct research
in China. Before that, they relied either on official documents or interviews with Hong Kong
refugees for their research, both sources biased (although in different directions). The Chinese
authorities still to some extent view social sciences as subversive to the “national interest”, and
as a means to secure social control and plan the future. The problem for the researcher coming
from the North today thus continues to be: should I work with the system, or approach the data
I regard as relevant, seen from my own (prejudiced) point of view? Conducting research in
China is still to a certain extent synonymous with being influenced by official rhetoric.
                                                
70  The web site of the Professional Association for China’s Environment (PACE) contains the journals China
Environment Reporter (1997-98) and Sinosphere (1999-). The International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD) in Canada is the secretariat of the Sino-international NGO China Council for International
Co-operation on Environment and Development (CCICED), and publishes the CCICED Newsletter. The China
Environment, Health and Safety Review, published by Environmental Resources Management (ERM) China, a
privately operated and managed joint venture corporation providing environmental, health and safety consulting
services in China, is a very good source of updated information on new policy developments. ERM China’s
web site also contains many useful publications in this regard, as do the web sites of the U.S. Embassy in
China, and the Commission for Sustainable Development, respectively. The U.S. Embassy in Beijing also
publishes Beijing Environment, Science and Technology Update. Among the journals irregularly publishing
articles on Chinese environmental policy are China Journal, China Quarterly, Issues and Studies, Journal of
Contemporary China, and China Information, as well as the electronic bulletins China Online, Inside China
Today, and China News Digest. The Earth Negotiations Bulletin’s reports from the Earth Summit + 5 session
have also been very useful, as have news briefs from Reuters’ World Environment News .
71 Much of this material was collected during a two-week stay at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS),
Copenhagen.
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Relatively poor mastery of Chinese language prevents me from reading complicated Chinese
texts, and conducting detailed interviews on complex political questions in Chinese. Although
this is to some extent a handicap when doing qualitative research in China, it has not posed
serious problems for the writing of this report, not least due to Mr. Zhu Rong-fa, who assisted
me during interviews with MOC representatives and on the visit to the project site. He speaks
and writes Norwegian and English fluently, and has been an interpreter for official Norwegian
environmental delegations and researchers in China since the late 1980s. Unfortunately,
economic considerations forced me to manage without him during the rest of the fieldwork.
However, this turned out to be much less of a problem than anticipated. Most of the
interviewees were able to communicate fairly well in English, and in the very few cases where
assistance turned out to be necessary, the interviewees provided an interpreter.
The most relevant, updated and interesting Chinese-language information is often to be found
in books, as they are not censored as thoroughly as, for example, newspaper articles. However,
to my knowledge, few if any books have been published in Chinese on the particular subject of
this study, and some of the authors of the most relevant books having been published were
interviewed during the fieldwork. Prominent Chinese scientists also are starting to publish
extensively in English, and some of the most important contributions have been translated into
English. Interviews with the Hong Kong researchers in the field were also very helpful in this
regard, as many of them have the advantage of both understanding Chinese and being able to
follow the international research on the subject.
Perhaps the largest problem, therefore, is my limited ability to read Chinese-language news-
paper articles. Chinese-language newspapers are becoming increasingly outspoken – especially
compared to news pieces translated from Chinese into English. The environmental field is a
good example in this regard, as the environment is a relatively non-controversial issue where
the government has stated the necessity of awareness and information-sharing. For example,
while the English-language weekly China Environment News provides interesting observa-
tions, the Chinese-language original edition, Zhongguo Huanjing Bao, is generally considered
to give much more valuable analyses and information, and is issued on a daily basis. Many
Chinese-language newspapers have now developed extensive web sites, and several search
engines have been developed for searching Chinese newspapers. These information sources I
am not able to take advantage of unless the material is translated into English by other news
media.
One of the key characteristics of decision-making in China is that decisions are pushed
upwards to the top for approval if consensus-building runs into problems at lower levels.
However, top-level decision-makers are (nearly) impossible to interview. In an analysis where
one proposition is that the power and connections of a few central people are of critical
importance for a decision to be implemented (see Section 8.2.1), it would have been valuable
to discuss such problems with those experiencing them in person. However, I have got access
to a number of quite high-ranking and knowledgeable persons who themselves have access to
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top decision-makers. Hence, the lack of opportunity to interview top-level decision-makers
should not undermine the conclusions of this study. Indeed, it is also important to avoid an
elitist bias, as the successful implementation of environmental technology projects depends just
as much upon the commitment of street-level bureaucrats.
3.5 Reliability and validity
3.5.1 Construct validity
To increase construct validity, clear operational measures should be established for the
concepts being used (Yin 1994: 33). It is important to employ various information sources in
order to secure that theoretical and empirical concepts correspond to each other.
Employing concepts designed for studies in the North to studies in the South may be criticised
on the grounds of construct validity. As elaborated upon in Section 8.2.2 below, the social
construction of technology (SCOT) model originates from studies of technology development
in the North. This is a weighty reason why I have chosen mainly to analyse the implementation
of China’s Agenda 21 through the lenses of theories of environmental policy implementation in
China in particular. Concepts used in the report are therefore either directly based on
established theories on Chinese politics and society (horizontal and vertical fragmentation) or
derived from such theories (relative organisational strength, individual-cum-organisational
relation building).72
While this vouches for correspondence between theoretical and empirical concepts, it should
be noted that it would be possible to add more indicators for each of the variables. For
example, there is no mentioning of the time factor among the indicators of fragmentation, even
though fragmentation is closely related to the fact that decision-making processes are
protracted and disjointed. However, the number of indicators is limited due to the limited scope
of this report. It should also be noted that the reason the characteristics of organisations’
leaders is not included among the indicators of relative organisational strength, is that this
would blur the differences between relative organisational strength (a structural variable) and
individual-cum-organisational relation building (a strategy variable).
By making a distinction between the concepts of implementation and compliance (see Section
2.1), it is hoped that the inclusion of external variables in the definition of the dependent
variable is avoided.
                                                
72 The concept of individual-cum-organisational relation building will be presented in Section 8.2.1. Jänicke’s
(1995, 1997) work on framework conditions for environmental capacity also partly takes countries in the South
as its departure.
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Interviews have been written in full and distributed to the respondents by e-mail for comments,
to improve intersubjective understanding of concepts used during interviews. Both the
interview files as they were originally saved and the revised ones will be kept for future
documentation. Parts of the report have been published elsewhere, and therefore been subject
to independent evaluation. As showed in Section 3.2, multiple sources of evidence have been
used: various kinds of written sources, interviews with different stakeholders in the project, and
observation. This is anticipated to make the measures of the phenomena more accurate.
Documents directly related to the case study are listed separately in the references section, so
that they are more easily identifiable for readers having a special interest in examining the
degree of correspondence between theoretical and empirical concepts.
3.5.2 Internal validity
As this is an explanatory project (cf. Section 1.4 above), some observations on internal validity
concerns (e.g. the quality of theoretical claims of causal relationships) should be made.
The two main factors that should be taken into account concerning internal validity, are
spurious relationships caused by third variables, and chronology, e.g. showing that the
suggested independent variables are preconditions for rather than consequences of
implementation status (the dependent variable).
Regarding chronology, the following assumption has been made: horizontal and vertical
fragmentation produces a situation where the importance of relative organisational strength
increases;73 furthermore, horizontal and vertical fragmentation coupled with relative organisa-
tional strength may provide for strategies like individual-cum-organisational relation building
and tactical translation of technology (the assumptions on strategies will be presented in
Section 8.2). This is based on the assumption that interaction between individuals creates
structures, which in turn influence the strategies of individuals and the organisations of which
they are part. Thus, the established causal relationship between these independent variables and
the dependent variable (implementation status) is based on the assumption that in order for a
project to be implemented in the first place, bureaucratic actors and structures need to exist.
However, as implicitly assumed in the discussion of agent and structure in the analytical
framework and the concluding chapter: as individual interaction is assumed to be the basis for
structures, it would be illogical to argue that actor strategies would not influence structures
once these have been established (e.g. a feedback mechanism).
The specification of the unit of analysis also influences internal validity, cf. the elaboration on
the choice of unit of analysis in this report in Section 3.1 above.
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As indicated in the analytical framework chapter above, economic, technical, cognitive and
institutional framework conditions may influence environmental technology project implemen-
tation as well. There are no reasons to believe that organisational framework conditions are not
of importance (rather the opposite, I believe), but all the above-mentioned four categories of
framework conditions – perhaps especially economic ones – exert a substantial influence on
implementation processes. This is briefly touched upon in the conclusion.
3.5.3 External validity
External validity concerns the definition of the domain to which the findings of a study can be
generalised. Again, case studies are concerned not with statistical but analytic generalisation,
meaning “the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalise theories (…) and not to enumerate
frequencies” (Yin 1994: 31).
This study is focusing on organisational framework conditions for environmental technology
policy in the People’s Republic of China. The Republic of China (Taiwan) is therefore not
included. Hong Kong became a part of the People’s Republic of China on 1 July 1997 and
Macao became a part of China 20 December 1999; therefore, there are no projects under CA21
focusing on the Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions.74Another reason to
keep these areas out of an analysis of the People’s Republic of China is their unique political-
institutional status due to their long period under foreign rule.
As the study examines one case only, it is not meant to be a strict empirical test of the
theoretical framework presented in Ch. 2. Rather, it tries to describe and explain actual causal
relationships in this particular case. The case study may thus produce general conclusions on
theoretical hypotheses applied in the study, but generalisation to populations or universes is not
possible. By examining whether a theory is applicable to a certain empirical phenomenon, it is
possible to assess the relevance of the applied theory, and thus develop and generalise theories.
Project 6-8 was still under implementation when the fieldwork in China was finished, in mid-
1999. The main problem related to studying a project currently under implementation is that
the assessment of whether implementation is successful or not according to a given set of
criteria must necessarily be of a preliminary character. The main reason for this, of course, is
that, in theory, the values on variables influencing implementation success may change until
                                                                                                                                                         
73 It is important to note that this does not imply that horizontal and vertical fragmentation precedes organisational
strength. Quite the opposite: organisations have to exist in order for them and/or the relationship between them
to be fragmented.
74 However, this may well change – South China Morning Post 5 June 1997 raised an eyebrow or two when it
described China as an example for Hong Kong to follow in terms of implementing Agenda 21.
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years after the project is successfully implemented.75 Objectives and planned outputs related to
intangibles as capacity building are hard to trace and often do not produce immediate results.
As such aspects are important in this report, this is definitely worth noting, and suggests
cautiousness with regard to the external validity of the report’s conclusions. However, most
evaluations of development aid projects actually take place before the projects are finished
(Dale 1998). In addition, important parts of the project had come a long way in the
implementation process at the time when the fieldwork was conducted.
The conclusions of the study are strictly speaking not valid outside their own defined
framework. However, findings and conclusions from this and similar case studies can
contribute to strengthening or weakening the explanatory power of existing theories and
approaches to the study of implementation, and thereby could be regarded as steps towards the
formulation of a new theory.
Selecting effectiveness as the sole criterion for successful implementation status (the dependent
variable of the study) raises two important methodological issues. First, the external validity of
the study’s conclusions is reduced by the fact that only one aspect of implementation is treated,
as opposed to a situation where other criteria (as relevance, sustainability and efficiency, see
Section 2.1) were included as well. The implementation process of the project can therefore
only be judged as successful or unsuccessful according to this aspect of implementation, and
generalisations are consequently limited to implementation effectiveness.
Furthermore, if criteria for implementation effectiveness had been followed blindly in the
empirical and analysis chapters, the study would also have run the risk of getting a top-down
focus (cf. Section 2.1), because success would have been evaluated according to the objectives
of CA21 and Project 6-8, rather than the problem(s) it set out to solve in the first place.
However, as will become obvious in Ch. 5, the results obtained by using the effectiveness
criterion have been evaluated with this problem in mind. Thus, the conclusions reached
regarding implementation effectiveness are far more balanced than what would have been the
case if the effectiveness criterion had been employed uncritically. After all, many deviations
from original objectives and planned outputs may be due to improvements of – rather than
weaknesses in – project design.
A number of limitations in terms of external validity have been mentioned, suggesting
cautiousness when generalising the results of the project outside the realm of other marine
pollution technology projects in China and (to a certain extent) other projects under the CA21
umbrella. Nevertheless, the conclusions of the study should be of interest for the research on
environmental policy implementation in China in general (perhaps in other countries in the
                                                
75 This is especially relevant for the evaluation of sustainability (see discussion on criteria for successful
implementation above).
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South as well), and on policy implementation (especially implementation effectiveness) in
other policy areas in China.
In the analytical framework chapter, I argued for the use of theories adapted to the realities of
Chinese politics in order to be able to grasp the essence of political processes in the country.
However, it is reasonable to believe that the processes and patterns observed may prove and/or
contest theoretical and empirical observations made in other contexts as well, for example
implementation of (environmental technology projects as part of) Agenda 21 in other countries
(be they in the North or in the South).
The case project could be biased in a number of ways. First, the CA21 projects could be more
influenced by central level actors than are many other environmental technology projects.
Second, the geographical location of the project – near the central bureaucracy in Beijing, and
in a comparatively rich area – could be of relevance for the assessment of possibilities for
generalisation. The period of project implementation could also be important, as China is going
through a period of rapid reform, when framework conditions change rapidly. Projects without
foreign involvement might also yield somewhat different results – for example, some
respondents asserted that guanxi (instrumental personal relations) played a more prominent
role in projects without foreign involvement, as these were subject to less stringent control
routines. The type of project (high or low priority area, hardware or software focus) might also
influence the possibilities for successful implementation. On the other hand, the same political
forces are now fuelling technology acquisition and economic growth all over China, and the
environmental problems to be augmented through the use of environmental technology is
familiar to all of China.
3.5.4 Reliability
The reliability of research depends on the extent to which the procedures leading to the
conclusions of a study can be repeated, producing the same results. The repeatability of the
methodological steps in a report depends not only on how transparently they are presented, but
also on their degree of accountability. As mentioned in Section 3.3.3 above, I have sought to
increase the reliability of the study by employing an interview guide, writing out the interviews
immediately after they were conducted, and sending the transcripts to respondents for approval.
It should be noted that I have not received feedback from all respondents on the material sent
to them; however, it was stated that they did not need to give feedback unless they had
comments.
Part of the criticism towards qualitative research has been that the results of the interview
hinges upon – and thus may be biased by – personal relations developed between researcher
and key individuals (interviewees, administrative personnel) related to the case study. This may
be partly true in the case of China. To a certain extent, guanxi  is necessary to access important
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written information, and to be able to interview the relevant respondents.76 Most interviewees
were contacted through experienced China researchers, business representatives or government
employees (see Ch. 3.3.3).
Individual-cum-organisational relation building describes intangible processes that have an
ambivalent status among the Chinese. The borderlines between such relation building on the
one hand, and corruption and bribery on the other, are not clear, and there is generally no clear
distinction between positive and negative aspects of such relation building (cf. Pye 1995b).
This makes the phenomenon hard to study, as respondents may hold back information. While
this could potentially make it difficult to replicate the results of this report, it should be noted
that guanxi has been subject to extensive research the last decades, providing a firm platform
for further studies, and that it seems to be easier to obtain high-quality answers on such matters
now than only a few years ago.
3.6 Summary and conclusion
The case study was chosen as research strategy because it is well suited to examine the
interrelated and project-specific contextual factors influencing the outcome of Project 6-8. The
case project was chosen mainly because it was extreme in the sense that so many factors
suggested it would be implemented successfully. The holistic single case study is advantageous
because it makes a thorough examination of causal mechanisms possible, and makes it easier to
obtain clear operational measures of data. Data collection was done through preparatory
interviews, and fieldwork (including interviews, direct observation, and examination of written
material). My limited ability to read Chinese-language sources and conduct interviews in
Chinese did not pose a serious problem to the writing of this report. The main problems related
to the robustness of the study’s conclusions to empirical and theoretical choices were judged to
be those related to the definition of the dependent variable. However, the fact that the case
project was not fully implemented, did not pose serious problems for the assessment of its
implementation status, as major parts of the project were almost finished at the time when the
fieldwork was conducted. The fact that the report is limited to studying implementation
effectiveness rather than all possible indicators for implementation status, suggests that
generalisation should be made with caution.
                                                
76 Christophersen (1994) reports how her husband’s guanxi made it possible for her to redefine her thesis work
from research to “visits”, and thereby circumvent the restrictions placed by the current political climate in
China on possible methodological approaches at that time.
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“[E]ffective dissemination of appropriate environmental
technologies at affordable prices will be a major
challenge to the [Chinese] Government in implementing
its Agenda 21 strategy”
Arthur N. Holcombe, Resident Representative,
UNDP Beijing77
4 China’s follow-up of Agenda 21 – a short overview
This chapter introduces the reader to China’s efforts to tackle its formidable sustainable
development challenges through China’s Agenda 21, as a background to the empirical and
analysis chapters. China has launched other comprehensive environmental programmes as well
(see e.g. NEPA’s Trans-Century Green Plan (1997)).78 However, they will not be elaborated on
below, as this report focuses on China’s Agenda 21 rather than China’s sustainable
development policy in general.
This study focuses on one particular project included in CA21. However, a short overview of
how CA21 has been formulated and implemented is appropriate, as the organisational context
of Project 6-8 plays a major role in the analysis of the factors influencing its implementation
status (cf. Ch. 7).
Not long after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in
1992, the Chinese government put forward ten policies for promoting environmental protection
and development in China. One of these measures was the preparation of a national Agenda 21.
Among the motives for the rapid Chinese follow-up of the Rio Conference may have been that
A21 was regarded as a means to channel more funds and technology to China. China may also
have regarded CA21 as a means to increase its standing in the international community in
general, and consolidate its leading position in the South in international politics, through being
active in the field of environment and development.
At the 23rd session of the (now abolished) State Environmental Protection Committee (SEPC)
of the State Council, 2 July 1992, it was decided to establish a leading group for China’s
Agenda 21. This leading group was to be co-chaired by deputy ministers of two of China’s
most powerful supra-ministerial organs, namely SPC and SSTC, and with deputy leaders from
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) and NEPA. The terms of reference for the
                                                
77 Speech at the Closing Ceremony of the International Workshop on China’s Agenda 21, 25-29 October 1993
(Holcombe 1994: 172).
78 This plan is sometimes called the Trans-Century Green Plan, and sometimes the Trans-Century Green Project
Plan. Here, the former title will be used.
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leading group were to organise and guide the formulation and implementation of the “White
Paper on China’s Population, Environment, and Development in the 21st Century” (“China’s
Agenda 21”, or CA21) and its associated Priority Programmes, with assistance from the
UNDP.79 Working groups composed of more than 300 experts from 52 commissions,
ministries, agencies, and government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs)
were established (ACCA21 1997b). The Administrative Centre for China’s Agenda 21
(ACCA21) was established in March 1993, and entrusted the responsibility for the routine
administration of CA21.80
The first draft of China’s Agenda 21, totalling 120,000 Chinese characters and 40 chapters,
was completed in May 1993. It suggested 80 programme areas for sustainable development
strategies and policies related to population, economy, society, resources, and the environment
in China. A second draft was ready in August 1993. After a third review by international
consultants financed by the UNDP, a final draft was subject to comments and suggested
changes from appropriate ministries and agencies of the State Council as well as domestic and
international experts, at a UNDP-sponsored international workshop 25-29 October 1993. The
final version of China’s Agenda 21, approved at the 16th Executive Meeting of the State
Council 25 March 1994, had the following four overarching objectives (ACCA21 1997b):
· maintain rapid economic development, but increase the quality of development through
scientific and technological advancements;
· establish a social basis for sustainable development;
· control pollution and use promote rational use of natural resources; and
· introduce legislation necessary for promoting overall co-ordination of decision-making
for sustainable development.
According to China’s national report to the UN Commission on Sustainable Development
before the Earth Summit +5 in 1997 (ACCA21 1997b), the following four dimensions of the
implementation of CA21 have been emphasised:
· economic structure adjustment;
· gradual integration of CA21 into national economic and social development plans;
· capacity building for sustainable development; and
· promotion of international co-operation.
CA21 consisted of 20 chapters divided into four major sections: (i) overall strategies for
sustainable development; (ii) sustainable social development; (iii) sustainable economic
                                                
79 Apart from assisting the CA21 Leading Group in formulating CA21, the first phase of UNDP’s so-called
Capacity 21 project included training and advice. The second phase concentrated on integrating CA21 into long
term plans, while the third phase aimed to help China implement its national Agenda 21 in provinces and
localities.
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development, and (iv) rational utilisation and protection of resources and the environment.
CA21 is divided into nine priority areas.81 Each chapter has been organised into two sections,
namely (i) introduction and (ii) programme areas (78 in all). The introduction aims to clarify
the objectives and significance of each programme area and the role each of these plays in
overall sustainable development. Each particular programme area is then divided into three
subsections: basis for action and key problems in the first, objectives in the second, and
proposed activities for implementation in the last.
China’s Agenda 21 was presented to the international community through “The High-Level
Round Table Conference on China’s Agenda 21” in Beijing 7-9 July 1994, together with “The
Priority Programme for China’s Agenda 21: First Tranche” (SPC/SSTC 1994b). The
conference defended its title, mostly thanks to intensive lobbying in several countries in the
North beforehand. In the plenary session, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), 15 foreign governments, 8 companies and international NGOs pledged their support
for 50 of the 62 projects included in the 1994 Priority Programme (PPCA21 1994).82 These 62
projects were to be integrated in the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), and the long-terms plans
to 2010, according to an agreement signed by SPC, SSTC and UNDP in July 1994. This
agreement also included a two-year research and training programme.
The priority projects were selected after a screening of more than 500 project proposals that
had been forwarded by actors at all levels in the political system (although perhaps mainly
from the central level). For a project to be selected, it should be so important for China’s
sustainable development strategy that it had to be completed quickly. It should also promote
economic and social development; strengthen China’s capacity to solve similar problems in the
future; contribute to the mitigation of global environmental problems; be integrated with
sectoral and local government planning; and be a demonstration project (Shen 1995: 72-73).
Sixty per cent of the funding for the first priority projects – tentatively estimated to be about
4.3 billion USD at that time (Gan S. 1995: 75) – was to be provided by China, and the
remaining forty per cent by the international community.
A directive simultaneously issued by the State Council also stipulated that China’s Agenda 21
should be an “overarching strategic guideline” for other economic and social development
plans – and implemented in day-to-day management – at both national and sub-national
(municipal/provincial) levels (ACCA21 1995a). The directive also called for the promotion of
                                                                                                                                                         
80 See Section 6.3 for more information on ACCA21’s areas of responsibility.
81 “Capacity building for sustainable development”; “Sustainable agriculture”; “Cleaner production and
environmental protection industry”; “Clean energy and transportation”; “Conservation and sustainable
utilisation of natural resources”; “Environmental pollution control”; “Combating poverty and regional
development”; “Population, health and human settlements”; and “Global change and biodiversity
conservation”, respectively.
82 See footnote 87 below.
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public awareness so that decision-makers and the public voluntarily would implement CA21
(see also Gan S. 1995: 76).
In May 1995, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council
approved “The Decision to Promote Progress in Science and Technology”, which included a
call for the thorough implementation of China’s Agenda 21. A national conference on the
implementation of China’s Agenda 21 was held 27-28 December 1995. By the end of 1996,
fourteen governmental agencies had set up leading groups. Nineteen sectors had formulated a
sectoral Agenda 21 and action plan.83 About two-thirds of China’s 30 provinces (including
Guizhou, Hubei, Shanxi and Sichuan), municipalities (including Beijing), and autonomous
regions (including Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region) had set up Local Agenda 21 leading
groups and/or formulated their own Agenda 21s (Chen 1997: 64, ACCA21 1997a, Guo R.
1997: 66).84 Several cities have done the same, among them Nanyang (Huang 1997: 69-70,
Nanyang LA21 1997), Changzhou (ACCA21 1997a), Benxi (Benxi Agenda 21 Leading Group
Office 1994), Shenyang and Wuhan.85 A number of efforts were made to make the Chinese
more aware of CA21. For example, an outline of CA21 was published in the government
mouthpiece People’s Daily 20 November 1994, and the 30-program TV series “China’s
Agenda 21 Is Not A Dream” was shown by TV stations in almost all provinces (Huang 1997:
74).
In July 1996, on the Fourth National Conference on Environmental Protection held by the State
Council, a specific sectoral five-year national plan for China’s environmental protection was
ratified. It aimed to establish a complete environmental management and legislative system and
bring the trend of increasing environmental pollution and environmental degradation under
control by 2000, and substantially improve in these fields by 2010. In order to meet these
goals, “The Programme for Controlling the Total Amount of Major Pollutants during the Ninth
Five-Year Plan” and the “China Trans-Century Green Plan” (NEPA 1997) were introduced.86
The latter’s primary focus is on the water pollution of three rivers (the Huaihe River, Haihe
River, and Liaohe River) and three lakes (Taihu Lake, Dianchi Lake, and Chaohu Lake); acid
rain in south-western, central, southern, and eastern China; as well as air pollution in 30 key
cities. The former specifies strict regulations in order to control the total amount of 12 major
pollutants.
                                                
83 Among them were NEPA’s “China’s Agenda 21 for Environmental Protection”; “China’s Ocean Agenda 21”
prepared by the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) under the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR);
“China’s Agenda 21 on Water Resources”  (the Ministry of Water Resources); “Meteorological Action Plan for
China’s Agenda 21” (China Meteorological Administration), and the “Forestry Action Plan for China’s Agenda
21”, formulated by the then Ministry of Forestry, which is now the State Forestry Administration.
84 See also ACCA21 (1995a).
85 UNDP (1998c), “Summary of China's National Agenda 21”, URL:
http://www.unchina.org/undp/shd/html/agenda21.htm (15 May 1999).
86 For more information, see SEPA (2000a, b).
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An updated Priority Programme (ACCA21 1996a), containing 19 revised projects from
PPCA21 1994 and 46 new projects with a total budget of 2.43 billion USD, was released in
connection with “the Second High-Level Roundtable Conference on China’s Agenda 21”, 26-
31 October 1996. The new projects were selected from 300 new project proposals. Including
the unchanged projects from PPCA21 1994, this gives 128 CA21 projects.87 A list of
investment projects (82 commercial investment projects, and 25 infrastructure projects, total
budget 4.17 billion USD) was also distributed together with the revised Priority Programme.88
The Chinese authorities made great efforts to assure foreign soft financing to PPCA21 1994,
but the results were not impressing (Lunde 1995). This was part of the reason why the second
Priority Programme was directed more towards international business than towards
governments and multilateral organisations.
As of December 1995, 32 per cent of the priority projects in PPCA21 1994 were reportedly
underway, after receiving technical and financial assistance from the domestic and
international community (ACCA21 1995a). Potential partners had expressed interest in and
begun work on 85 per cent of the priority projects. At the time the revised Priority Programme
was issued (October 1996), 41.5 per cent of the projects were underway, and 33 per cent were
under negotiation. Thirty-six per cent of the projects had received international funding. China
had invested 1.29 billion USD in the projects, and the international community 330 million
USD.89 Unfortunately, it has proved impossible to obtain more detailed and updated data on
the progress of projects and the number of projects actually under implementation.
According to the introduction to the 1996 Priority Programme – which this time contained ads
from several large international companies – the revised 1994 projects were modified “as a
consequence of rapidly changing economic conditions and new insights gained during the
earlier promotional efforts”. The introduction also emphasises that both new and revised
projects have been refined in order “to meet international standards, to justify the need for
international co-operation, to facilitate project execution and to attract more industrial and
commercial participants” and investors; that “[a]lmost all projects are included in either the
national or local government’s Ninth Five-Year Plan”; that “[p]rojects of middle and western
China are added to promote the development and sustainability of these areas”; that “[p]rojects
(…) of non-governmental organisations are added to broaden social participation”; and that
“[c]apacity-building and demonstration projects are enhanced”.
                                                
87 The reader should note that the two Priority Programmes use different definitions of what constitutes a project.
In the revised edition, projects that were entitled subprojects in the 1994 Priority Programme were treated as
separate projects.
88 See ACCA21 (1996c), “Brief Profiles of Investment Projects for China’s Agenda 21”, URL:
http://www.cestt.org.cn/acca21/brief.htm (14 December 2000), and UNDP (1996), “UNDP and China Jointly
Hold the Second High-Level Round Table Conference on China's Agenda 21”, URL:
http://www.unchina.org/undp/news/html/961106.html (15 May 1999).
89 See ACCA21 (1996a), “Introduction”, and Huang (1998: 27). Huang wrote that 41.5 per cent of the projects had
been implemented, but this was clearly not the case. He also stated that the number of projects under
negotiation were 30.5 per cent, and not 33 per cent.
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One of the new projects was the trial implementation of local Agenda 21s on provincial,
municipal and city levels (see e.g. ACCA21/Interconsult Academy 1997, see above). Another,
the Centre for Environmentally Sound Technology Transfer (CESTT, sponsored by ADB), was
established in 1997, in close collaboration with (and on the premises of) ACCA21. Its mission
is to promote co-operation among government departments, research institutions, financial
institutions, international organisations and foreign and domestic enterprises, especially
between small and medium-sized enterprises (Deng 1998). It aims to build a national network
for environmentally technology co-operation between China and foreign partners as well as
within China, around CESTT in Beijing. This is to be achieved through establishing partner
agencies in East, Central, South, Northeast, Southwest, and Northwest China, respectively.
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5 Empirical mapping of the dependent variable: The implemen-
tation effectiveness of China’s Agenda 21 Project 6-8 so far
This chapter opens with an overview of China’s marine pollution problems today. Following
this, the implementation status of Project 6-8 under the Priority Programme for China’s
Agenda 21 (PPCA21 1994), is evaluated according to the criterion for successful implemen-
tation status chosen in Section 2.1 above, namely effectiveness.
5.1 China’s seas – hope or demise?
As China supports 22 per cent of the world’s population on only about 10 per cent of its arable
land,90 the Chinese place their confidence in China’s vast oceanic territory, totalling 3 million
square kilometres, and deems it vital to assuring China’s future. The Chinese coastline, 18,000
kilometres long, is the most heavy populated in the world, has one of the world’s heaviest
concentrations of industry, and has a large number of shipping routes. It has played a central
role in China’s massive modernisation strategy, as one of the main elements of the strategy has
been to give priority to coastal development through the establishment of Special Economic
Zones, enjoying more autonomy than other areas of China.
However, marine oil pollution is a serious threat to China’s coastal environment as well as its
economy. It endangers the thriving fishery and mariculture industries, salt production, and
tourism (Lu 1990, Yu 1993, MOC 1996, Zou 1999). Over 70 per cent of China’s coastal waters
are polluted and below national standards. Recent analyses conducted by the State Oceanic
Administration (SOA, Chs. 6 and 7 below) have showed a constant environmental degradation
in the coastal sea area, and an expansion of the areas polluted. Pollution by organic matter as
well as oil spills has been increasing.
As mentioned above, oil resources are mainly distributed in the north and the interior of China.
Of these, 40 per cent are transported to coastal or riverside oil enterprises. China is intensifying
its search for and development of oil resources. Furthermore, China is gradually leaving its
former strategy of self-sufficiency in energy supplies to the advantage of buying oil and gas
abroad (Rashid and Saywell 1998, Buen 1998b, U.S. Embassy 2000b). While there are
ambitious plans for building new pipelines, the ocean transportation of oil will most probably
increase as well.
                                                
90 The size of China’s arable land is a hotly debated issue, not least due to the pessimistic publications of the
WorldWatch Institute. The official Chinese figures were revised upwards by as much as 40 per cent in 1998 in
order to correct unreliable statistical data, thus increasing China’s portion of the world’s arable land from 7 to
10 per cent.
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So will accidents, if the oil spill contingency system along China’s coastline is not developed.
According to statistics from the Ministry of Communications (MOC), there were 2242 ship oil
spill accidents in China’s coastal areas between 1976 and 1996, and since 1994, serious oil
spills have increased by five to seven cases annually. From 1973 to 1994, there were 26 serious
accidents, of which 22 involved oil spillage from ships, resulting in the leakage of more than
21,000 tons of crude oil and other chemical materials into China’s seawaters.91
China recently acceded to the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness,
Response and Co-operation (OPRC). It is designed to improve the ability of nations to cope
with a sudden emergency, such as a tanker accident. The convention requires member states
that have not yet established a national system for emergency oil spills at sea to do so as soon
as possible (MOC 1996).
For the same reasons, in the period 1992-1995, oil spill contingency plans were developed for
the six biggest harbours in China (Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen and
Guangzhou), with assistance from the World Bank (Pu 1997).92 Emergency plans for oil spills
on board have been put into practice on both international and national shipping routes from
1996 onwards. However, regional plans and an overall national plan for managing oil spill
emergencies are still pending, and most harbours lack proper monitoring technology and
human resources. At the time of writing, Shenzhen is the only harbour in China experimenting
with regulations aimed at preventing and/or coping with oil disasters. What measures to take
and what sanctions to impose to whom in the case of oil pollution at sea in China are still not
specified by laws or regulations.93
5.2 Implementation effectiveness of Project 6-8: on the path towards success?
The main question to be answered in this section is to what extent the planned outputs and
expected effects of Project 6-8 have been achieved so far. This question needs to be answered
in order to document the implementation status according to the criterion of implementation
effectiveness. First, a summary of the project’s progress is provided. Then, the implementation
status of the project as of mid-1999 is summarised, in terms of correspondence with planned
outputs and expected effects.
                                                
91 “Special forces should tackle oil spills”, China Daily, 23 October 1998. An article in People’s Daily (“China
Implementing Program Against Maritime Oil Spill”, 25 April 2000, URL:
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200004/25/eng20000425_39594.htm) (20 January 2001) states that 29,000
tons of oil leaked out in 53 serious accidents in China 1973-1999. While this certainly questions the quality of
the cited statistics, the point is still valid.
92 The MOC feasibility study (1996: 8) states that Qingdao also has established such an oil spill contingency plan.
This does not seem to be correct.
93 “Special forces should tackle oil spills”, China Daily, 23 October 1998.
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The marine pollution problems outlined above were the reason why the Ministry of
Communications (MOC) proposed what was to become China’s Agenda 21 Project 6-8,
“Prevention and Control of Marine Oil Spills”. The Priority Programme for China’s Agenda 21
(PPCA21 1994) states that Project 6-8 is based on programme area 12E of China’s Agenda 21,
“Sustainable Development of Transportation and Communication”.
According to PPCA21 1994, the objective of the project is “to introduce technologies and
facilities for establishing an emergency demonstration centre in the port of Qingdao, Shandong
province, to recover small scale spills and control larger spills”. This roughly corresponds to
the definition of expected effects, one of two elements of effectiveness, the criterion for
successful implementation status. Although this was not stated explicitly in the project
description, another objective was that the project should be a pilot project, and that it therefore
should serve as a model for similar projects in other coastal areas in China.94
The other aspect according to which implementation effectiveness will be examined below is
the planned outputs of the project – or the activities to be conducted in order to achieve the
stated project objectives. The objectives of Project 6-8 were to be reached through:
· establishing an emergency management administration in the port of Qingdao;
· establishing an information system for oil spill emergency management;
· introducing and adopting spill prevention and management technology; and
· building capacity for prevention and control of oil spills.
The project was to be conducted by MOC, the port of Qingdao and relevant research and
design agencies.95 The estimated budget was 10 million USD, of which Chinese inputs were
supposed to be 7 million USD. The remaining 3 million USD was expected to be external
grants (1 million USD), mostly for capacity building, and soft loans (2 million USD), for
introduction of technology, facilities and equipment.
The Bohai Sea – along which the project area is situated – is rich in fishery resources, as it is
situated in the north temperate zone. Spawning farms for fish, shrimps and crabs are found in
large numbers in the area. Oil spill accidents affect the production of salines, which not only
are vital ingredients in the diet of the local population, but also an essential raw material for
industry and scientific work. When oil spills occur, the desalination of water stops, affecting
industry’s water intakes. Oil spills damage the esthetical environment along the shoreline, and
                                                
94 All documents from the project negotiations refer to the project as a pilot, or “model”, project. Another reliable
indicator that this was indeed an objective on the part of the implementing agency and the end user was that the
final end user, Yantai Maritime Safety Superintendent Bureau, had established a separate “Office for the Model
Project of Oil Spill Prevention from Ships”, and this affiliation was specified on the cards of relevant YMSSB
employees.
95 In the first stage of the process, before the project was included in CA21, Department of Science and
Technology in MOC was in charge. Then the Department of Planning took over (interview G13).
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curb several types of tourism along the shoreline and on nearby islands (swimming, diving,
rowing and fishing).
Four seas border China’s Eastern coastline, namely the South China Sea, the East China Sea,
the Yellow Sea, and the Bohai Sea (see Figure 5.1 below). The Bohai Sea is 77,000 km2, has
an average depth of 18 meters, and links up with the Yellow Sea through the Bohai Straits,
only 57 nautical miles wide. Liaoning, Hebei and Shandong provinces and Tianjin
municipality – all relatively well-developed in Chinese terms – encircle it. The Bohai Sea is
one out of two priority areas for development of oil resources in China, and the only one
offshore. It is the main oil-producing region in the country.
Figure 5.1 Project area in perspective
Source: Lu (1990)
On the surface, it seems that, contrary to what is the case in many other areas of international
environmental politics, North-South environmental technology co-operation projects under the
A21 framework should have every chance to create win-win situations. Countries in the North,
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in this case Norway, need markets for their growing environmental technology industry, while
countries in the South, such as China, seek funding and increased capacity to implement
environmental technology projects.
Indeed, both the Chinese and the Norwegians seemingly had a strong interest in implementing
the project. The implementing agency on the Chinese side, MOC, forwarded the project idea
itself. The MOC was eager to implement the project in order to come to grips with steadily
worsening problems related to oil spillage from ships. Other possible motivations were perhaps
the revenue and prestige related to internationally funded technology co-operation projects, and
because the pilot project could very well open for more (foreign) funds to similar projects in
the future.96
There was also considerable interest for the project in Norway. The Norwegian Strategic Plan
for Asia (Asiaplanen, 1994, see Knudsen 1995) singled out environmental technology as one of
six priority areas in co-operation with the growth economies of East and Southeast Asia in the
period 1994-99. A sector plan for the export of environmental technology to China was made.
In the period 31 October-5 November 1994, a major Norwegian initiative was made to get a
foothold in China’s environmental technology sector. The initiative involved the participation
of many Norwegian companies on a large environmental technology exhibition, and a number
of high-level meetings (Weisz 1994). However, most importantly, the Norwegian Trade
Council in collaboration with the Norwegian embassy in Beijing and the Administrative Centre
for China’s Agenda 21 (ACCA21) held a Sino-Norwegian Conference on Environmental
Technology. The conference focused especially on the projects under China’s Agenda 21. It
concluded by proposing 4 project areas for further Sino-Norwegian co-operation,
corresponding with project proposals in PPCA21 1994: water treatment (6-2B), storage of low
radioactive nuclear waste (6-7), crisis management (8-8A/B), in addition to the project on oil
spill contingency (6-8). According to Lunde et al. (1995: 63), the projects had a potential total
export value of around 50 million USD at the time.
Following the first CA21 international donor roundtable conference in 1994, it was decided
that Norway was well positioned to assist China in implementing Project 6-8. Six or seven
countries had shown interest for the project, and signed letters of intention. 97 One of the main
reasons why the Norwegians were preferred was that Norwegian consulting firms and
companies seemed able to provide both the necessary equipment to prevent and control oil
spills, and the knowledge and organisational framework needed to make proper use of the
equipment.98
                                                
96 See also interview G12.
97 Interview G13.
98 Ibid.
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The Norwegian government as well as the business community saw Project 6-8 as a possible
exhibition window to a potentially enormous market for oil spill contingency technology in
China. The Norwegian state-owned oil company Statoil was about to become operator for the
Lufeng 22-1 oil field in the South China Sea at the time, and it would therefore be politically
very favourable if Norwegians were involved in a project for prevention and control of oil
spills in China.99
Kværner Water Systems, and later Frank Mohn Flatøy, has headed a Norwegian consortium
negotiating on the central and local specification of the project with the local end user and the
central institutional partner, MOC.100,101 Preliminary meetings between the Norwegians and
ACCA21 were held in November 1994. A site visit to the port of Qingdao was included. In
February 1995, a workshop was held in Beijing, hosted by ACCA21 and MOC. Then, the
Norwegian participants were informed that the project site was changed from Qingdao to the
city of Yantai, also in Shandong Province, and that the new end user would be Yantai Maritime
Safety Superintendent Bureau (YMSSB).
After the Yantai project had been presented to the international community, and preparatory
talks had been started with the Norwegian project group, it turned out that the project had not
been properly approved by MOC’s own Planning Department. The project was therefore
delayed by 7 to 10 months.102 In August 1995, the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-
operation (NORAD) approved an application from the Norwegian project group for funding to
a prefeasibility study. Based on the Norwegian draft project proposal (NOSCA 1995) and
Chinese project documents, a feasibility study was conducted by MOC (1996). The study was
presented to the Norwegians 15-20 April 1996 in Beijing, followed by a trip to the project site
in Yantai. The feasibility study was approved by MOC in August 1996. Then a joint project
proposal was sent to the State Planning Commission for approval, which was given in
September 1996. The project was thereafter put on MOFTEC’s list of projects awaiting final
financial approval (MOFTEC did not include the project on this list at first, because they
claimed MOC’s feasibility study was too poor, but did so later). Key persons on the Chinese
side were invited to Norway. After the Norwegian bilateral aid authorities had stated their
interest in providing grants for capacity-building and mixed credits for the purchase of
equipment, MOFTEC asked the Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC) to examine the
repayment capability of the implementing agencies.
                                                
99 Interview G3.
100 Det norske Veritas, UNITOR, PETCON and SINTEF have also been actively representing the Norwegian Oil
Spill Control Association (NOSCA) in this project at different stages. NOSCA, founded in 1993, is a non-
profit co-operative consisting of Norwegian pollution control authorities, business and R&D (research and
development) organisations with the aim of joining forces to develop equipment and contingency planning for
oil spill prevention and recovery and export these products worldwide.
101 Frank Mohn Flatøy has implemented a project similar to the Yantai project, in co-operation with Shanghai
authorities.
102 Interview G10.
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In January 1997, the Norwegian project group met MOC and MOFTEC in Beijing to discuss a
possible financial model for the project. At this time, prestige had run into the Yantai project
for the Norwegian Government. Norwegian companies and institutions had been involved in
four other CA21 projects as well. However, by the time the Sino-Norwegian negotiations on
the Yantai project started, it was clear that these projects would either not be implemented or
be implemented without Norwegian involvement, wasting both the time and resources of the
institutions involved and Norwegian taxpayers’ money invested in preparing the projects.
Norwegian authorities, all the way from the “street-level” bureaucrat to the top leadership,
went out of their way to get the Yantai project going. Even the Norwegian Prime Minister
herself, Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundtland – also the chairperson of the Brundtland Commission
whose work the Rio Summit and thus A21 is based on – engaged herself in order to get the
project on track. According to one interviewee, she had made the Norwegian position – and
frustration – crystal clear for SSTC Chairman Song Jian when he visited Norway in late
1996.103
On the basis of the results from the meeting sin January 1997, NORAD agreed to postpone the
project by one year, but made it clear that if no solution had been found within this time frame,
the project would be terminated. MOC had stated that it wanted to guarantee for the project,
but this was not acceptable for the EIBC.104 It asserted that a government organisation like
MOC could not guarantee for a loan, as it could very well change or be abolished. This had to
do with the Guarantee Law, introduced in 1995. Another important reason, however, was the
fact that MOC had major troubles repaying debt at that time (accumulated because of
unfortunate dispositions on other international projects).
It is somewhat unclear how the process to obtain funding on the Chinese side progressed after
this point. What we do know is that MOC hoped to obtain 4 million USD through the 9th Five-
Year Plan for the project, and that this obviously did not work out as planned – at least not in
first instance (see below).105 Indeed, according to the summary from a meeting between
NOSCA representatives and MOFTEC’s Foreign Financing Administration in Beijing in
January 1997, “[w]hat is the big problem now is that Bank of China does not know who is the
actual borrower – MOC in Beijing or Yantai Maritime Safety Superintenden[t Bureau]”
(Sørbye 1997b).106 One interviewee also highlights the (potential) role of the Shandong
                                                
103 Interview G3.
104 Most of the information in this paragraph is from interview G10, but most of its contents have been confirmed
by interviews G2, G3, G12, and G13.
105 According to Høst (1994, my translation), “MOC has confirmed that they have allocated 4 million USD to the
project. They also said that the project must be integrated in the 9th Five-Year Plan. The interpretation of this
must be that the project now is included in MOC’s budgets, but whether it actually gets money depends on the
next Five-Year Plan (…) MOC’s said they must send their input to the 9th Five-Year Plan in March 1995”.
106 The translation is mine. The quote also underlines the confusion as regards funding in another manner; it is
referred to “the Bank of China”, while most sources confirm that the Export-Import Bank of China was
conducting the examination of the implementing agencies’ repayment capabilities.
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provincial government as well as Yantai municipal authorities – especially in providing the
required financial guarantees.107
Neither MOC nor Yantai Maritime Safety Superintendent Bureau – or the Shandong provincial
government for that sake – managed to come up with a funding solution satisfying EIBC.
Another aspect of the discussions was the relationship between equipment and other elements
in the technology co-operation package. NORAD offered a combined package of capacity
building and equipment; however, the Chinese were not interested.108
Consequently, neither NORAD nor MOFTEC would approve the project. According to internal
NORAD documents, MOFTEC suggested that the project be cancelled.109 Therefore, 26
February 1998, the Sino-Norwegian co-operation was officially ended. Later that year, the
Chinese government decided to finance the project from its own funds, without foreign loans.
In August 1998, the hardware elements of the project were put out for international bidding on
purely commercial terms. Norwegian companies took part, but lost out to British competitors.
In mid-1999, five years after the Sino-Norwegian negotiations started, the Yantai project was
still not finished. It was to be completed in late 2000.
As should be obvious from the expected effects and planned outputs specified above, the
judgement of the implementation effectiveness of the Yantai project wholly depends on how
one defines technology. If technology were defined only as hardware, some of the conclusions
below would not be valid. Part of the objective of the Yantai project was to introduce the
technologies needed in order for the oil spill contingency demonstration centre to become
operative. As the outputs planned in order to reach this objective included transfer of skills,
knowledge and organisational elements as well as equipment, it is reasonable to use the broad
definition of technology provided in Ch. 1 as a starting point and examine to what extent these
strategies actually have been implemented.110
Even though this study was ended in mid-1999, before the project was completed, some
relatively unambiguous tendencies could be found. First, the hardware parts of the project
largely seemed to be on the way towards completion. A site visit confirmed that the
demonstration centre specified in the project description was more than halfway built.
                                                
107 Interview BI4, as well as personal communication 15 February 2001 with the interviewee.
108 For more details, see Ch. 8.2.2 .
109 This is confirmed by internal reports from NORAD (1998) and the Norwegian Embassy in China (1998), and,
indirectly, by interviewee G10 from MOFTEC.
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Secondly, the project might succeed – at least partly so – in its long-term development
objective of solving specific problems in the site area as well as being a model for other ports
as to how to handle oil spills. The Yantai project may thus lay the foundation for establishing
an overall oil spill emergency response system in China’s northern sea area (MOC 1996: 9-10,
13). MOC interviewees indicated that the project would be followed up by similar projects, as
did Yantai Maritime Safety Superintendent Bureau (YMSSB).111
The implementing agencies emphasise that the Yantai project was to be a pilot project.112
However, this is not clearly specified in the project description. Nevertheless, MOC
interviewees argued that because of experience obtained from the implementation of the Yantai
project among other things, MOC has seen the necessity of a national plan for oil spill
prevention and control, and is currently developing it. 113 Projects resembling the one in Yantai
are planned for the East and South China Sea, and YMSSB is supposed to communicate its
practical experiences to representatives from these areas.114 Leaders and other representatives
from these two areas have already been invited to Yantai for preparatory meetings, and they
will be invited to the review of the project when it is finalised.
Considering the central government’s financial situation, the fact that MOC granted around 50
million renmimbi (RMB) for the Yantai project signalled strong commitment. However,
according to YMSSB representatives, it seems unlikely that more investment from the Chinese
government is forthcoming, as many other coastal areas do neither have equipment nor
management systems for oil spill contingencies.115 This suggests that the completion of an
emergency response system in Yantai depends on foreign investment.
A less positive aspect of project implementation so far is that the Chinese implementing
agency, MOC, to an increasing extent has focused on technology as hardware at the cost of
capacity building.116 There have been no indications that the Sino-foreign R&D co-operation
                                                                                                                                                         
110 Admittedly, the project description in the 1994 Priority Programme for CA21 focused more on technology in
the form of monitoring, identification, warning and recovery equipment than management and training aspects.
However, it is stated that “there remains a wide gap between China’s capabilities and international (…)
personnel training”, the need for “extensive maintenance” of oil spill management technologies is
acknowledged, and a capacity building and training program formed one out of four components of the project.
Among the mentioned benefits of the project, it was mentioned that China would “develop emergency
response management capabilities”.
111 Interview G12 and G13.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Interview G13.
116 It should be noted that only the Norwegian interviewees emphasise this tendency. However, as almost all
interviewees involved in the project on the Norwegian side emphasised this point, it is deemed trustworthy.
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signalled in PPCA21 1994 has been implemented.117 Therefore, Chinese industry, research and
design institutes probably have not have obtained sufficient competence so far to implement
follow-up projects without foreign assistance, even though considerable competence has been
gained through the Yantai project. This is at least true for the prevention and control of large-
scale oil spillage at sea. However, representatives of YMSSB have claimed that an
organisational framework for oil spill contingencies is in place.118 They distinguish between
five units responsible for protection of marine areas, as evident in the Law on Protection of the
Marine Environment: the local environmental protection bureau, the local Maritime Safety
Administration, the local Oceanic Bureau, the local fishery authorities, and the Navy.
According to the interviewees, relevant personnel in these units have received training.
The Norwegian interviewees did not believe that the Chinese have actually managed to
establish a proper oil spill emergency system, including both planning and organisation. 119 The
Norwegian project group (as well as NORAD) considered not only the hardware, but also skills
and organisational-institutional elements (capacity-building) to be essential parts of project
implementation. According to their experience, trying to implement oil spill prevention and
control projects without considering this aspect would not yield success (NOSCA 1997, see
also Ch. 8.2.2).120 The objective of the Norwegian research group was to develop Chinese
competence, knowledge and capability to handle oil spills (NOSCA 1997: 2). The strategy for
accomplishing this was to educate and train operative and scientific personnel; pursue scientific
co-operation; conduct mutual R&D projects; and to develop contingency systems, contingency
organisation, and technology. The Chinese counterparts have not to the same extent seen the
need for such efforts. They have believed the concessionary aid is for equipment, and not for
paying more consultants. They have also argued that Norway should not have any trouble
funding the project, as the Norwegians had already earmarked money for this purpose.
The project focus has been changed substantially, from a comprehensive co-operation project
consisting of knowledge, organisation and equipment (or, in short: technology co-operation)
towards transfer of equipment only. As expressed by one Norwegian interviewee: “We offered
a total system for oil spill contingency planning, however, the Chinese (…) did not understand
the value of getting a total system. They really needed contingency planning, but only wanted
to buy technology (…) The end user wants to show off the technology, not necessarily use it.
                                                
117 The extent of Sino-foreign R&D co-operation envisaged in the project description in PPCA21 1994 is
somewhat unclear. While numerous research tasks are specified (e.g. assessing the impact of oil spills on
coastal and marine ecology, and “develop[ing] rapid and high precision spill identification technology”), very
little funding is put aside for such activities in the project budget. However, the different drafts of the project
proposal (see e.g. NOSCA 1995, 1997) were developed partly by Norwegian consultants and partly by these
consultants in co-operation with the Chinese, and the final version was approved by MOC. This underlines the
conclusion that R&D and not only equipment should be regarded as one of the planned outputs of the project.
118 However, whether this is correct is questionable (see Section 6.1 for more details).
119 It is obviously hard to judge the correctness of either the Chinese or the Norwegian claims, as the only real test
for an oil spill emergency response system is an oil spill emergency happening near Yantai, after the
completion of the project.
120 Interview PNB1 and PNB8.
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The technology is a status symbol, and a means to enhance power and prestige, more than a
tool.”121
A second point where the actual implementation status of the Yantai project differs from the
objectives stated in the project description in PPCA21 1994 is its geographic focus. From
being a project directed towards potential oil spill contingencies in the harbour of Qingdao, it
became a project focusing more on oil spillage prevention and control at sea, outside Yantai. In
the words of a YMSSB interviewee: “In Qingdao, the port was chosen as setting for the
project. At the workshop in Qingdao, changing the focus of the project towards Beihai Sea was
suggested.”
MOC and YMSSB interviewees gave several reasons for this change of project site. First,
similar projects as the one suggested in Qingdao were already implemented in six other
Chinese ports. Second, while private actors would be able to finance clean-up of port areas like
Qingdao, such financing would be more difficult to obtain for projects focusing on oil spills at
sea. As CA21 is a common undertaking, it was argued, one should concentrate on common
property resources, one of them being the oceans. Third, given that the focus should be on oil
spills at sea, Yantai is ideally situated for the project (according to MOC), as it is located at the
mouth of Bohai bay (see Figure 5.1 above). It is situated next to Tianjin and Qinhuangdao
harbours in the west, opposite to Dalian harbour in the north, bordering on Qingdao harbour in
the south, and facing the Korean peninsula and Japan across the Yellow Sea. Fourth, a rescuing
and dragging bureau under the MOC is already located in Yantai. Only three such bureaux
exist in China – the other two are in Shanghai (east) and Guangzhou (south).122 Fifth, two-
thirds of the Chengshantou, Changshan and Laotieshan waterways are under direct control of
Yantai Maritime Safety Superintendent Bureau (YMSSB), the specified end user of the project.
Due to a combination of heavy traffic (220000 ships have been estimated by MOC to pass
through the Chengshantou waterway this year), frequent fog, strong currents and the second
strongest winds in China, the Chengshantou, Changshan and Laotieshan waterways and nearby
waters have experienced many spill accidents. Between 1984 and 1996, 15 major oil spill
accidents occurred in this area (NOSCA 1997: 13-14).
The change of geographical focus for the project was closely linked to a change of
technological focus – from oil spill technology adapted to oil spill prevention and control in
ports to technology to prevent and control such spills at sea. As Norwegian equipment for oil
spill management and control is adapted to the harsh conditions of the North Sea, the
equipment offered by the Norwegians is generally more robust than their competitors’, and
therefore better suited for conditions like those in Yantai. The downside, of course, is that this
also makes such equipment more expensive. This suggests that the technology offered by the
                                                
121 Interview PNBI8.
122 Interview G12.
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Norwegian vendors (and, obviously, their efforts to sell this technology) was another reason for
the change of geographical as well as technological focus (see below).
However, while a number of Chinese interviewees downplayed this, there were probably two
other reasons for the relocation of the project as well, which had less to do with geographical
and technological aspects. The first was that Qingdao did not have a clear idea as to how to
implement the project and where to get funding.123 The second was that Yantai Maritime
Safety Superintendent Bureau (YMSSB) lobbied to take over the project (see Section 6.2 for
more details).
The last point where the actual implementation status of the project deviated substantially from
the intended development of the project in terms of implementation effectiveness was the fact
that the Sino-Norwegian co-operation was ended, and equipment bought from a British
supplier instead. This may or may not have resulted in the Chinese buying lower quality
equipment. However, far more important than the changed nationality of the equipment
supplier is the fact that this marked the end of a Sino-Norwegian co-operation that could
potentially have been long-term, focusing on all aspects of technology, and therefore beneficial
for both parties in the technology co-operation.
An example: Part of the suggested Sino-Norwegian technology co-operation was the transfer of
skimmers from a Norwegian vendor. According to Norwegian sources, these are larger than
skimmers offered by other countries’ vendors, and made of stronger materials. Therefore, they
are more suitable for oil spill prevention and control at sea, which turned out to become the
focus of the project.124 However, the Norwegian vendor’s skimmers cost 600,000 USD each,
which is about double the price of many competitors’ skimmers. As long as this was a
development aid project involving concessionary financing, this posed no problem. However,
when the project was put out for bidding after the Sino-Norwegian co-operation had ended, the
customer chose to buy a simpler skimmer from a UK company for about 200,000 USD. The
reason was that the project budget for such expenses was only 1,5 million USD. In other
words: because the Sino-Norwegian co-operation failed, and Norwegian concessionary
financing failed to appear, the Chinese ended up with a product that was less suitable for the
conditions in Yantai, and the Norwegians ended up without having sold any equipment
whatsoever.125 The Norwegians were most likely more disappointed with this development
than the Chinese. The reason is that the Chinese end user probably regarded the Norwegians as
just one in a number of potential equipment suppliers, while the Norwegians regarded the
Yantai project as a very important window towards a potentially very large Chinese market.
                                                
123 Interview PNBI1 and G10.
124 Interview B13.
125 Ibid. It should be noted, however, that one interviewee (PNBI6) questioned whether skimmers adapted to
heavy seas were actually necessary at the project site.
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While not directly relevant according to the definition of implementation effectiveness, another
aspect of the project negotiations should be mentioned. In the description of Project 6-8 in
PPCA21 1994, the portion of the funding coming from Chinese sources was stipulated to be 60
per cent, in line with the general policy of CA21. However, in the project negotiations, the
Chinese have tried to include a larger portion of foreign funding compared to the Chinese
contribution. For example, the distribution of funding suggested at a meeting between NOSCA
representatives and MOC in Beijing in January 1997 was that the Chinese should contribute 3
million USD, while the Norwegian authorities would contribute 4,5 million USD (3 million in
mixed credits, the rest as a grant) (Sørbye 1997a). This is very different from the budget
included in the project description of Project 6-8 in the 1994 Priority Programme; here, the
Chinese contribution is set at 7 million USD and the foreign contribution at 3 million
dollars.126
5.3 Summary and conclusion
Project 6-8 bears some promise in terms of learning effects for similar projects in other
geographical areas. The demonstration centre facilities were not too far from being ready in
mid-1999, in line with the project objectives. The project’s geographical and technological
focus of the project has been changed, but this seems to have contributed to making the project
more relevant for the end user as well as more suited to the equipment offered by the
Norwegian suppliers, and thus could be considered an improvement rather than a deviation
from original goals. Far more problematic, however, is the fact that knowledge, skills and
organisational elements of technology co-operation have been given too little attention by the
Chinese end user. This is problematic, because it may result in poor capacity on the part of the
involved organisations to implement similar projects in the future, and because the lack of
focus on such aspects of technology makes it rather unlikely that the centre will perform its
intended functions in an emergency situation.
                                                
126 The reason that total sums differ is that it was agreed to reduce the total size of the project somewhat without
changing its focus.
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“The 21st century faces three major problems: a
rapidly increasing population, a shortage of
resources and a deteriorating environment, and
[we] should look to the sea for solutions.”
Song Jian, former head of SSTC, now vice-
chairman of the National Committee of the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Confe-
rence, and president of the Chinese Academy of
Engineering
127
6 Empirical mapping of independent variables: Three
organisational framework conditions
This chapter provides an empirical overview of the independent variables that in the analytical
framework were suggested to influence the implementation status of the Yantai project. The
documentation follows the chronology of the analytical framework, starting with horizontal
fragmentation, followed by vertical fragmentation and relative organisational strength,
respectively.
The general argument in the analytical framework was that organisational framework
conditions influence the implementation of environmental technology projects. This being the
starting point, this empirical documentation cannot possibly focus only at the Yantai project as
such. In order to appreciate the dynamics of the implementation process of the Yantai project,
it is necessary to understand the role of the CA21 administration on a central level, as part of
its mandate has been to “participate in the formulation and implementation of China’s Agenda
21 (…) [and to] assist in the co-ordination of international participation [in CA21 projects]”.128
Another weighty reason for choosing such a scope is that the actors on programme and project
level overlap to a considerable extent.
For all three variables, matters related to the CA21 administration and the issue area are
structured separately, but within the same section. Due to the nature of the variables in
question, the main focus in the empirical documentation of horizontal fragmentation and
relative organisational strength will be on central-level actors, and these actors will be
presented as rather unitary. However, these actors may also be regarded as agglomerations of
numerous provincial and local-level actors. The empirical documentation of vertical
fragmentation will naturally focus more on provincial and local-level actors.
                                                
127 Cited in Ministry of Land and Resources (2000a), “China to exploit its marine resources”, URL:
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/english/China%20to%20exploit%20its%20marine%20resources.html (20 January
2001).
128 For more details on the responsibilities of the Administrative Centre for China’s Agenda 21, see Section 6.3.
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6.1 Horizontal fragmentation
The question this section is to answer is whether the implementation process of the Yantai
project can be characterised as horizontally fragmented or horizontally integrated. The
following indicators for extent of horizontal fragmentation were specified in Section 2.2.1:
· The number of actors involved in decisions related to the implementation of the Yantai
project.
· The extent – if any at all – of competing and/or overlapping jurisdictions of the
organisations involved in the implementation of the Yantai project.
· The extent – if any at all – of cross-sectoral co-ordination of initiatives between the
governmental actors involved in the Yantai project, e.g. through meetings and
information-sharing.
According to ACCA21 (1995a), “China’s Agenda 21 (…) took into account the interests and
plans of appropriate ministries, so as to make China’s Agenda 21 comprehensive, workable
and more authoritative”. However, in reality, the authority structures related to the central
administration of China’s Agenda 21 (CA21) have been – and are – horizontally fragmented.
This fragmentation has manifested itself in the following ways:
· The central planning bureaucracies have not been sufficiently involved in the co-
ordination of CA21.
· The environmental bureaucracy has been more or less left out of the CA21 process, and
has implemented parallel – and, to some extent, competing – programmes.
· The division of responsibilities has been unclear between the administrative centre for
the CA21 and its priority projects on the one hand and the bureaucracies administering
foreign financing of these projects on the other.
· Local Agenda 21 initiatives and CA21 priority project implementation have not been
sufficiently co-ordinated on the central level.
· The agencies implementing CA21 priority projects have not to a sufficient extent co-
ordinated the implementation of these projects with the CA21 administration.
· The division of responsibilities is unclear between implementing agencies and other
organisations involved in marine oil pollution policy.
Beyond nuts and bolts 77
The figure below shows the most important actors involved in CA21 administration and the
area of marine oil pollution (cf. the case project), respectively.129 The closer a bureaucracy is
placed to the middle of one of the two circles, the more influential it is in policy formulation
and implementation within this field. However, the figure does not tell whether this area is to
close to or far from the “core” of an organisation’s official jurisdiction, or to what extent the
organisation itself claims “ownership” to the issue.
Figure 6.1 Main bureaucratic actors involved in Yantai project implementation
The process of drafting the CA21 White Paper bore every sign of horizontal fragmentation.
The CA21 formulation process developed too quickly, according to many central observers
(Pasztor 1993, Finamore and Holcombe 1994, Huang 1998). They claim this was a major cause
of the insufficient consensus building and integration between key actors in the implementation
of CA21.
In the first draft of the CA21 White Paper, linkages between sectors, sources and impacts were
largely ignored.130 Each chapter was prepared by the line ministry responsible for the relevant
issue. Consequently, in the chapters prepared by the economic and industrial ministries, only a
                                                
129 This overview is not complete. A number of more peripheral actors that have been involved in the project have
been left out, as including them would unduly complicate both the textual and graphic overview. Most actors
have also been involved in the project at the local level, either directly or through their satellites at lower
administrative levels. Among the main local bureaucratic actors involved in the project that are not on the
figure, are the Yantai local government (including Mayor’s Office, Planning Committee, Economic
Committee, Foreign Trade Committee and Environmental Protection Bureau one rank lower than the others);
and Shandong Provincial government.
130 This paragraph is building on Pasztor (1993), Finamore and Holcombe (1994), as well as Huang (1998: 18-19).
Pasztor was the Chief Technical Advisor for UNDP’s CA21 Project; Holcombe was the UNDP Chief
representative in China at that time; Finamore was one of the UNDP consultants reviewing the drafts; and
Huang was a key person in ACCA21’s efforts to co-ordinate the drafting work.
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small section on the environment was added, while the opposite was the case in the chapters
drafted by environmental bureaucracies. The first draft was 2000 (!) pages, and contained a
massive amount of historic facts instead of sustainable development strategies. The second
draft was half the size of the first, and the participants had obtained a closer understanding of
the relationship between sectors, sources and impacts. However, the industrial line ministries’
response to the call for cross-sectoral integration was limited to merging their own chapters
into one chapter, containing separate summaries of each ministry’s former chapter. The third
and final version was not perfect either, but contains many serious attempts at regarding issues
in an integrated manner, which is an achievement in itself, considering the initial point of
departure.
Lack of involvement of planning bureaucracies in CA21 co-ordination: According to Lunde et
al. (1995: 58), the extent to which the CA21 priority projects were integrated in the 9th Five-
Year Plan (1996-2000) would decide the success of CA21. However, in the opinion of one of
the international consultants assisting China in the implementation of CA21 on behalf of
UNDP, “[t]he [1994] Priority Programme was a real disappointment. The process of selecting
priority projects did not seem to have any relation whatsoever to China’s Agenda 21. They
were not even pretending that the projects were related to CA21, although it was fresh in
everybody’s mind at the time. It was a real political process (…) the 62 priority projects were
chosen on the grounds of distribution of benefits. In this process, SPC was only mentioned as
lip service.”131
At the outset, the responsibility for the overall implementation of CA21 was to be shared
between the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC, now the Ministry of Science
and Technology (MOST)), the State Planning Commission (SPC, now the State Development
Planning Commission (SDPC)), and the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA,
now the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA)). However, even though
SDPC in theory has shared the leadership of China’s Agenda 21 with MOST, SDPC in practice
has regarded the Administrative Centre for China’s Agenda 21 (ACCA21) as MOST’s centre.
For example, at a conference in 1999 on planning for the 21st century, hosted by SDPC,
China’s Agenda 21 was not mentioned with a word, until UNDP’s residential representative in
China, Ms. Kerstin Leitner, complained.132 This would never have happened if the conference
were hosted by MOST.
After the restructuring in 1998, the Director General of ACCA21 is directly appointed by
MOST, which in practice has implied that the director of MOST’s Department of Social
Development is also the director of ACCA21. Most ACCA21 employees are recruited from
                                                
131 Interview N7. Finamore and Holcombe (1994) also state that a general lack of co-ordination between the
Priority Programme and the White Paper is a serious flaw in China’s national follow-up of Agenda 21.
132 Interview G4.
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MOST. The ACCA21 premises have been acquired from MOST’s Beijing subsidiary.133 The
centre would also have had a hard time if MOST had not provided it with government-funded
projects. “The source of the money defines power”, as an ACCA21 source formulates it,
referring to MOST.134 The State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) and SEPA only
to a very limited extent have provided ACCA21 with projects. This means that MOST has
increased its control of ACCA21, at the cost of ACCA21’s intended role as an
interdepartmental centre.
Environmental bureaucracy ostracised from CA21 formulation and implementation process
and CA21 administration: In Figure 6.1 above, SEPA was positioned as having organisational
interests in both CA21 and the issue area of marine oil pollution. In fact, SEPA would probably
regard both to be close to its “core business” – but are marginalised in both areas (for more
details on the issue area, see below). Despite intense UNDP argumentation to the contrary,
NEPA was largely kept out of the China’s Agenda 21 process.135 China’s agency for the
environment was thus more or less left out of a process meant to strengthen the country’s focus
on environment and development issues.136
NEPA’s counterstrategy was to disengage from the CA21 discussion and instead concentrate
on legislation and bilateral treaties providing funding for its own projects. These projects were
to some extent overlapping with CA21. Lunde et al. (1995: 58) note that “[i]nterdepartmental
struggle” has been taking place in the formulation phase, and that “key institutions like NEPA
(…) [were] deliberately sidelined in the CA21 process”. In the words of a SEPA interviewee,
“NEPA thought that it should co-ordinate the whole [China’s] Agenda 21, but SSTC thought
they should be involved, as they were involved in environment and development”.137 Another
said, “[i]n the public, and as an organisation, SEPA supports CA21. But CA21 is under SDPC
and MOST, so many officials within SEPA do not like that.”138 Furthermore, at about the same
time as CA21 was launched, NEPA initiated its own large-scale environmental project plan,
called “China’s Trans-Century Green Plan”.139 The CA21 project portfolio is much broader
than that of the Green Plan, and the Green Plan has a different focus.
                                                
133 Interview PNG4 and G4.
134 Interview G2.
135 For example, in UNDP’s “Report on the Progress of the Project ‘Formulating and Implementing China’s
Agenda 21’”, attached to the first announcement of the First High-Level Roundtable for Agenda 21 in 1994
(SPC/SSTC/UNDP 1993: 2), it is stated that “[t]he State Planning Commission (SPC), the State Science and
Technology Commission (SSTC) and the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) will work
together in the planning of fund mobilisation, scientific research and legislation concerning the implementation
of the National Agenda 21”.
136 Interview N7, PGA4 and PGA5.
137 Interview G5.
138 Interview B16.
139 See executive summary in NEPA (1997).
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However, its name (“Trans-Century…”) suggested NEPA wanted to show both its bureaucratic
competitors and international donors that it was able to formulate and implement projects
focusing on China’s challenges in the 21st century.140 Furthermore, SEPA competes with CA21
for foreign funding, and there are obvious overlaps between the two project lists in the fields of
solid waste, air pollution and water.141 Finamore (1998: 4) regards SEPA’s Green Plan as an
example that “[c]apture by one national organisation [MOST/ACCA21] leads to sabotage and
parallel efforts by others”.142
Admittedly, assigning SSTC and SPC with the task of leading CA21 signalled to the
international community that China’s top leadership took sustainable development seriously,
and sustainable development initiatives need a broader institutional approach than that of an
environmental agency. However, these arguments lose much of their idealistic flavour when
power-political motives are taken into account.
“Who has the responsibility? In China, all ministries, departments, agencies
and businesses say that they are the right ones to do exactly the job you want
done. However, the fragmented institutional system, and the infighting
between these actors, influences China’s ability to utilise new environmental
technology in a negative way.”
Gunnar Mathisen, former Environmental Councillor, Norwegian Embassy in
China
Division of responsibilities ACCA21 vs. MOFTEC unclear: In Figure 6.1 above, MOFTEC was
the only organisation being placed outside both the circle illustrating the CA21 administration
and the circle  showing the issue area directly related to the project. While it is obvious that
marine oil pollution is not MOFTEC’s “core business”, the fact that it has been almost
completely left out of the administration of a large programme involving considerable amounts
of foreign financing (CA21), to the benefit of an organisation set up only for this purpose
(ACCA21), is extraordinary. According to Lunde et al. (1995: 68), “priority projects (…) have
not been sufficiently anchored in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation
(MOFTEC). Agenda 21 clearly falls into the category of projects that MOFTEC has to handle
and approve.” The CA21 projects were assembled in the two Priority Programmes for CA21 in
order to make them more appealing to foreign government institutions and private investors.
However, the projects were not fully approved according to formal project procedures.
MOFTEC was enraged because they claimed ACCA21 had kept MOFTEC out of the CA21
process. According to a very experienced senior official in MOFTEC, “MOFTEC should get
                                                
140 Interview B15.
141 Interview G4.
142 The term “Green Plan” is used as an abbreviation for the “Trans-Century Green Plan”. The Green Plan has also
been translated as “The Trans-Century Engineering Green Project Plan” or “The Trans-Century Green Project
Plan”.
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funding to channel to ACCA21. If this funding goes directly to ACCA21, it means trouble (…)
official channels were neglected”.143
MOFTEC was very sceptical towards the Yantai project in particular - not only because the
financial aspects of the project were not clarified in advance but also because it was not
approved within the MOC system. MOFTEC sources said that “[w]e warned our Norwegian
counterparts about the problems, and told NORAD that this project would waste tax payers’
money, but they would not listen”.144 Nevertheless, MOFTEC sources claim that the treatment
of the Yantai project did not differ from any other project.
To the extent that MOFTEC has ever had a monopoly on the responsibility of listing projects
for Sino-foreign co-operation, this monopoly has de facto been broken down and its position is
contested. ACCA21 is not the only agency apart from MOFTEC approaching foreign investors
with a list of environmental projects they need funding for. A MOFTEC interviewee said
“[f]oreign companies and governmental institutions can approach MOFTEC directly. We have
a list of priority projects”.145 However, so do SEPA, the Ministry of Construction, MOST,
SETC, municipal governments, and environmental organisations, just to name a few actors.146
According to one interviewee, “ACCA21 was established out of a genuine wish to improve –
but has almost been counterproductive, at least in the case of Norway (…) The reason was the
organisational anchoring of the projects.”147 As these projects were not handled through
MOFTEC, it was harder to get hold of mixed credits, even though projects were good. Until
1998, MOFTEC controlled mixed credits projects. It was also involved in grant-financed
projects, but had tough rivals in SSTC and SPC.148 SDPC and MOST try to handle more and
more projects directly with their foreign counterparts. This strategy, while potentially in the
interest of both the foreign partner and the Chinese implementing agency, may very easily
backfire, as MOFTEC or MOF has the power to delay and even stop the projects.149
Another area of responsibility that has only partly been sorted out between MOFTEC and
ACCA21, is which agency that should be UNDP’s main counterpart in China. In 1993-94,
UNDP wanted to strengthen ACCA21 by diverting more projects and more funding to the
centre. This enraged China International Centre for Economic and Technical Exchange
(CICETE), set up specifically by MOFTEC as early as in 1985 to be UNDP’s counterpart in
China. According to a MOFTEC source, the minister of MOFTEC, Wu Yi, protested directly
                                                
143 Interview G10.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Interview B15.
147 Interview G3.
148 This is supported by Sørbye (1997c).
149 Interview G3.
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to Deng Nan, responsible for ACCA21 within MOST. Under UNDP’s new resident
representative, more projects have been diverted to CICETE again.150
Lack of co-ordination between Local Agenda 21 initiatives and CA21 priority project imple-
mentation: It is still not resolved which central-level bureaucracy should co-ordinate the Local
Agenda 21 centres, leading groups etc. being developed in China’s provinces, municipalities
and cities. According to a resolution from the State Council (China’s highest-ranking
bureaucratic organ), ACCA21 is supposed to co-ordinate the implementation of Local Agenda
21s in Chinese provinces, municipalities and cities (ACCA21 1995a). However, partly because
ACCA21 is not a separate government organisation, but attached to MOST, none of the LA21
centres seemingly report directly to ACCA21.151 Instead, the centres have been integrated in or
attached to different existing bureaucracies in different localities. Some LA21 offices are under
the auspices of SEPA because they are hosted by local or provincial EPBs. Others are under
the local science and technology commissions (e.g. under the Ministry of Science and
Technology (MOST)), and yet some are under the local Planning Commission (e.g. under the
State Development Planning Commission (SDPC)). For example, Benxi’s LA21 centre is
under the administration of the municipal EPB, and therefore is financed by the municipal
government. Wuhan’s LA21 centre is under the Municipal Planning Committee. In Shenyang,
the responsibility for the LA21 centre is located to the local EPB. LA21 centres administered
by local EPBs report to their local government, and – perhaps – to SEPA. The centre in Benxi
sometimes reports to MOST, and sometimes to SEPA. This does not exactly seem to facilitate
co-ordination.152 Furthermore, UNDP has given China International Centre for Economic and
Technical Exchange (CICETE, see above) the responsibility for the implementation of pilot
projects for development of Local Agenda 21s in Shenyang, Benxi, and Wuhan municipalities.
Despite of this, CICETE has very little – or no – direct contact with ACCA21.153
CA21 projects have been or are implemented by a large number of different actors. Some
projects were started long before Local Agenda 21 centres were established, and there seems to
be few or no links between the Local Agenda 21 centres and the projects that are currently
under implementation. As returned to below, this illustrates that priority projects are associated
with the implementing agency, not Agenda 21. The Local Agenda 21 centres are integrated in
different parts of the existing bureaucratic structure rather than the CA21 administration, and
therefore do not function as comprehensive and co-ordinating agencies for CA21 activities in a
given city or province.
                                                
150 Interview G4. See also the discussion below on lack of co-operation between CICETE and ACCA21 with
regard to Local Agenda 21 co-ordination.
151 Indeed, this is also an indication of vertical fragmentation, in the sense that ACCA21 only to a very limited
extent controls what could be regarded as its lower-level replicates. However, I have chosen to highlight the
horizontal fragmentation aspects here, as they are seemingly more dominant.
152 Interview G4.
153 This is confirmed by both ACCA21 and CICETE interviewees (interview G4 and G2, respectively).
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“During the Ninth Five-Year Plan period, more of the priority projects will be implemented in
existing and new national and provincial pilot zones for sustainable development”, ACCA21
(1995a) proclaimed in its report on the progress of CA21. Such co-ordination has unfortunately
not been the case in the Yantai project. The Mupin area, within the borders of Yantai city, is
one of the pilot zones for sustainable development. However, neither YMSSB nor MOC
interviewees knew of the project (ACCA21 did). However, a positive sign is that the Local
Agenda 21 initiatives now seem to be co-ordinated with the already established pilot zones for
sustainable development. These have their origins in the experiences of Comprehensive
Experimental Communities for Social Development, which were started as early as 1986 by
SSTC, SPC, the State Commission for Restructuring Economy, and 20 other ministries under
the State Council. In 1995, 18 national level and 40 provincial level pilot zones for integrated
sustainable development had been established (ACCA21 1995a).
Lack of co-ordination between CA21 administration and CA21 project implementing agencies:
Other ministries regard ACCA21 as belonging to the Ministry of Science and Technology
(MOST). As a result, according to one interviewee, they resist interference from ACCA21 in
the implementation of the CA21 projects they have been assigned responsibility for.154
ACCA21 interviewees have adapted to this view, although ACCA21’s mandate (as stated in
CA21 documents) is rather broad. Says one: “[i]f our help is not wanted, we will withdraw
from the project. We have too many other things to do, and after all it is their [the
implementing agencies’] and not our projects.”155
Another indicator of the lack of co-ordination between actors formulating the CA21 White
Paper and those carrying out the CA21 priority projects that were to embody the ideas of this
White Paper, is that the profile of the priority projects is not well co-ordinated with overall
CA21 objectives. The profile of the Yantai project seems to result from two characteristics of
horizontal fragmentation: lack of co-ordination, and consensus building. One possible reason
why MOC was awarded the responsibility for the project even though it was obviously not too
well prepared in advance (cf. the changing of project site and the problems involving financing,
see Ch. 5.2 above) could be that this was the only project in the 1994 Priority Programme that
MOC is responsible for.156 Thus, the fact that Project 6-8 was selected could be regarded as
part of a strategy to spread benefits from international co-financial and technological operation
on as many actors as possible to maintain consensus and good relations (cf. Economy 1994).
The accordance between the objectives of Project 6-8 and the objectives of CA21’s Ch. 12E –
to which the description of the Yantai project in the 1994 Priority Programme refers – is
unclear, at best. Oil spill prevention and control is never explicitly discussed in Ch. 12E. In Ch.
                                                
154 Interview G10.
155 Interview G2.
156 MOC proposed three projects – only 6-8 was chosen. The themes of the two other project proposals the
prevention of explosions when storing coal powder at sea, and the prevention of pollution when loading and
unloading coal, respectively (interview G12).
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14, on the other hand, especially section 14F on “Sustainable Development and Conservation
of Marine Resources” (CA21 1994: 158-164), marine oil pollution is more explicitly dealt
with, even though its focus is on the management and monitoring of fishery resources and
marine natural reserves. For example it suggests “[b]uilding facilities at harbour areas to collect
used oils (…) from ships” as one of three actions for protecting the marine environment (CA21
1994: 162, point 14.74). It is also stated that “China will continue to co-operatively study (…)
sea area pollution control and management technologies, and the models for the forecast of oil
spill drift movement” (CA21 1994: 164, point 14.77). While it has not been possible to
confirm, it could be speculated that Ch. 14 was drafted by SOA, with limited consultation with
other actors.
The introduction to the 1994 Priority Programme (PPCA21 1994: 1) ascertains that the basis
for its formulation is “[o]verall strategy, programme areas of China’s Agenda 21, and the
foundation laid down by the previous work”. However, it is quite illustrating that searches for
the terms “oil spillage” and “oil spill” in China’s Agenda 21 (a 250-page document) – on
which the PPCA21 1994 was supposed to be based – return no matches at all. The central topic
of Ch. 12 in CA21 is how to achieve industrial reform and launch initiatives for sustainable
development in industry, and secondly, to make the transportation and telecommunications
sectors in China more effective in order to contribute to sustainable development. The
environmental aspects of these two objectives, for example in terms of increased pollution, are
only touched upon very briefly, and the environment and development dimensions are not
treated in an integrated manner. Within the section on sustainable transportation and communi-
cations, highways, railways and aviation are the sectors most focused on. Marine transportation
does not seem to be among the priority areas.157 Therefore, a project focusing on marine oil
pollution from ships does not seem to fit the framework of this chapter.
Unclear division of responsibilities between implementing agencies and other organisations
involved in marine oil pollution policy: As regards the Yantai project in particular, it is located
in the middle of a bureaucratic minefield. The field of marine oil pollution policies and projects
is characterised by fragmented, overlapping and unclear areas of responsibility, and,
consequently, institutional infighting.158 The result has been conflicts and further environ-
mental degradation. Everything from a “super marine ministry” to interministerial co-
ordinating committees has been suggested to improve the situation (Lu 1990: 366, 376).
According to the Marine Environmental Protection Law (MEPL, 1983), SEPA should be in
charge of implementing it.159 SOA has had the responsibility for pollution from development
                                                
157 Ch. 12 does mention the need to “develop coastal marine transport” (12.71), to “[r]enovate old harbours to
make use of their potentials” (12.76) and to “raise shipping standards” (12.77), however, these initiatives are
all seen as part of an effort to make transportation more effective, and not as environmental measures.
158 The central authorities also acknowledge this. See e.g. the article “Marine conservation atop State’s agenda” in
the government mouthpiece China Daily, 8 June 1998.
159 However, the MEPL was revised in 2000, and this directive seems to have been adjusted somewhat – see the
discussion of SOA’s relative organisational strength in Section 6.3.
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and exploration of offshore oil and the offshore dumping of waste. The Maritime Safety
Superintendent Bureaux under MOC were to take care of pollution from ships. The State
Administration of Aquatic Products of the Ministry of Agriculture have been responsible for
waste from ships in fishing ports, environmental departments of the Military has handled waste
by military ships, and provincial EPBs have been responsible for pollution from coastal
engineering projects and pollutants from land sources (Lu 1990: 373). When technologies to
avoid, monitor, control or remediate marine pollution are to be considered, even more actors
have become involved. Most of the above-mentioned ministries and agencies have their own
marine science and technology development programs. So do the State Economic and Trade
Commission (SETC),160 and the Ministry of Science and Technology. China Corporation of
Shipbuilding Industry, a ministry-level company, also has stakes in the matter, as does SDPC,
in terms of planning and resource allocation.
The implementing agency in the Yantai project has been the Ministry of Communications
(MOC), as well as its local satellite, Yantai Maritime Safety Superintendent Bureau (YMSSB).
However, it might just as well have been State Oceanic Administration (SOA) or SEPA, which
seem to be the two other main bureaucratic actors within the field of marine oil pollution from
ships. The division of responsibilities between these three bureaucratic actors in the field of
marine environmental protection has never been quite clear. For example, SEPA is sometimes
regarded as having comprehensive authority over marine oil pollution (see e.g. Pu 1997: 891),
while MOC interviewees downplayed the role of SEPA almost completely. 161 Interviews with
MOC officials at different levels also reveal vague conceptions of the division of
responsibilities between SOA and MOC’s Maritime Safety Administration. 162
MOC interviewees described a linear process from the point MOC sent the application for
Project 6-8 to ACCA21 to a fully implemented project in Autumn 2000. However, a key
person that has worked at ACCA21 since it was established in 1993, and who has been able to
follow the project from the application stage, points to problems of overlapping jurisdictions
and the possibilities of bureaucratic battles:
“There were problems in defining who should be responsible for the project. There is currently no legal
framework specifying which institution should be leading in the area, and the division of labour between
institutions, but the leading institution should be – and will be – the SOA. MOC had money and gave
priority to the issue of emergency centres in harbours at that time, so they got the project.”163
After years of bureaucratic infighting, contours of a de facto bureaucratic division of labour in
the field of marine oil pollution policy could be detected before the 1998 restructuring: MOC
                                                
160 SETC inherited the research portfolio of the Ministries of Petrochemical Industry, and Geology and Mineral
Resources, respectively, after overtaking them in the 1998 government restructuring.
161 Interview G12 and G13.
162 Ibid.
163 Interview G2.
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had the jurisdiction over activities in harbour areas, while areas outside the harbour were
considered to be the responsibility of SOA. SEPA and its local-level satellites mostly kept their
activities onshore.
In other words: when oil spills are still at sea, they are the responsibility of the local Maritime
Safety Superintendent Bureau, on behalf of MOC. When the oil spillage from ships reaches the
shore, it is the responsibility of the EPB on behalf of the local government. If offshore
equipment other than ships is involved in the oil spillage, the local SOA has the main
responsibility, on behalf of the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources. To my knowledge, it
is not specified who has the overall authority in situation where two – or even all three –
jurisdictions are being involved.
MOC, SOA and SEPA have launched overlapping and to some extent competing initiatives
within the field of marine oil pollution. First, ACCA21 interviewees suggest that the Ministry
of Communications (MOC) had plans for centres for marine oil spills before the inclusion of
the Yantai project in PPCA21 1994.164  They also suggest that Yantai was one of these centres,
and that the project therefore confirms the suspicions of one interviewee that many CA21
projects were actually projects that were in the pipeline anyway, which were “repackaged” in
order to obtain foreign funding. However, this is denied by MOC sources.165
Second, SEPA has also launched major initiatives in the field of marine environmental
protection. NEPA’s own action plan for China’s Agenda 21 emphasised, among other things,
natural resources conservation and environmental protection in oceans (ACCA21 1995a). In
autumn 1998, SEPA published a draft action plan to clean up the Bohai Sea within 2030 (Zhu
1998). The project supports SEPA’s plan for “total amount control” of a series of major
pollutants, including oil pollutants. The plan has aimed to reduce oil pollution to the level
registered at the end of the 8th Five-Year Plan period within the end of 2000.166 The draft
action plan for the Bohai Sea suggested focusing on 13 cities around the Sea, among them
Yantai. The draft also singled out ships and oil platforms (together with industrial enterprises)
as the main polluters, which should meet national standards for pollutant discharge according
to a specified time schedule.
However, the contents of the final version of the action plan, called “Turning the Bohai Sea
Into the Blue Sea,” published in September 2000, had seemingly changed. Although the use of
the word “sea” in the title suggests a comprehensive project, the focus now seems to be more
on restoring the environment around than in the Bohai Sea. Indeed, it is emphasised that the
plan “will concentrate on bringing erosion-related pollution under control and improving the
Bohai coastline”, and that the emphasis should be on sewage treatment plants, tree planting and
                                                
164 Interview G2 and G9.
165 Interview G12 and G13.
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heavy industrial pollution.167 Nevertheless, the plan has a total budget of over 7 billion USD.
Furthermore, ships and offshore facilities are included in the plan, as is monitoring. Both these
facts suggest conflict with MOC and SOA, respectively.
Third, the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) has implemented several projects overlapping
with the Yantai project in terms of jurisdiction. For example, between 1994 and 1999, SOA
conducted the “Maritime Pollution Prevention and Control Project in South Asian Maritime
Space”, in co-operation with UNDP, the Global Environment Facility and the International
Maritime Organisation.168 The project mostly focused on pollution at sea, just like the Yantai
project, and it was a pilot project as well.
In 1996, SOA issued the “Ocean Agenda 21”. In China’s report to Earth Summit +5 (1997: 42)
it is stated that “[e]arly in 1995, a common understanding on the principal strategy, objectives
and countermeasures of China’s maritime work in the 21st [c]entury was reached after several
discussions organised by the State Oceanic Administration (…) attended by local governments
in the coastal areas (…) [and] marine research specialists”. MOC and SEPA were not
mentioned. The section on China’s Oceanic Agenda 21 continues by mentioning MOST, the
Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Agriculture as “major governmental
agencies involved in co-ordination of domestic oceanic efforts”. Again, neither MOC nor
SEPA is mentioned. This could indicate that little or no consultation had taken place between
SOA and the other bureaucracies involved in marine sustainable development. 169 Xu (1998), a
SOA researcher, mentions that “there are some other professional monitoring networks such as
[the] networks of [the] transportation [ministry]”, but that these “are working on marine
environmental monitoring for their special needs”. The implicit assumption is that SOA heads
the only comprehensive and impartial marine environmental monitoring network in China.
According to SOA’s self-description, it is “the lead agency responsible for China’s ocean
policy making and overall management”.170 This is not in agreement with MOC’s and SEPA’s
                                                                                                                                                         
166 “The Plan for Total Amount Control of Major Pollutants Discharge in China During the Ninth Five Year Plan”,
URL: http://www.zhb.gov.cn/english/plan/totalp-right.htm (23 November 2000).
167 See China Online, 14 September 2000, http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/000914/1/B200090819.asp (15
September 2000), and “Sixty Billion Yuan for Bohai Sea Environmental Protection”, People’s Daily, 31 July
2000, URL: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200007/31/eng20000731_46895.html (31 August 2000).
168 Ministry of Land and Resources, “Survey of China’ s Marine Resources”, URL:
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/english/pMarine%20Res.html (20 January 2001). See also “People’s Republic of China
– Integrated Coastal Management Country Profile”, URL: http://icm.noaa.gov/country/China.html (20 January
2001).
169 A reliable indication is that the MOC interviewees contacted had neither read or obtained the Ocean Agenda
21; said that MOC had not been co-operating with SOA in the development of its Ocean Agenda 21; and
thought it was natural that each ministry and agency formulated its own action plan in order to follow up the
CA21 initiative. According to two MOC interview G12, MOC should publish its an action plan of its own one
of these days, if it has not already been published.
170 Ministry of Land and Resources (2000), “Survey of China’ s Marine Resources”, URL:
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/english/pMarine%20Res.html (20 January 2001).
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definitions of their own jurisdiction, especially as SEPA after the 1998 government
restructuring has been supposed to play a co-ordinating role in national environmental policy.
Furthermore, SOA, on behalf of Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), has taken charge of
the further development of China’s oceanic environmental monitoring network. The network,
initiated in 1986, is also to monitor oil spills. Given that the press release published when the
network was proclaimed a national network in 1998 stated, “[t]he development of oceanic
environmental monitoring should abide by China’s Agenda 21 (…) and the China Ocean
Agenda 21” (Liu 1998), it is interesting to note that, according to MOC interviewees, there has
been little (if any) co-operation between SOA/MLR and MOC on the planning of the Yantai
project.171 This is somewhat peculiar – one would believe it to be in SOA’s interests to have
strengthen control of oil pollution because SOA is responsible for the country’s more than 60
oceanic environmental protection zones. However, it is not in SOA’s organisational interest
that this increased control also increases the influence of MOC.
Furthermore, it would be natural for an agency responsible for monitoring of marine oil
pollution and an agency responsible for preventing and controlling oil spill accidents to discuss
matters of common interest, or co-ordinate their efforts to develop the marine safety infra-
structure. Even more so when one of these has published an overall plan for sustainable
development of ocean areas and the other is implementing a pilot project on oil spill prevention
and control that it hopes to replicate in as many harbours as possible. It is also interesting to
note that it took 12 years for SOA’s environmental monitoring network to become officially
approved, although SOA itself pictures the establishment of the network as a joint effort of
“over 100 departments”, among them “environmental protection, communication, ocean water
conservancy, aquatic production and [the] military”.172
Horizontal fragmentation has also played a role on lower territorial levels. The Bohai Sea
borders Liaoning, Hebei and Shandong provinces, as well as Tianjin Municipality (which also
has the administrative rank of a province). One reason why SEPA has initiated its campaign to
clean up the Bohai Sea might be that there has been a lack of co-operation between the cities
and provinces surrounding the sea in the field of marine pollution prevention.173
The division of responsibilities in an emergency situation between YMSSB – being directly
under the central government – and the local government, seem vague. As mentioned in
                                                
171 Interview G12.
172 SEPA (2000), “Oceanic Administration Departments’ Implementation of CBD [the UN Convention on
Biological Diversity]”, URL: http://www.sepaeic.gov.cn./biodiv/devt_imp_en/ocean_dept.html (20 January
2001).
173 The central authorities acknowledge the lack of interprovincial co-ordination. For example, in the article
“Special forces should tackle oil spills” in the government mouthpiece China Daily 23 October 1998, Wang
Hongsheng, chief of the Ship Safety and Environment Protection Division of Ningbo Maritime Safety Bureau
under the Ministry of Communications says that “[c]o-operation between different regions and provinces is
still weak when it comes to dealing with leakage emergencies (…) [i]t can lead to disastrous sea pollution.”
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Section 5.2, the MEPL divides responsibility for protection of marine areas between the EPB,
the Maritime Safety Administration, the Oceanic Bureau, and the fishery authorities in a
locality, in addition to the Navy. Relevant companies, port authorities, and search and rescue
centres are also supposed to participate if an emergency occurs. Different units control the
equipment necessary for handling oil spill emergencies, but according to the YMSSB
interviewee, they can be mobilised in a co-ordinated way. However, the same interviewee both
said that “the local government (…) is in a commanding position”, and that “[I]f there is an oil
spillage accident in this area, emergency action will be co-ordinated from this centre”. As the
centre is established under the authority of YMSSB, this definition of authority structures
seems at best unclear; who is in charge when an oil spill occurs outside Yantai – YMSSB, or
the local government?
ACCA21 has made attempts at cross-sectoral co-ordination of initiatives between the
governmental actors involved in the Yantai project. After the project was listed, but before
Norwegians were introduced to the project, ACCA21 convened research institutions,
government and industry (MOC, SOA, research institutes under MOC and SOA, and China
National Offshore Oil Corporation, among others) for a policy dialogue.174 These actors did not
convene to discuss the Yantai project in particular, but to discuss International Petroleum
Industry Environmental Conservation Association’s experiences with oil spill emergency
response. According to ACCA21, such meetings were held for very few of the other CA21
priority projects – in other words, it is no reason to believe that the Yantai project is a negative
exception to the rule regarding interministerial co-ordination.
On a general level, another initiative from ACCA21 to promote cross-sectoral co-ordination in
the implementation of CA21 is the China’s Sustainable Development Networking Program
(CSDNP). It is connected to a large international network, established as a consequence of
Agenda 21. CSDNP’s objective is to promote the sharing of information between government
agencies, academic institutions, enterprises and non-governmental organisations and the public
via the Internet, and develop information services facilitating the implementation of CA21 and
the priority programmes both nationally and on the local level (Finamore and Anwar 1993).175
Information sharing and co-ordination has increased because of CA21, but there is a lack of
information sharing culture among Chinese bureaucracies, and such a culture cannot be
changed overnight.176 Huang (1998: 22) notes that “[t]he implementation of CSDNP has faced
                                                
174 There seems to have been at least one more initiative from ACCA21 for interministerial co-ordination related
to the Yantai project, although ACCA21 interviewees did not mention this. In a fax to Norwegian actors in
Project 6-8 dated 23 September 1994, Liu Peizhe (then director general of ACCA21) wrote that “we
[ACCA21] are organising and co-ordinating relevant sectoral and local agencies” in order to prepare a
“concret[e] and practical project proposal”.
175 ACCA21 (1995c), “China’s Sustainable Development Networking Program (CSDNP): Feasibility Study”,
URL: http://www.acca21.edu.cn/scnfsc1.html (20 September 1999), ACCA21 (1995d) “United Nations
Development Programme - Project of the Government of the People’s Republic of China”, project document,
URL: http://www.acca21.edu.cn/schinapr.html (20 September 1999).
176 ACCA21 (1995c), see footnote above.
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the dual challenge of meeting the extensive information requirements from each central
ministry and local government bodies while also overcoming the obstacles (…) [that] presently
prevent such information exchanges”. One of the international consultants who reviewed the
project description for this project was sceptical towards its feasibility, but added, “on the other
hand, one has to start somewhere”.177
To summarise, the implementation process of the Yantai project has in fact not included so
many actors. MOST (ACCA21) has been the most important on the central administrative
level, while MOC (YMSSB) has been the key actor in the project issue area as such. In direct
opposition to the argument underlying the choice of the number of actors as a criterion for
horizontal fragmentation, the problem seems to be that too few actors are included in
implementation processes, rather than that too many actors are involved.
This is because the division of responsibilities between different bureaucracies involved in or
related to the Yantai project is unclear, the jurisdictions of these organisations overlapping, and
– consequently – the level of interministerial conflict rather high. This is true both for the
organisations related to the co-ordination of the CA21 projects centrally, and the bureaucracies
related to the field of marine oil pollution. Some of the conflicts were not fully resolved by the
1998 central government restructuring. The CA21 administration’s half-hearted attempts to co-
ordinate relevant actors in the issue area have only had marginal effects.
6.2 Vertical fragmentation
Can the implementation process of the Yantai project be characterised as vertically fragmented
or as vertically integrated? The indicators according to which this question is to be examined
are the extent of co-ordination between different levels of the implementing organisations, and
the relative influence of these bureaucratic levels in project implementation, respectively. The
documentation will concentrate on processes involving different levels of the main
implementing agency, MOC. The central-local relationship within the CA21 administrative
structure will also be touched upon.178
Below, it will be argued that the implementation of the Yantai project has been characterised
by vertical fragmentation, for the following reasons:
                                                
177 Interview N7.
178 However, this was indirectly covered through the discussion on the fragmented authority over the Local
Agenda 21 bureaucracies in Section 6.1 above.
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· The project implementation process has been initiated from the top, and therefore has
not been anchored locally to a sufficient extent.
· There is a lack of a clearly defined CA21 administrative structure on lower levels of
government.
· Provincial and local-level actors have their own agenda, separate from that imposed on
them by central-level bureaucracies.
· Several of the Ministry of Communications’ subsidiaries have rivalled to become the
site of the Yantai project.
· The distribution of responsibilities between central and local levels related to project
financing has been vague, and therefore open for negotiation.
Top-down initiated project process – lack of local anchoring: It has frequently been claimed
that proposals for PPCA21 1994 projects came from central as well as local levels. However, it
seems that most proposals came from central level organisations, and that these organisations
had not co-ordinated their efforts too well with the local level bodies on which they would
depend in order to implement projects successfully. The Yantai project was no exception in
this regard. 15-19 April 1996, more than one and a half years after the Project 6-8 preparations
begun, YMSSB had its first meeting with six representatives from NOSCA, in Beijing. All the
previous meetings had been held between NOSCA and central-level authorities. Parties within
the Shandong provincial government were also involved in the project preparations,179 but did
not play a central role.
The Norwegians had expected that since the Yantai project and the other Sino-Norwegian co-
operation projects under CA21 were priority projects, they would be well prepared. However,
the CA21 priority projects had neither gone through prefeasibility studies nor feasibility studies
before they were presented in PPCA21 1994. This came as a surprise for the Norwegian
companies and consultants. Sverre Bergh Johansen, then Norwegian Ambassador to China,
clearly uttered the Norwegian discontent with the Sino-Norwegian co-operation projects in a
speech at the opening ceremony of the “Second High-Level Roundtable Conference on China’s
Agenda 21” (Bergh Johansen 1996: 76):
”…after almost three years and high costs for the companies involved, very little progress has been made
in the realisation of the [PPCA21] projects. Our experience from these projects leaves the impression that
the projects were approved more as a whole programme than at the level of each individual
environmental project. It seems that the projects have to be approved by the different Chinese authorities
just as any other project. I think it was expected that the projects were more mature and elaborated when
they were introduced to the international community in 1994.”
This message could not be misunderstood. It was among the extremely few critical words
uttered at an occasion inviting for the praising of past efforts as well as discussions on future
co-operation rather than the critical evaluation of past and ongoing projects. However, the
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Norwegians did not seem to have realised that although SSTC and SPC (who spearheaded the
CA21 programme) were powerful supraministerial commissions, they did not have the
mandate to guarantee for the implementation of every single priority project. This was
particularly the case with projects whose successful implementation hinged upon the active
participation of other ministries’ provincial and local-level actors, with whom they had varying
degrees of contact and control. The Yantai project is a good example of this.180 Thus, as
pointed out relatively early in the CA21 implementation process by Lunde et al. (1995: 58), the
Agenda 21 strategy has “so far not [been] well integrated at the provincial and local levels”.181
No clearly defined CA21 administrative structure on lower governmental levels: One aspect of
the lack of CA21 anchoring on the local level, is that ACCA21 does not have a well-defined
and well-established structure of bureaucratic satellites at the provincial and local levels on
which to depend in following up the local implementation of CA21 projects. However, this
will not be elaborated on further in this section.182
YMSSB’s separate agenda: Even though clear weaknesses in terms of co-ordination between
MOC centrally and YMSSB have been pointed to in this section, the central bureaucracy
generally seems to have been able to control its satellite in Yantai. MOC has a leadership
relationship (lingdao guanxi) to YMSSB, which for example implies that MOC provides
YMSSB’s funding, controls its number of staff, and may make other organisational changes if
deemed necessary (see below). Furthermore, YMSSB and MOC sources have both said
jokingly that part of the reason why the Yantai project in their opinion was being successfully
implemented was the project’s feminine profile. The initiator in MOC’s Science and Techno-
logy Department, Department of Planning, the chief engineer at the Planning and Design
Institute as well as the person representing YMSSB during most of the project implementation
process have all been women.
A restructuring of the marine safety administrative apparatus in 1998 has seemingly
strengthened MOC’s central-level authority in the field, at the cost of local governments.
Before 1998, most harbours had one safety supervision agency directly under MOC, and one
under the local government. In this period, the end user of the Yantai project, Yantai Maritime
Safety Superintendent Bureau, was in charge of marine safety matters. It was under MOC’s
direct authority, meaning that MOC appointed its employees and financed its operations. It was
also supposed to receive guidance from local authorities, although it did not have much contact
                                                                                                                                                         
179 Interview BI4.
180 To illustrate the difference between two CA21 priority projects: The Yantai project (implemented by MOC and
dependent on MOC’s subsidiary in Yantai for success) has run a risk of not being successfully implemented,
e.g. because it is detached from the “implementation centre”. The establishing of the Centre for
Environmentally Sound Technology Transfer (CESTT) in the premises of ACCA21, owned by SSTC Beijing
(which also leads the CA21 programme), is much more likely to be implemented successfully.
181 This was also pointed out in interview PNBI1.
182 For more details, see discussion on the fragmentation and overlapping responsibilities related to the
administration of Local Agenda 21 administration and initiatives in Section 6.1 above.
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with the local government.183 Yantai Harbour Authority (YHA), on the other hand, was the
local government organ responsible for loading, unloading, and management of the harbour; it
only received guidance from MOC. However, in November 1998, the China Maritime Safety
Administration (CMSA) was established. The restructuring meant that YHA and YMSSB
merged to one agency, under the direct leadership of CMSA. CMSA has also initiated a
program against maritime oil spills, both at a national level, and for each of the major sea
regions (the North China Sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Taiwan
Straits).184 Clearly, this has strengthened MOC’s authority over marine safety and marine
pollution. The pre-1998 system had obvious weaknesses. “The overlapping set-up has caused
ever-increasing problems in  (…) environmental protection, law enforcement and sometimes
(…) extra fee-charging”, the CMSA said in a remarkably open-hearted document published in
China Daily.185 Most coastal agencies were reorganised at the end of 1999, while those related
to inland waterways lagged somewhat behind.186
Nevertheless, in the period before the restructuring (the period of most interest in an analysis of
the implementation process of the Yantai project), YMSSB had its own agenda. It was not only
MOC’s bureau in Yantai, but also competed with MOC bureaux in other cities along the coast
for resources and prestige. According to a YMSSB interviewee, it aims to become the locus of
preparations for oil spill contingencies in the Beihai (North Sea) area.187 The YMSSB
representatives have also viewed the project as part of a strategy to position YMSSB to become
a central actor in China’s follow-up of China’s obligations towards the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) – and the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and
Co-operation in particular. Their hope has been that a training base in co-operation with the
IMO secretariat for the Pacific Asia area will be placed in Yantai.188 Obtaining CA21 Project
6-8 was an excellent first step towards strengthening YMSSB’s responsibility for co-ordinating
oil spill emergency operations in the Beihai (North Sea) area.
Rivalling subsidiaries: However, several other similar bureaux in the Northern Sea area have
aimed for the same position. Therefore, behind the scenes, there has been considerable
competition between different marine safety bureaux – and port authorities – to get the CA21
Project 6-8. According to the leader for the implementation of the Yantai project at YMSSB,
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184 See “China Implementing Program Against Maritime Oil Spill”, People’s Daily, 25 April 2000, URL:
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200004/25/eng20000425_39594.htm, and “China’s First Oil Spill Emergency
Programs Take Effect”, People’s Daily, 4 April 2000, URL:
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200004/04/eng20000404_38267.htm (both 20 January 2001).
185 Cited in “Marine safety and prevention of pollution given new emphasis in China”, The Bunker Bulletin, 1
March 1999, URL: http://www.bunkerworld.com/news/archive1qtr_99/bullet_010399_1.htm (20 January
2001).
186 See “China sets up first maritime safety administration”, Chinaenvironment.com, 19 June 1999, URL:
http://www.chinaenvironment.com/english/news/june99/0619marine.htm (20 January 2001).
187 Interview G13.
188 Ibid.
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“‘[e]verybody’ wanted the project (…) Maritime Safety Bureaux in Qingdao, Dalian and
Tianjin – all [harbours] related to the Beihai area – and even Yantai Harbour Authority”.189 As
mentioned in Section 5.2, Yantai Maritime Safety Superintendent Bureau (YMSSB) lobbied to
take over the project. The current leader of the Yantai project at YMSSB confirmed that the
suggestion to change the project site from Qingdao to Yantai came from her.190 Other
interviewees confirm that “Beidaihe was also a relevant site for the oil spill contingency
planning centre placed in Yantai – especially because China’s top leaders spend their holidays
on the beaches there”,191 and that “[i]n the beginning, both Nanjing, Zhuhai, Dalian, Qingdao
and Yantai all wanted the centre to be in their place. They tried through their own relations to
influence MOC”.192
It should be noted here that only three-quarters of the specified project area is under the
jurisdiction of the Yantai Marine Safety Superintendent Bureau area (MOC 1996) – the rest is
under the corresponding agency in Dalian, which does not figure among the implementing
agencies of the project.
YMSSB has had a different position than that of MOC regarding the techno-organisational
profile of the Yantai project. YMSSB has been far more hardware-oriented than MOC, which
took a more comprehensive perspective of the project (see also Section 8.2.2). While MOC
agreed with the Norwegian representatives that capacity building should be an important aspect
of the project, YMSSB pressed on for more focus on equipment. According to a Norwegian
interviewee, “MOC’s local department in Yantai defined what they should do themselves.
MOC centrally tried to control them, but could not. Yantai wanted to press activity towards
equipment, and do the planning themselves.”193 Another agreed: “MOC and Yantai said
different things to us (…) The difference in interests was most profound in the beginning of
our engagement, in 1994 – after all, this problem became smaller later on in the project
negotiation process. However, what was consistently unclear was the distribution of power
between local and central authorities.”194
Vague distribution of financial responsibilities: The point where the distribution of power
between YMSSB and MOC perhaps has been most unclear and the differences between the
two have been largest, has been project financing. MOC sources have claimed YMSSB sought
financing from local companies, but that this turned out to be impossible. However, the
YMSSB representatives said that they had never made contact with any local banks or other
agencies for financing. One of the reasons they gave for this was that “[t]he Ministry of
                                                
189 Ibid.
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192 Ibid. For more details of possible strategies employed by the harbours competing for the Yantai project, see
Section 8.2.1 below.
193 Interview PNBI1. See also Section 8.2.2 below.
194 Interview PNBI8.
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Communications is supposed to finance the project”, and therefore should “negotiate with
MOFTEC at the national level”.195 It therefore seems that the central and local level does not
agree on where funding should come from.
In sum, the co-ordination between MOC centrally and its subsidiary in Yantai in terms of
meetings and the sharing of information has been reasonably good so far. Furthermore, MOC’s
central control seems to have been strengthened after the establishing of China’s Maritime
Safety Administration under MOC in Beijing, and the consequent merging of the Yantai
Maritime Safety Superintendent Bureau and Yantai Harbour Authority. However, YMSSB has
had its own agenda: it has i) competed with other harbours to become the site for CA21 Project
6-8 in order to obtain a more central position in marine safety work in the North China Sea; ii)
pushed the financing responsibilities for the project upwards to MOC centrally; and iii) lobbied
for a higher hardware content in the project. As it has so far succeeded along most, if not all,
these dimensions, it is reasonable to conclude that its relative influence on the implementation
of the Yantai project has been unproportionally large compared with that of MOC centrally.
The CA21 administration, on the other hand, has had limited ability to influence the course of
the project; it has so far not established a separate bureaucracy on lower administrative levels
like the city of Yantai.
6.3 Relative organisational strength
In the analytical framework, it was suggested that the organisational strength of implementing
organisations compared to their opponents would become important for implementation of
environmental technology projects if implementation of these projects were to be characterised
by horizontal and vertical fragmentation of authority. As seen above, the implementation
process of the Yantai project has been marked by such fragmentation. This section is to
examine whether or not the agencies implementing the Yantai project are organisationally
weaker or stronger than their opponents, in terms of administrative capacity (personnel),
jurisdiction, rank, and network (national and international organisational linkages).196
The successful implementation of China’s Agenda 21 and its priority projects hinges on the
organisational strength of its proponents on the administrative level relative to that of
organisations more sceptical to CA21. The most important is the Administrative Centre for
China’s Agenda 21 (ACCA21), under the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST).
Scepticism towards China’s Agenda 21 has been found most clearly in the State Development
                                                
195 Interview G13.
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Planning Commission (SDPC),197 the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA),
and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC). While calling the
latter opponents may not be correct – they have all been involved in projects under China’s
Agenda 21, and SEPA has published its own sectoral Agenda 21 – their organisational goals
have often been counter to the further strengthening of China’s Agenda 21. Therefore, in order
to understand the factors influencing the implementation status of the project it is necessary to
assess the relative strength of ACCA21/ MOST on the one hand and SDPC, MOFTEC and
SEPA, respectively, on the other.
The role of ACCA21 is evolving. Until 1997, the centre was more of a national secretariat for
the daily administration of CA21. Its activity was focused on the follow-up of priority projects,
and key events like the working group meetings during the formulation of China’s Agenda 21,
the two roundtable conferences in 1994 and 1996 to attract donors for CA21 priority projects,
and the 1997 National Report to the Earth Summit +5. While still having such a function,
ACCA21 is becoming more and more of a service centre, and its focus has been moved from
the co-ordination of different ministries’ efforts at the national level more towards the local
level, and towards particular industries.198 However, ACCA21 suffers from being dependent on
other agencies for funding. According to one source, “ACCA21 had no money. [It was] very
weak (…) One of its [ACCA21’s] tasks should have been finding eligible financing for the
CA21 priority projects through contacting the end user and the local bank, but it has not been
able to do so.”199
The ACCA21 staff – which counts around 20 people, including the Centre for Environmentally
Sustainable Technology Transfer (CESST, see below) – is known for being “capable and effi-
cient”, but they also seem to have been known as being somewhat “arrogant and
aggressive”.200 ACCA21 has also suffered from a reputation of having inexperienced
employees – quite natural for a newly established unit. ACCA21 interviewees admit this as
well:
                                                                                                                                                         
196 Conclusions on different actors’ relative organisational strength obviously depend on comparisons between the
documented values for each of the other bureaucracies involved in CA21 administration and the issue area of
marine oil pollution, respectively; therefore, conclusions will be summarised at the end of the section instead
of the beginning. It should also be noted that the number of personnel given below should only be taken as
approximate indications. One of the reasons is that many organisations have numerous affiliates whose
relations to the mother organisation can often be rather vague (see Ch. 9.2.1).
197 This may seem paradoxical, as the then SPC was initially assigned responsibility for the formulation and
implementation of China’s Agenda 21 together with SSTC. However, the scepticism has had to do with the
fact that SSTC (now MOST) gradually took over the control of China’s Agenda 21.
198 Interview G2.
199 Interview B16. However, to my knowledge, locating eligible financing has not been among the responsibilities
officially given to ACCA21.
200 Interview G4.
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“We were not that experienced in the beginning. We were not able to judge whether the suggested projects were
appropriate for Norwegian technology. Now we have learned some lessons”201
ACCA21 is responsible for “co-ordinating the implementation of China’s Agenda 21 and the
Priority Programmes” (ACCA21 1995a). However, the formulation and follow-up of priority
projects is only one part of ACCA21’s responsibilities. Only one of ACCA21’s subdivisions is
responsible for this. Thus, ACCA21 obviously does not have the necessary organisational
strength to keep control over a plethora of actors implementing CA21 projects. “We keep out
of projects because do not have capacity and because it is not our task to control
implementation”, says one ACCA21 interviewee. The problem, then, is that no other organs
monitor CA21 implementation either – apart from the implementing agencies themselves.
In contrast to what was stated by the ACCA21 interviewee above, ACCA21’s official mandate
is to monitor (and, to some extent, evaluate) CA21 progress, and technical assistance if needed.
ACCA21 was originally under SSTC’s Department of Science and Technology for Social
Development, and is now under MOST’s Department of Rural and Social Development.
According to ACCA21 interviewees, even though ACCA21 has department-level status, it
needs a major liaison department like the Department for Rural and Social Development in
order to have enough political clout.202 Another interviewee describes ACCA21 as a “think
tank”, and contrasts it to organisations having real influence.203
ACCA21 is supposed to serve as a bridge between domestic and international partners – and
between domestic partners as well – for the implementation of the priority programmes.
However, due to its short history, its national and international linkages are far more limited
than those of both SDPC and SEPA. It should be noted, however, that MOST has an extensive
network of science and technology representatives on Chinese embassies around the globe (see
below). ACCA21 itself pursues an active Internet strategy to draw the attention of international
business as well as foreign governments and researchers. Its leaders have participated actively
in the activities of the UN Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD), and it has sent
numerous delegates to a number of international fora and countries in the North to secure
funding to the Priority Programmes.
The establishment of the Centre for Environmentally Sound Technology Transfer (CESTT)
under ACCA21 in 1997 seems to have strengthened ACCA21’s position somewhat, especially
in terms of national and international linkages. The role of this centre is very much in line with
the A21 goals of establishing regional clearinghouses for promoting the accessibility of
information on advanced environmental technologies. There are concrete plans to establish two
similar centres in southern and northern China, respectively.
                                                
201 Interview G2. Another good proof that the ACCA21 staff was inexperienced in the beginning is to be found in
an internal UNDP memo about Project 6-8 from September 1994. It states that  “[a]ccording to ACCA21 this
project does not necessarily need a feasibility study. Implementation could start relatively soon”.
202 Interview G2.
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The 1998 restructuring might have strengthened ACCA21 organisationally. The downsizing of
MOST resulted in that many previous MOST functions were outsourced to MOST’s centres,
among them ACCA21 (see Section 9.2.1). As part of the restructuring, ACCA21 was awarded
new responsibilities within the areas of R&D, science and technology for disaster mitigation,
and life sciences (a new medical department has been established). More functions are likely to
follow in the time to come, one of them is the management of the R&D programme for a large
Sustainable Development Communities project, lead by MOST and SDPC. The Director
General of ACCA21 is since 1998 directly appointed by MOST, which also indicates that
MOST places increased emphasis on ACCA21.204 However, it remains to be seen whether the
increased number and thematic diversity of projects is accompanied by a ditto increase in
funding.
At the time when China’s Agenda 21 was launched, SSTC held a strong position in the
Chinese political system, the environmental sector being no exception. The State Environ-
mental Protection Commission (SEPC) was established in 1986. Here, ministers from all
relevant ministries came together four times a year to improve interdepartmental co-operation
in environmental questions. SEPC work was prepared, organised and led by SSTC, with NEPA
acting as secretariat. SSTC took many environmental diplomacy decisions, and represented
China internationally, e.g. at the Earth Summit in 1992. In this period, SSTC seems to have had
ambitions to control the environmental sector in China, including NEPA, and therefore
objected to the plans for a separate environment ministry. SSTC also took formal CA21
leadership, and has gained control over ACCA21 by funding most of its activities and
providing most of its staff.205
As a result of the 1998 restructuring, MOST took over from the former State Planning
Commission the responsibility of drafting national medium- and long-term plans for scientific
and technological development.206 Among the responsibilities transferred from MOST to other
bureaucracies was the authority over the State Bureau of Oceanography (now called the State
Oceanic Administration, see below), transferred to the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR).
Its Rural and Social Development Department (headed by Vice-Minister Deng Nan, the
daughter of Deng Xiaoping) co-ordinates MOST’s CA21 work. It is responsible for science
and technology projects associated with population, resources, environment, health and
medicine, among them the experimental zones for sustainable development mentioned in
Section 6.1.207
                                                                                                                                                         
203 Interview BI4.
204 The State Commission for Restructuring the Economy was part of the Leading Group for the Sustainable
Communities Project until it was reduced from a commission to an office in the 1998 restructuring process.
205 Interview PGA4 and PGA5.
206 Department of International Co-operation, State Information Centre (2000b), “Ministry of Science and
Technology”, URL: http://www.cei.gov.cn/sicnet/siccew/echn/a1/ca102mst.htm (20 January 2001).
207 Ibid.
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After the 1998 government restructuring, MOST has a staff of about 230. Its main
responsibility is to craft China’s strategy for promoting economic and social development by
relying on science and technology. MOST is also very influential in the area of research and
development. One of its areas of responsibility is to co-ordinate the science and technology
work of State Council departments, various provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities,
including the ongoing reform of the science and technology system. Thus, it allocates much of
the funding for research in China, including environmental research. For example, all funding
for SEPA’s research is allocated by MOST. The ministry also has a central role in stimulating
foreign and domestic investment in science and technology, of which CA21 is an example.
Furthermore, MOST has the responsibility for a number of large technology development and
assimilation projects, even though much of this work has now been delegated to research
institutions and local governments.
MOST has a strong international profile. Its International Co-operation Department is
responsible for foreign co-operation and exchange in science and technology, manages foreign
science and technology aid, and directs the work of science and technology organisations as
well as scientific and technical officials abroad. The department is also responsible for
maintaining relations with science and technology organisations of foreign governments and
international organisations posted in China
The State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) lost some of its core functions during
the 1998 restructuring, mainly due to the gradual introduction of a market economy in
China.208 It still exercises considerable influence over which projects are implemented in
different sectors in China. However, after the restructuring in 1998, it evaluates projects not in
terms of their economic viability but their accordance with political development goals.209
Furthermore, while SDPC will still develop strategies and annual, medium and long-range
plans for China’s economic and social development, the State Economic and Trade
Commission (SETC) has taken over the responsibility for formulating and implementing
industrial policies. MOFTEC has been granted the responsibility for formulating policies on
foreign trade, economic co-operation and foreign investment, as well as the administration of
those import and export quotas that have not been left to the market.
The formulation of plans and financing affairs for major technical projects has been diverted to
MOST. Plans for the utilisation of land and resources are now the domain of the Ministry of
Land Resources; however, SDPC is still to participate in overall planning of water resources,
and is central in regional and sustainable development policy.
                                                
208 Interview N7.
209 Interview B15. Apart from interviews and other documentation, the information used in the discussion on
SDPC’s relative organisational strength is based on Department of International Co-operation, State
Information Centre (2000d), “State Development Planning Commission”, URL:
http://ce.cei.gov.cn/echn/a1/ca102dpc.htm (20 January 2001).
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SDPC’s role in economic planning has been toned down somewhat. Its authority to fix prices
and control loans for specific projects has been considerably reduced. Rather than to specify
production targets for industry and transportation, as it did before, it is now to provide forecast
targets.
Apart from economic and development planning, SDPC is now responsible for formulating
policies for taxation, interest rates, exchange rates and the prices of certain commodities. It also
monitors China’s foreign debt and export balance, sets the total size of fixed asset investment,
including the management of state grain reserves, and conducts planning related to major
projects. SDPC is also engaged in the development of high-tech and knowledge-intensive
industries.
In drafting China’s Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), SDPC has allowed a greater role for
market mechanisms. The main objectives of the plan are to harmonise economic development
with population growth, natural resource exploitation and environmental protection; and to
level out regional imbalances by developing central and western China.
SDPC has a staff of 590, in 19 functional departments.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC) replaced the Ministry
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) in March 1993.210 After the 1998
government reshuffling, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation
(MOFTEC) is now responsible for policy-making related to – and management of – foreign
investment and trade in China. MOFTEC is also responsible for negotiating with foreign
governments or international economic and trade organisations (including the WTO
negotiations), and representing China in such organisations. Furthermore, MOFTEC devises
import and export development strategies; promotes and manages foreign investment in China
and China’s investment abroad (including aid); and considers applications from foreign-funded
enterprises for doing business in China as well as applications from Chinese firms to engage in
activities abroad. MOFTEC also participates in the formulation of taxation, exchange rates,
credit and pricing, and maintains contacts with commercial organisations of foreign embassies
in China.
                                                
210 Apart from interviews and other documentation, the paragraph on MOFTEC’s relative organisational strength
is based on China Unique (2000), “Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation”, URL:
http://www.chinaunique.com/moftec.htm; Department of International Co-operation, State Information Centre
(2000e), “Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation”, URL:
http://ce.cei.gov.cn/echn/a1/ca102fte.htm; Ministry of Finance (2000), “Role of the Ministry of Finance”,
URL: http://mof.gov.cn/eng/index2-role.htm; Department of International Co-operation, State Information
Centre (2000f), “Ministry of Finance”, URL: http://ce.cei.gov.cn/echn/a1/ca102mfe.htm  (all 20 January 2001).
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Before the restructuring, MOFTEC was responsible for all projects involving foreign
financing, including mixed credits projects. After the 1998 restructuring, the Foreign Financing
Administration was placed under the Ministry of Finance (so was the responsibility for mixed
credits projects, and the task of negotiating and signing international agreements related to
external finance and foreign borrowing). The management of foreign governmental loans was
transferred to the Ministry of Finance and the China Import and Export Bank. This meant that
MOFTEC’s project portfolio – and thus its chances of skimming fees and profits from lucrative
international projects – was considerably reduced.211 This also implied a loss of prestige,
according to MOFTEC sources.212 After the restructuring, the MOFTEC bureaucracy is to
become more clearly separated from the enterprises run by units directly affiliated to it. A
number of approval procedures have been delegated to relevant chambers of commerce, and a
number of planning routines (like issuing general import and export plans) have been dis-
continued. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the formulation of policies for foreign trade,
economic co-operation and foreign investment and the management of general import and
export targets and quotas were diverted from the former SPC to MOFTEC.
MOFTEC has a staff of 457 people in 19 departments, of which a majority has an international
profile. Among these are separate departments for Asian, West Asian and African, European
and American, and Oceanian Affairs, as well as for overseas economic co-operation, and
international trade and economic co-operation. MOFTEC therefore has a comprehensive
international network.
Many studies have documented the inferior bureaucratic status of the State Environmental
Protection Administration (SEPA) compared to the planning, economic, construction and
industrial authorities (see e.g. Ross 1988, Edmonds 1994: 255-256, Sinkule and Ortolano 1995,
Jahiel 1997, 1998). However, the environmental bureaucracy has been relatively strengthened
since the launching of China’s Agenda 21, compared to the CA21 administration.
In the 1998 restructuring, SEPA (together with the custom authorities) was the only agency
promoted to ministerial status. SEPA is now a ministerial-level authority directly under the
State Council responsible for environmental protection. This was remarkable, as the whole
point of the restructuring was to reduce the number of ministries considerably (the number of
ministries was indeed reduced, from 41 to 29). It has also been signalled that there exists a
clear plan to increase SEPA’s standing further from its current “deputy-ministerial” to full-
fledged ministerial status when the central government’s resource situation is improved (Lo
and Leung 2000: 678).
                                                
211 As the Ministry of Finance (MOF) took over the Foreign Financing Administration only after the Sino-
Norwegian co-operation had been discontinued, MOF is not focused upon in this overview of relative
organisational strength.
212 Interview G4 (MOFTEC source).
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As SEPA has only recently been granted ministerial rank, and as it is only a deputy ministry,
its status is still somewhat lower than other ministries. It is entitled neither to approve concrete
projects nor to allocate money. It does not generate enough sources of income of its own, nor is
it included in the “Ministerial A-Team” of 29 ministries using the name of ministry and having
a permanent seat in the State Council.
Since 1998, SEPA has inter alia been responsible for formulating and enforcing guidelines,
standards, policies, laws and regulations for environmental protection at large. This also
includes pollution control, and environmental impact assessments of development plans and
technological policies. Guiding, co-ordinating and monitoring marine environment protection
work is also among SEPA’s specified tasks (this is to be the role of the Ocean and Sea Division
in the Department of Nature Conservation). So is the co-ordination of efforts to deal with
major environmental problems involving different departments, localities, river basins and
regions; and resolving interprovincial environmental disputes. SEPA is also supposed to
organise, build and manage the national networks for environmental monitoring and
environmental information, and submit reports on the national environment quality. In
addition, it shall co-ordinate publicity and education on environmental protection, and
encourage public and non-governmental organisations to participate in environmental
protection.
The environmental bureaucracy has also started promoting technological solutions to
environmental problems (including cleaner production technologies and development of clean
energy) rather than purely administrative measures. Although the responsibility for formulating
environment protection industrial policies has been transferred to the State Economic and
Trade Commission, SEPA still promotes the development of environmental science and
technology and important research projects, and guides the development of the environmental
industry. It has also gradually introduced more market incentives and economic instruments to
encourage environmentally friendly behaviour and technologies. In addition, SEPA works to
attract foreign investment to China’s environmental protection efforts. Finally, SEPA has taken
over the responsibility for the administration of nuclear safety from the former State Science
and Technology Commission.
The 1998 reform intended to make SEPA more powerful in macro-level policy making,
through abolishing the State Environmental Protection Commission and transferring its
mandate to SEPA (see e.g. Jahiel 1998, Guo N. 1998). Each department is now supposed to
approach SEPA with project proposals and guidelines for review before they are handed over
to the State Council for final approval. Whether this actually happens, remains to be seen. For
example, SEPA now has a higher bureaucratic rank than the former industrial ministries.213
                                                
213 State Bureaux for Coal, Machine-Building, Metallurgical, Textile, Petrochemical and Light Industries,
respectively, as well as the government functions of China Petroleum and Natural Gas Corp. and China
Petroleum and Chemical Industry Corp.
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However, SETC controls these ministries. It can potentially block SEPA’s initiatives, as it is a
commission, and thus has higher rank than SEPA.214
As was the case with all central bureaucracies, SEPA’s staff was substantially reduced in the
1998 restructuring. Admittedly, SEPA experienced a smaller loss of personnel than did most
other ministries (a reduction of somewhere between 30 and 38 per cent has been mentioned in
interviews).215 Nevertheless, this is almost outweighed by the fact that it now has to tackle
more responsibilities with a smaller staff than before (a little more than 200, as compared to
almost 400 before the restructuring).216 This suggests that SEPA will still neither have
resources nor revenues to leverage the traditional industry bureaux or to exercise stronger
authority over provincial and local EPBs.217 However, SEPA can lean on a host of affiliated
organisations, including its own research institutions, monitoring centres, environmental
media, government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs), training centres
and schools, and industrial associations.
SEPA has gradually become more involved in global environmental issues. After the 1998
restructuring, it was entrusted with the responsibility for co-ordinating activities related to the
domestic implementation of international environmental agreements. It participates in – and
co-ordinates – international environmental protection activities, attends international environ-
mental negotiations, and co-ordinates foreign economic co-operation within environmental
protection. It maintains a broad range of contacts with international environmental protection
organisations, and undertakes administrative work related to China’s participation in the China
Council for International Co-operation on Environment and Development (CCICED).218
As mentioned above, the bureaucratic borderlines in the marine oil pollution area are subject to
continuous debate and reshuffling, with MOC, SEPA and SOA as the main actors. Therefore,
the relative strength of these three actors is crucial in order to assess the likeliness of successful
implementation of the Yantai project. The Ministry of Communications (MOC) was established
in 1949. Since the 1998 restructuring, MOC has been responsible for crafting strategies,
policies, laws, regulations and technical standards for the development of China’s highway and
water transport.219 This also implies the responsibility for carrying out major road and water-
way projects. Furthermore, it is responsible for the restructuring of the communications
industry, and formulating science and technology development policies in the field of
communications.
                                                
214 Interview B15.
215 Interview G4.
216 Interview G5 and B15.
217 Interview B15.
218 Apart from interviews and other documentation, the paragraph on SEPA’s relative organisational strength is
based on Department of International Co-operation, State Information Centre (2000g), “State Administration
for Environmental Protection”, URL: http://ce.cei.gov.cn/echn/a1/ca102sep.htm (20 January 2001).
219 However, the day-to-day responsibility for road transport has been delegated to provincial and local level
governments.
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Furthermore, MOC’s International Co-operation Department is responsible for the foreign
affairs of the communications industry, including matters relating to international organisations
and Sino-foreign economic and technical co-operation.
Most relevant for this report is MOC’s responsibility for pollution by vessels; for ensuring the
safety of water transport; inspecting vessels and marine transport facilities; rescue and salvage
efforts; and the use of ports and navigation facilities.
In 1998, the MOC created the China Maritime Safety Administration out of a merger of its
safety supervision and shipping inspection bureaux. The agency is responsible for marine
safety and the prevention of offshore pollution resulting from shipping activity (e.g. oil spills),
and has implied a centralisation of the marine safety organisational structure (see Section
6.2).220
No major functions were transferred to – or diverted from – MOC in the 1998 restructuring.
However, a number of its functions changed; after 1998, MOC only examines and appraises
large communications projects, and the division of responsibilities between MOC’s admini-
stration and the commercial activities of its subsidiaries was emphasised. MOC has a staff of
300.
Before 1993, the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) was positioned directly under the State
Council. Then it became subordinated to the State Science and Technology Commission. After
the 1998 restructuring, SOA became a subdivision of the Ministry of Land and Natural
Resources (MLR).221 Due to the scope of this report, we need to make the presentation of MLR
short. It was established in 1998, on the basis of the Ministry of Geology and Mineral
Resources, State Bureau of Land Administration, State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping, and
the National Bureau of Oceanography. SOA by and large replaced the latter. MLR is
responsible for the planning, management, protection and rational utilisation of land, mineral
and ocean resources.
The State Oceanic Administration is now in charge of “supervising and managing use of sea
areas, protecting marine environment, safeguarding marine rights and interests and organising
marine scientific studies”. Among its main functions are to “formulate plans, standards and
                                                
220 “Ministry of Communications – Ministry Profile”, ChinaOnline, URL:
http://www.chinaonline.com/refer/ministry_profiles/MOC.asp (20 January 2001).
221 The presentation of SOA is adapted from the following sources: Department of International Co-operation,
State Information Centre (2000c), “State Oceanographic Bureau”, URL:
http://ce.cei.gov.cn/echn/a1/ca102sob.htm; MLR (2000b), “The State Oceanic Administration”, URL:
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/english/Mainsoa%20Web.htm; MLR (2000c), “Archive of Major Events of MLR”,
URL: http://www.mlr.gov.cn/english/Chronology%20of%20Major%20Events%20for.html; and MLR (2000d),
“Survey of China’s Marine Resources”, URL: http://www.mlr.gov.cn/english/pMarine%20Res.html (all 20
January 2001). Apart from the already mentioned MLR sources, the presentation of MLR is also based on:
MLR (2000e), “Reform Plan of MLR”, URL: http://www.mlr.gov.cn/english/3d.html; and MLR (2000f),
“Introduction to MLR Leaders”, URL: http://www.mlr.gov.cn/english/leaderintro.html (both 20 January 2001).
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criteria for protection and rectification of marine environment, limit the amount of pollutants
discharged into the sea, (…) and prevent sea pollution caused by offshore oil exploration”, and
marine monitoring and warning for disasters, to be conducted by SOA’s Department of Marine
Environmental Protection. SOA has a staff of about 100 (the MLR has a total staff of 300,
including SOA).
As SEPA has lacked administrative capacity, facilities and equipment to fulfil its leading role
in the Marine Environmental Protection Law (MEPL), SOA, which has a large number of
trained specialists in the field of marine pollution, has sought to increase its influence. In 1998,
it was decided to revise the MEPL to make the division of labour between the bureaucracies
clearer (Zou 1999: 216-217). SOA remained a national bureau after the restructuring (despite
its somewhat confusing title, indicating it was upgraded to an administration).222 However, the
amended Marine Environmental Protection Law adopted by the National People’s Congress in
late December 1999 and put into force in April 2000 expands the mandate of SOA. It specifies
that SOA is responsible for investigating, monitoring, and assessing China’s marine
environment, for research on such matters, and for environmental damage resulting from near-
shore construction projects.223
However, marine environmental monitoring does not seem to be on top of the MLR agenda.
The words “marine”, “environment” and “monitor” were neither present in the minister’s
speech at the 50 year anniversary for the People’s Republic, nor in the summary of main work
areas in 2000, nor in the summary on MLR’s web site of major events since it was established
in 1998. The persons dominating the top leadership of MLR have their educated within and
have experience from geology and mineral resources, and – to a lesser extent – land
administration; only one vice-minister is representing marine interests.
SOA has 16 local oceanic administrations, of which nine are on the provincial level. There are
regional SOA branches for each sea region (the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the
North China Sea), in addition to a number of R&D institutes. SOA’s International Co-
operation Department organises foreign co-operation and exchanges. It also is active in China’s
efforts to implement international maritime treaties.
SOA has a separate Department of Maritime Environment Protection (which again has a
Division of Pollution Control), whose function is to monitor China’s marine environment,
especially the damages cause by offshore oil exploration, waste dumping in the ocean and
marine engineering.
                                                
222 MLR (2000c), “Archive of Major Events of MLR”, see above.
223 See “NPC Amends Marine Environmental Protection Law”, CCICED Newsletter, Vol. 5 No. 4 – January 2000,
p.7, and  “Annual NPC session passes laws, closes”, China Daily, 27 December 1999, URL:
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndydb/1999/12/d1-3npc.c27.html (10 November 2000).
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Based on the above documentation, the following conclusions can be drawn as to the
development in the relative strength of relevant actors within i) the CA21 administration and ii)
the issue area of marine oil pollution, since the introduction of CA21 in 1992:
· While its rank is lower than that of its main organisational “competitors”, the CA21
administration has been strengthened in absolute terms regarding jurisdiction and
personnel as well as international linkages; however, the rank and jurisdiction of its
organisational “host” nationally, the science and technology bureaucracy, has been
weakened in absolute terms. Nevertheless, this bureaucracy is still strong in relative
terms as regards national and (especially) international linkages, personnel and
jurisdiction.
· The planning bureaucracy has been substantially weakened in absolute terms regarding
jurisdiction after the 1998 restructuring, but still has considerable strength relative to its
organisational opponents regarding CA21 administration (SEPA, MOST/ACCA21,
MOFTEC) in terms of both jurisdiction, rank, international and (especially) national
linkages, and personnel.
· The foreign economic co-operation bureaucracy has been substantially weakened in
absolute terms regarding jurisdiction as a consequence of the 1998 restructuring, but is
still strong relative to ACCA21/MOST, SEPA and to some extent SDPC regarding
jurisdiction, personnel and national and (especially) international linkages.
· The environmental protection bureaucracy has been strengthened in relative terms
regarding jurisdiction, personnel, rank, as well as national/international linkages;
however, while this has had implications for its relationship to the CA21
administration, it has only had minor impact within the issue area, as it is still inferior
to both SOA and – particularly – MOC.
· The communications bureaucracy has been remained relatively stable in absolute terms
regarding personnel, rank as well as national/international linkages, while it has been
weakened somewhat in terms of jurisdiction. However, within the issue area, it still
seems significantly stronger organisationally along all parameters in relative terms than
its opponents SEPA and SOA.
· The jurisdiction, personnel, international linkages and bureaucratic rank of the oceanic
administration have by and large remained stable in the period in absolute terms, while
its national linkages have been strengthened through its inclusion in the Ministry of
Land and Resources. Its relative position in the field of marine oil pollution is weaker
than that of MOC, but stronger than that of SEPA.
6.4 Summary and conclusion
The implementation process of the Yantai project has been horizontally fragmented. However,
the problem seems to be that important actors (the bureaucracies for planning, foreign
financing, and environmental protection, respectively) have been excluded from the
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implementation process, rather than that too many actors are involved. The division of
responsibilities between different bureaucracies involved in or related to the Yantai project (the
communications bureaucracy, the environmental bureaucracy, and the oceanic administration)
is unclear, the jurisdictions of these organisations are overlapping, and – consequently – the
level of interministerial conflict is rather high. Attempts at interministerial co-ordination have
so far had limited impact.
The Ministry of Communications (MOC) and its subsidiary, the Yantai Maritime Safety
Superintendent Bureau (YMSSB), have co-ordinated their efforts reasonably well.
Furthermore, MOC has centralised its control over local marine safety administrations.
Nevertheless, YMSSB’s influence on the implementation of the Yantai project has been
substantial, as it won the struggle for becoming the project site; pushed financing upwards to
MOC centrally; and managed to direct the project from a broad technology and capacity
building approach towards hardware. The lack of a distinct CA21 bureaucracy on lower
administrative levels has made it impossible for the CA21 administration to influence the
implementation of the Yantai project even if it would have wanted to.
The relative strength of the environmental protection bureaucracy has improved both compared
to the CA21 administration and the opponents within the area of marine oil pollution in the
period covered by the report (1992-99). However, established actors (MOST/ACCA21,
MOFTEC and SDPC related to the CA21 administration, and MOC and SOA related to marine
oil pollution) are still stronger in relative terms, both regarding personnel, jurisdiction, and
(inter-)national linkages. This is true even though all SEPA’s opponents as regards the CA21
administration have been organisationally weakened in absolute terms. The CA21
administration has been somewhat weakened by the degrading of the State Science and
Technology Commission to the Ministry of Science and Technology. The communications
bureaucracy, on the other hand, is substantially stronger than its opponents in the area of
marine oil pollution, and its relative position has not been weakened to any great extent
throughout the period.
In the next chapter, the relationship between the findings above and the values documented on
the dependent variable (implementation effectiveness) will be analysed, in light of the insights
from the analytical framework.
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“The most important problem in technology co-operation between
China and other countries through China’s Agenda 21 is not
technological. It is bureaucratic and institutional. How can we make
organisations co-operate – especially when they have never co-
operated before? How can we help companies identify the ‘correct’
partners?”
Anonymous, World Bank224
7 Empirical analysis I: Domestic organisational challenges facing
the implementation of environmental technology policy in
China225
Below, the relationship between the implementation status of the Yantai project and the three
organisational framework conditions (horizontal fragmentation, vertical fragmentation, and the
relative organisational strength of implementing agencies is analysed, and related to the values
on these variables suggested in Ch. 2. To what extent do these organisational framework
conditions explain the sub-optimal implementation status of the Yantai project so far?226
The first empirical chapter (Ch. 5), focusing on the dependent variable, characterised the
implementation status of China’s Agenda 21 Project 6-8 as sub-optimal according to the
criterion of implementation effectiveness. To repeat, implementation effectiveness consists of
two components; expected effects and planned outputs. The expected effects of the Yantai
project was i) the introduction of technologies and facilities for establishing an emergency
demonstration centre in the port of Qingdao, Shandong province, to recover small scale spills
and control larger spills (PPCA21 1994), and ii) that the project should be a pilot project, and
serve as a model for similar projects in other coastal areas in China. These objectives were to
be reached through the following planned outputs: an emergency management administration
in the port of Qingdao; an information system for oil spill emergency management; spill
prevention and management technology; and capacity for prevention and control of oil spills.
The reason why the project was characterised as sub-optimal according to these criteria, was
that the project’s focus has narrowed from technology towards technique; that the intended
Sino-Norwegian co-operation ended before it had begun, and thus rendered capacity building
and technology co-operation impossible; and – to a certain extent – that the technological and
geographical focus of the project was changed underway.
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226 While this discussion has focused on implementation outcome (as has the other empirical chapters), as
signalled in the analytical framework, the inspiration from literature and debates on – as well as interviews
about – implementation output regarding the case of study has played a central part as well.
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Ch. 6, the second empirical chapter, focused on the independent variables. It was documented
that the implementation process of the Yantai project has been horizontally and vertically
fragmented. However, the documentation of the relative strength of implementing agencies
showed a mixed picture; whereas the CA21 administration has been relatively organisationally
weaker than its opponents, the transport and communications bureaucracy has been stronger
than its opponents in the issue area.
7.1 Horizontal fragmentation: Competing compartments revisited
The first hypothesis suggested in the analytical framework was that the more horizontally
fragmented authority is among the governmental actors involved in the implementation of the
Yantai project, the less likely it is that the implementation status of the Yantai project is
positive. How and why does horizontal fragmentation of authority influence the implemen-
tation effectiveness of the Yantai project?
The empirical documentation in the preceding chapter concluded that the implementation
process of the Yantai project has been horizontally fragmented for a number of reasons. First,
the planning bureaucracies were not sufficiently integrated in implementation. Second, the
environmental bureaucracy was ostracised from the implementation process. Third, the foreign
economic co-operation bureaucracy was not integrated in the implementation process either.
Fourth, Local Agenda 21 initiatives and CA21 projects were not co-ordinated. Fifth, there was
insufficient co-ordination between the CA21 administration and the agencies implementing the
CA21 pilot projects. Sixth, the relationship between the agencies most closely involved in the
project’s issue area (the communications bureaucracy, the environmental bureaucracy, and the
oceanic administration) has been characterised by vague and overlapping jurisdictions and thus
interministerial conflict.
Relatively early in the CA21 implementation process, Lunde et al. (1995:57) wrote that “[t]he
prime advantage of the Agenda 21 Priority Programme is that it presents fairly concrete
projects which are given political priority for implementation”. In hindsight, and much to the
surprise of NORAD and the Norwegian businesses involved, it seems that one of the major
weaknesses of the priority projects was the lack of priority given to them by important actors.
This is especially true for those bureaucratic actors whose prestige and economy were not
directly influenced by the success of CA21.
The rivalry between SPC and SSTC for the control over China’s Agenda 21 was probably one
reason why many of the CA21 priority projects, among them the Yantai project, were not given
priority in the 9th Five-Year Plan. 227 The State Planning Commission seems to have regarded
CA21 as part of SSTC’s portfolio rather than a common undertaking for all central
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bureaucracies related to environment and development. The 9th Five-Year Plan is often referred
to as the first one taking environmental problems seriously into account. However, the link
between the selection of China’s Agenda 21 priority projects and the selection of key projects
in the 9th Five-Year Plan has been weak at best. The planners reportedly did not even seem to
make an effort to use the priority projects as base for selection of key projects. This was
surprising, as CA21 was so fresh in their minds.228
Integrating the China’s Agenda 21 projects into the 9th Five-Year Plan was crucial; as China’s
Agenda 21 covers a very broad range of initiatives, the point of departure was in practice
defined by the selection and funding of the priority projects.229 Therefore, the lack of a clear
relationship between the White Paper objectives and many of the projects in the China’s
Agenda 21 Priority Programmes has been unfortunate. Some of the chapters in the White Paper
are not directly related to any priority projects, while others have links to many such projects,
and some of the projects are at best vaguely related to the chapters in the CA21 White Paper.
The Yantai project belongs to the latter category, as shown in Section 5.2.
MOC might be able to implement projects resembling the one implemented in Yantai in other
harbours. However, a comprehensive and co-ordinated follow-up of the pilot project in Yantai,
involving other bureaucratic actors like SEPA and SOA, is not very likely. For this to be
possible, the actors involved in matters related to marine oil pollution are too many, too
uncoordinated, and too enmeshed in institutional rivalry. This harmonises well with
Finamore’s (1998: 4) analysis of CA21, namely that the heavy focus on demonstration projects
in unlikely to be followed up, due to fragmentation.
The fact that the environmental bureaucracy has been more or less left out of the CA21
process, at the same time as this bureaucracy has been strengthened organisationally (see
Sections 6.3 and 7.3), suggests CA21 will continue to be one of several – and to a certain
extent competing – environment and sustainable development programmes in China. Thus, it is
highly uncertain whether CA21 will be given priority at the cost of similar initiatives in the
future. Another reason why the exclusion of SEPA from CA21 does not bode well for the
implementation effectiveness of the Yantai project is that this reduces the chances for a co-
ordinated approach to marine pollution problems in the Bohai Sea and along the Chinese
coastline as such. At least it seems unlikely that such co-ordinated action can take place within
the CA21 framework.
Lack of co-ordination and institutional rivalry between the CA21 administration and the
foreign economic co-operation bureaucracy was probably part of the reason why a number of
CA21 priority projects – and the Yantai project in particular – did not get the sufficient priority
by MOFTEC. At the time of the Sino-Norwegian negotiations on Project 6-8, MOFTEC’s
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near-monopoly on foreign financing started to come under double pressure – from rivalling
initiatives by SSTC and SPC on the national level, and from entrepreneurial local governments
(see Section 7.2). SDPC, MOST and MOFTEC continue to compete for the revenue and
prestige from handling negotiations with foreign vendors and authorities in the sustainable
development field. CA21 has been no exception is this regard. SDPC and MOST have sought
to handle more projects directly with their foreign counterparts. They seek to handle as much
of project preparations as possible through their own channels, linking foreign donors and
business representatives to the local partner right away, and only bringing in MOFTEC in the
twelfth hour to ensure that the project is included in the official lists of bilateral co-operation
projects. This strategy might seem to be in the interest of both the foreign partner and the
Chinese implementing agency, but can easily backfire.
The risk actors like MOST and SDPC have run by following such a strategy is that MOFTEC
refuses to put their projects on the list of projects viable for foreign funding, or that MOFTEC
finds that their repayment capabilities are not good enough. The last scenario seems to have
proved correct for the Yantai project. MOFTEC is widely regarded as a “rubber-stamp
organisation” – an opinion even shared by a MOFTEC interviewee.230 It felt excluded from the
early phases of the China’s Agenda 21 process – not the least regarding the preparation of this
particular project, because it was not at all well-prepared, in MOFTEC’s view.231 Several
interviewees claim that MOFTEC gave the Yantai project and other China’s Agenda 21
projects a lower priority than would have been the case if MOFTEC had been more central in
the project process.232 MOFTEC has the power to give clear signals to the banks approached
for loans and financing in order to accelerate the approval process; this was probably not done
in the case of the Yantai project.233
The rivalry between SDPC, MOST and MOFTEC conforms to a larger picture, of an
increasing number of cash-strapped central-level agencies launching separate lists of projects
for foreign funding. China’s environmental market is – and has been for some time –
characterised by overcapacity. Finamore’s (1998: 4) observation that CA21 is a “vehicle for
attracting international investments rather than spurring domestic change” might therefore be
correct. For example, SEPA’s “Trans-Century Green Plan” requires investments of more than
100 billion yuan (around 12-13 billion USD). If all these projects are carried out, there would
be clear water and blue skies in China, but they can be implemented only if they have been
officially approved (see section below for more details).234
After SSTC won the “bureaucratic battle” for the control of China’s Agenda 21, many other
bureaucracies perceived China’s Agenda 21 as belonging to SSTC, and therefore only to a
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limited extent felt ownership to the programme. To some extent, they regarded CA21 as a
strategy on the part of SSTC in the fight for foreign funding (see section below), and
subsequently initiated competing and parallel initiatives.235
Similarly, priority projects came to be regarded as the “babies” of the implementing agencies,
rather than “China’s common property”. While ACCA21 took the role of a facilitator in the
introductory phase of the Yantai project, it soon backed out, and the project gradually took the
character of a MOC project rather than a project under China's Agenda 21. This led to less
follow-up of the implementation process on the part of ACCA21, and the follow-up that was
being done, was not satisfactory, according to Norwegian interviewees. As ACCA21 has been
perceived as an agency affiliated to a specific part of government, implementing agencies
probably have had little interest in involving ACCA21 in project implementation. This has
made co-ordination and information sharing difficult, making it hard for ACCA21 to fulfil its
role as a “China’s Agenda 21 clearinghouse”. The job has not been made easier by the fact that
the CA21 priority projects are not sufficiently co-ordinated with Local Agenda 21 initiatives.
The conflictual relationship between MOC, SEPA and SOA within the area of marine oil
pollution has, to my knowledge, not directly influenced the implementation effectiveness of the
Yantai project. However, the scope for replicating the Yantai project is reduced, and thus an
indirect link to sub-optimal implementation effectiveness is apparent. The picture is not
becoming brighter when one knows that most laws and regulations related to the exploitation
and conservation of marine resources in China are “sectorial [and] single purpose” in
character.236 A further problem is the fragmented nature of the development of ocean resources
(cf. Lu 1990: 376). In addition, it is nearly impossible to draw a line between marine and
terrestrial jurisdictions, as there are clear logical interconnections. For example, around eighty
per cent of marine pollution comes from land-based sources.
The infighting about which bureaucratic actor should control China’s Agenda 21 confirms the
assumptions made in the analytical framework chapter (Ch. 2), that implementation of
environmental technology policy in China is fragmented across several ministries, with
overlapping responsibilities.237 The empirical documentation supports the claim made in the
analytical framework, in that co-ordination and co-operation between – and even within –
agencies and ministries dealing with international environmental technology co-operation is
lacking. This is both assumed to be a consequence of overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions,
and a reason why such problems persist (see also UNDP 1993, Sinkule 1993, Economy 1994,
and Holstius and Ma 1995: 42). The empirical analysis has documented that the problems
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related to interorganisational co-operation mentioned in the literature characterised the
implementation of the Yantai project as well.
While the formulation of the CA21 White Paper and the CA21 Priority Programmes was
characterised by bargaining and consensus building, the empirical evidence of these
phenomena as reflected in the report has perhaps been less comprehensive in the case of the
Yantai project itself. This might represent a weak spot in the collection of empirical material –
namely a lack of interviews with relevant actors in the local government in Yantai city and
Shandong province – rather than a deviation from policy implementation in China as
characterised by the fragmented authoritarianism approach. However, the suggestion made in
the analytical framework that the environmental sector would be more prone to such problems
than other sectors cannot be fully verified.
More interesting, from a theoretical standpoint, is the conclusion from the empirical documen-
tation of the independent variables that the main problem of fragmentation in this case seems to
be that important actors (the bureaucracies for planning, foreign financing, and environmental
protection, respectively) have been excluded from the implementation process, rather than that
too many actors are involved. It must be assumed that, even though the exclusion of relevant
actors does not necessarily affect the implementation of one isolated project, the chances of
following up such a pilot project in a comprehensive and co-ordinated manner are probably
meagre. Another central aspect in this report, which has been discussed surprisingly little in the
literature, is what I have already termed “the fight for foreign funding”. In this section, we
observed this struggle from the point of view of horizontal fragmentation. However, this fierce
competition between bureaucracies for the revenue and prestige related to foreign-financed
projects is perhaps even more marked between central and local actors (see Section 6.2, and
below)
 “For foreigners, it is hard to know which
policies can be decided upon locally, and which
policies have to be approved centrally”.
Anonymous, ECON Centre of Economic
Analysis238
7.2 Vertical fragmentation: The fight for foreign funding
The more vertically fragmented authority is within the organisations implementing the Yantai
project, the less likely it is that the implementation status of the Yantai project is positive. This
was the suggested relationship between vertical fragmentation of authority and implementation
status forwarded in the analytical framework chapter. How and why does vertical
fragmentation influence the implementation effectiveness of CA21 6-8?
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In the empirical documentation in Ch. 6.2, it was concluded that there was rivalry between
MOC subsidiaries for the Yantai project; that the central-local relationship with regard to
project financing was a highly negotiated one; that the Yantai project has been initiated in a
top-down manner, which has impeded the provincial and local anchoring of the project; that
the CA21 administration lacks an administrative structure on lower administrative levels; and
that YMSSB had its own agenda related to project implementation.
The struggle between several different harbours to become the project site of the Yantai project
has clearly reduced implementation effectiveness of the project. The reason is that the
infighting between MOC’s lower-level replicates decreases the likelihood of comprehensive
and co-ordinated follow-up of the project, at least in terms of capacity building. It is not very
likely that harbours competing for limited central-level funding and a correspondingly small
number of projects are eager to engage in joint capacity building projects.
Although one could speculate that the rivalry between different coastal cities for the Yantai
project was partly out of commercial motivations, there were no explicit empirical indications
of the “local state corporatism” so often described in the literature (see Ch. 2.2.2). However,
the assumption that the devolution of economic and financial authority to lower-level actors
would strap central level actors of finances and privileges and thus intensify the struggle
between the centre and the localities for foreign funding has been confirmed (see below). So
has the assumption that central-local co-ordination in policy implementation is unsatisfactory,
and that provincial and local-level commitment and capacity are crucial to secure successful
implementation.
There seems to have been a certain degree of confusion and disagreement between different
actors on the Chinese side of the Yantai project as to whether the process to obtain funding
should have been pursued more actively at the local and provincial level.239 This confusion is
probably due to YMSSB’s position as a centrally controlled agency. As YMSSB has been an
agency directly under MOC, local and provincial actors may have perceived that YMSSB
skipped them in the project preparation phase, and therefore vetoed initiatives for local
financing later on in the process. It may also be correct, as YMSSB sources claim, that
YMSSB never approached local and provincial actors for financing; according to some
sources, this was not done, because YMSSB regarded financing as the responsibility of MOC
in Beijing.240 However, the confusion related to whether funding should come from a central or
a local actor also reflects that project funding is subject to continuous negotiations between
actors at different administrative levels. This seems to have been an important reason for the
decision of the Export-Import Bank of China did not approve the financial framework of the
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project.241 A fundamental reason for this, as touched upon in the analytical framework, is that
more economic power has been transferred to provincial and local level actors as a means to
accelerate economic reform.
Authority relations between MOC and YMSSB have been under constant negotiation during
the project implementation process (see Section 6.2), according to most Norwegian
interviewees. This has delayed project negotiations and project preparations for two reasons.
First, it made it necessary to spend more time and resources – both for the Chinese and the
Norwegians – on internal co-ordination between the end user in Yantai and MOC centrally.
Second, it made it difficult for the Norwegians to understand the authority structures among the
Chinese actors implementing the project. This indirectly contributed to the Norwegian
withdrawal from the project, and thus had a negative impact on implementation effectiveness.
Furthermore, this highly negotiated central-local relationship probably was part of the problem
when it came to producing the Chinese portion of the project funding, which also influenced
implementation effectiveness in a negative manner.
However, relatively recent changes in China’s financial system may make it easier to resolve
funding dilemmas like this. As mentioned in Section 6.3, the division of labour between
MOFTEC and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) was adjusted in the 1998 restructuring. Before
1998, foreign funding was channelled via MOFTEC to the localities, while MOF was
responsible for getting back the money. Now MOF is responsible for both.242 MOF – and the
banks, e.g. Bank of China – now have every incentive to re-emphasise and strengthen the
requirement for clear priorities in the budgets of localities for repayment of loans for buying
e.g. foreign technology. Before, when functions were split between MOFTEC and MOF, the
guarantees were often not reflected in the real priorities of the local government in question.
Thus, provinces and localities gave guarantees, but did not follow them up in practice. The
result was that MOF had to reallocate money from other sources to fill in the gap.
This highlights important economic aspects of the project implementation process that have not
been sufficiently covered by the analytical framework, especially central-level financial
capacity. In discussing environmental technology transfer to China, Martinot et al. (1997: 389)
cite the “[w]eakening of central political and economic authority” as preventing the adoption of
technologies being effective in other countries. The revenue base of the Chinese government
totals about 12 per cent of China’s GDP. In many countries in the North, this proportion may
be as high as 40-50 per cent (Wang 2000). The area of energy and environment promises
revenue and prestige related to international co-operation. MOFTEC and other central
government agencies therefore cling to their influence over decisions on government grants for
such international co-operation projects.243
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The problem of “too many mothers-in-law” – e.g. that a bureaucratic unit on a certain
administrative level below the very centre has to report to two or more different superiors,
where one is the territorial government and another is a functional unit within the issue area –
has not been prominent in the case of YMSSB. This is probably due to the fact that YMSSB, in
contrast to e.g. local environmental protection bureaux’ relationship to SEPA, is funded and
administered directly from MOC in Beijing. The drawback of central co-ordination, as the
Yantai project illustrates, is rather the danger for a lack of co-ordination with local and
provincial level actors – within e.g. financing and planning. This means trouble in a situation
where the central government is so cash-strapped that most foreign environmental co-operation
projects in reality depend on local and provincial funding goodwill in order to be implemented.
The Yantai project was formulated on the national level, and the preparatory talks were
conducted with MOC - not YMSSB, or the local government in Yantai. Lack of participation
in decision-making processes often weakens commitment on the part of implementers.
Furthermore, a difference in interests can perhaps be observed between central and local actors.
While central actors to a larger extent seem to view a particular project as part of a more
comprehensive and longer-term strategy (if not always co-ordinated with other bureaucratic
actors, so at least within their own department), local actors have their own agenda. They seem
more interested in short-term economic and material benefits, and enhancement of their status
in the locality as well as compared with similar agencies in other areas. This may cause a
situation where the distribution of power and responsibilities between central and local levels
within a xitong (a “system” of vertical authority within a particular policy domain, e.g.
environmental policy, or communications policy) is in constant flux, as illustrated in the fight
for foreign funding outlined above.
The implementation effectiveness of the Yantai project has also potentially been reduced
because ACCA21 lacks a vertical bureaucracy to rely on in monitoring and co-ordinating the
implementation of projects. In the case of the Yantai project, ACCA21 has not been able – or
perhaps not willing? – to participate actively in implementation, and has therefore not been
able to influence the course of the project other than sporadically through its “clearinghouse”
function in Beijing.
The hardware-oriented approach taken by the project’s end user, Yantai Maritime Safety
Superintendent Bureau, contributed to the delay and later discontinuation of the Sino-
Norwegian co-operation. The main reason for this was that a project focusing purely on
equipment was not acceptable for Norwegian bilateral aid authorities. YMSSB’s focus on
hardware rather than capacity building has obviously also moved the technological profile of
the Yantai project away from the specified output in the PPCA21 1994 project description, and
thus reduced the implementation effectiveness of the project.
To summarise, the fight among several different harbours to become the project site of the pilot
project on oil spill prevention and control potentially reduces implementation effectiveness
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because it decreases the likelihood of comprehensive and co-ordinated follow-up of the project,
at least in terms of capacity building. The hardware-oriented approach taken by the project’s
end user, Yantai Maritime Safety Superintendent Bureau, not only changed the project’s
technical profile in the direction of equipment, but also contributed to the delay and later
discontinuation of the Sino-Norwegian co-operation. The fact that authority relations between
MOC and YMSSB have been under constant renegotiation during the project implementation
process, has slowed down project negotiations and project preparations, not the least because it
has made it difficult for the Norwegians to understand the authority structures among the
Chinese actors implementing the project. Part of the background for the negotiated central-
local relationship is that the central bureaucracies are cash-strapped while local actors have
obtained increased financial autonomy because of economic reforms.
7.3 Relative organisational strength: A mixed picture
Given that authority is fragmented horizontally and vertically; the weaker the agencies
implementing the Yantai project are compared to organisational opponents of the project, the
less likely it is that the implementation status of the Yantai project is positive. This was the
suggested relationship between relative organisational strength of implementing agencies and
project implementation status in the analytical framework chapter. How and why does the
relative organisational strength of the implementing agencies influence the implementation
effectiveness of Project 6-8?
As documented in Ch. 5 above, and revisited in the two foregoing sections in this chapter, the
implementation process of Project 6-8 in Yantai has so far been characterised by horizontal and
vertical fragmentation. Ch.5 also concluded that the Ministry of Communications, the main
implementing agency in the Yantai project, has so far been organisationally stronger than its
main opponents SOA and SEPA along all parameters examined (jurisdiction, personnel, rank,
national and international linkages). The implementing agency on an administrative level,
ACCA21, has been strengthened in absolute terms on all parameters except rank, but its
mother agency, MOST, has been weakened substantially in absolute terms regarding its
jurisdiction, due to its degradation from commission to ministry level. SEPA, having the
position of an opponent both in the issue area (versus MOC) and CA21 administration (versus
MOST/ACC21), has been strengthened in absolute terms along all measured dimensions.
However, it is still substantially weaker than both ACCA21/MOST and MOC in relative terms.
In terms of jurisdiction, MOFTEC is on the defensive, as other central- and local level
bureaucracies have broken its former near-monopoly on the prestige and money related to
foreign financing. MOFTEC has also been faced with fierce competition from other ministries
and commissions and from territorial actors on lower levels for the benefits related to foreign-
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funded projects.244 Its scepticism towards approving the Yantai project therefore may have
been one way of signalling who as authority in matters related to international economic co-
operation in the sustainable development field.
The fact that ACCA21 is still organisationally weak in terms of number of – and the
competence and experience of – personnel, has contributed to reducing the implementation
effectiveness of the Yantai project. The reason is that these limitations have made it more
difficult for ACCA21 to monitor the implementation of priority projects like Project 6-8. As
ACCA21 has had a rather limited national and international network, also has reduced its value
for foreign actors (like NOSCA) entering the Chinese environmental technology market.
However, ACCA21 is gradually starting to live up to its role as a clearinghouse for sustainable
development information and network building, so this situation looks brighter today than it
did when project negotiations started in 1994-95. Nevertheless, even if it had had the capacity
to monitor the implementation of the priority project, ACCA21 would find it difficult to
influence the course of the projects already underway. The reason is that it has a lower
bureaucratic rank than most of the bureaucratic actors whose projects it has been supposed to
monitor (among them MOC). As mentioned above, the rank of its mother organisation, MOST,
has also been reduced.
MOC, on the other hand, has not only proven to be organisationally stronger than the other
organisational actors in its issue area, but certainly also than ACCA21 – both in terms of
personnel and international linkages. However, perhaps most importantly however, MOC was
able to generate financial resources to implement the Yantai project itself after the Sino-
Norwegian co-operation ended. MOC also has had a higher rank than its main organisational
competitors within the field of marine oil pollution, SOA and SEPA. Furthermore, SEPA and
(to a certain degree) SOA have lacked the organisational strength to fulfil their roles in the
marine environmental protection sector. For example, SEPA has not been able to conduct
environmental monitoring, as it does not have access to the necessary vessels. Therefore, there
has been scope for the transport and communications bureaucracy to increase its influence
within this sector.
The relative organisational strength of MOC was probably the most important reason why the
project was not shelved when the Norwegians withdrew, and has therefore had a very positive
influence on the implementation effectiveness of the project. In a more extensive analysis,
financial resources should be added among the indicators of organisational strength. It is
probably a key indicator; weak and/or newly established bureaucracies probably will also be
financially weak, as they will neither have established relations with the bureaucracies
controlling the coffers, nor have generated substantial sources of income of their own.
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In a situation where the CA21 administration lacks relative organisational strength, and has a
limited jurisdiction, there is scope for implementing agencies to redefine projects to suit their
own purposes. Horizontal fragmentation is therefore not the only factor explaining how MOC
has been able to implement the Yantai project without much interference from the CA21
administration. ACCA21 has (not shockingly) lacked the organisational capacity to monitor
and follow up the implementation process of all priority projects, and no other bureaucracies
have felt the responsibility, as ACCA21 is the unit having got the assignment.
The environmental bureaucracy has been strengthened organisationally, but has been ostracised
from the formulation and implementation process of CA21. Therefore, it has initiated and
implemented parallel and to some extent competing and partly overlapping initiatives, like
“Blue Sea Bohai”. The fact that SEPA was awarded the responsibility for the co-ordination of
environmental policy making and implementation in China after the 1998 restructuring was
most definitely a victory for SEPA itself. However, SEPA’s upgrading is not necessarily
beneficial for the co-ordination of environmental work in China, given SEPA’s rather limited
organisational resources and status at present. It is hard to see how SEPA can fulfil such a
demanding co-ordination task in a convincing way as its standing is today.
Focusing on the relative strength of environmental and developmental bureaucracies, as
suggested in the analytical framework (Triantafillou 1995), has only partly been relevant.
Conventional industrial ministries were among the main actors in the organisational struggle
related to CA21 formulation, which was to some extent polarised between environment and
development ministries. However, CA21 is a sustainable development programme rather than a
programme focusing strictly on environmental matters. For example, while MOC is
implementing the project studied in this report, it is a developmental rather than an
environmental bureaucracy. A seemingly more relevant conflict dimension goes between those
Chinese bureaucracies (be they central or local, environmental or developmental) being able to
benefit from the trend towards more domestic and international focus on environment and
sustainable development, and those who have not been able to or in the position to do so.
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8 Empirical analysis II: Putting the actors back in
The empirical work has revealed a number of aspects related to the CA21 implementation
process in general and Project 6-8 in particular that are not covered to a satisfactory extent by
the variables suggested in the analytical framework. While these should, strictly speaking, be
documented in the empirical documentation chapters above, I have chosen to treat them as part
of the empirical analysis. The reason is twofold. First, the empirical documentation on these
points is somewhat sparse and fragmented and therefore not really worth treating as a separate
point in the empirical documentation. Second, closely related to the first point, rather than to
establish undisputed empirical facts the sections below therefore serve to put forward possible
weaknesses of the originally proposed analytical framework and suggest ways to ameliorate
these. This naturally belongs in an empirical analysis.
The following empirical fragments and the suggested theoretical implications thereof will
hopefully serve to ameliorate a possible weakness of the analysis so far; while there is
relatively unambiguous empirical documentation for the degree of horizontal and vertical
fragmentation as well as the degree of relative organisational strength, it might sometimes be
difficult to detect the direct links between values on these variables and values on the
dependent variable (implementation effectiveness). The most important cause of this weakness,
which should become obvious from the empirical points and theoretical elaborations below, is
that the report’s independent variables are exclusively structure-oriented.245 While structural
variables are well suited for generalisation, they may render it difficult to get to grips with
project-specific issues. These may be less fit for generalisation, but may at the same time
improve understanding of project implementation dynamics substantially.
8.1 The impact of individuals, and the territories of technology
The first notable characteristic of the implementation of CA21 in general and Project 6-8 in
particular that does not entirely fit into the original analytical framework is the importance of
individuals and individual relationships for successful implementation. The second point at
odds with the original analytical framework is the role technology seems to play in the
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organisational competition for the resources and prestige related to international environmental
technology projects.
Importance of individuals and individual relationships for successful implementation: The role
that individuals play in implementation seems to be important in at least three ways: First, a
small number of distinguished and influential individuals have taken the role of CA21 “aides”.
Second, it seems that chances for implementation success are improved if key persons in
implementing organisations actively cultivate relations with key individuals in organisations on
whose jurisdiction the project encroaches. Third, relation building still to a certain extent seems
necessary in order to increase access to information.
First, the concrete implementation process of the Yantai project illustrates the importance of
individuals. In the starting phase of the Yantai project, as well as in the period from 1997
onwards, Ms. Wang Shu Mei was head of YMSSB’s “Office for the Model Project of Oil Spill
Prevention from Ships”, and thus personified the Yantai project. She met the Norwegian
project representatives a number of times in 1995, but then a period followed when Ms. Wang
was not in charge for the project locally. In this period, the project lagged behind schedule, and
there was a lack of continuity in the relations between YMSSB and the Norwegians. The new
head of the project office also reportedly cultivated relations with other vendors in parallel with
the Norwegians – for example, he allegedly directed his attention more towards U.S.
equipment suppliers.246 However, the other central persons in the project in MOC were still
working with the project.
Three individuals played a key role in preparing CA21 on the central level. While still Vice-
Premier, Li Peng became the first Chairman of the State Environmental Protection Commis-
sion (SEPC) in 1986. After becoming Premier in 1987, Li lead the preparations in China and
the co-ordination among developing countries before the Rio Summit in 1992. He also headed
                                                                                                                                                         
245 This structuring of the analytical framework might also still be criticised for not taking into account that
technology (e.g. through implemented projects) has an independent influence on social and political processes.
As technology is not included as an independent variable, the chosen approach could easily be criticised of
being social determinist and static, as it does not fully appreciate the two-way dynamism of socio-
technological processes. This inherent weakness of the analytical framework could have been avoided by
acknowledging a dynamic interdependence between structure and agent. In other words, one would study not
only how framework conditions and the strategies resulting from these framework conditions affect the
implementation of environmental technology projects, but also how actors’ strategies in turn influence
framework conditions, embodied in concrete actions (as for example the Yantai project). However, such a
demanding endeavour can unfortunately not be embarked upon within the limited scope of this thesis; after all,
its focus is on how organisational framework conditions influence implementation of technology projects, and
not the other way around.
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the Chinese delegation to Rio, and was active in China’s follow-up after Rio.247 Li stepped
down in 1998 after two five-year terms as Premier, and now heads the National People’s
Congress (NPC), still regarded largely as a rubber-stamp organ.
When Li was promoted to Premier in 1988, Song Jian became his successor as SEPC
Chairman, and kept that position until SEPC was dissolved in 1998. Song was appointed
Minister of the State Science and Technology Commission in 1985, and kept that position until
1998 as well. In 1998, he retired to the position as Vice Chairman of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference, often regarded as a rubber-stamp organ. As Song combined
the SEPC and SSTC positions, SSTC was central in China’s environmental policy-making both
domestically and internationally, which was part of the reason why it has played such a central
role in the implementation of CA21.
Ms. Deng Nan has in many ways has been – and still is – the top-level protégé of ACCA21.
When ACCA21 was to be established, SPC, SSTC and NEPA struggled for the leadership of
the Leading Group for China’s Agenda 21. SSTC and Deng Nan got the position. SSTC’s
leading position in the CA21 process can partly be ascribed to Ms. Deng Nan. One of the
reasons may have been that she was more powerful at that time, because her father, Deng
Xiaoping, was still alive. While there is no proof that China’s “last emperor” dictated the
outcome of the CA21 power struggle, it is no bad guess that he had an opinion on the matter,
and that his opinion was heeded.
The key individuals mentioned above provided the China’s Agenda 21 process with the
necessary backing in order to secure rapid implementation – and therefore their retreat from
politics or relative weakening of power has weakened the role of China’s Agenda 21 as well.
Today, most of the individuals having their personal prestige linked to CA21 are either out of
high-level politics or have had their influence reduced as a result of the death of influential
“aides”. After Li Peng’s period as Premier was over in 1998, Song Jian retired to a position in
the People’s Consultative Conference, and Deng Nan lost the backing of her powerful father,248
CA21 – while still being implemented – has had low profile in China’s political life. In
Chinese media, CA21 has been mentioned only once or twice in English-language Chinese
media since late-1997) and towards the outside world.
                                                
247 There is some disagreement in the literature as to how active a role Li Peng has played for the environmental
cause in China. For example, Economy (1994: 182) cites interviewees that describe how Li would be “bored”
and how his eyes would “glaze over” whenever environmental issues came up. Li has a background as Vice-
Minister of the then Ministry of Electric Power, and thus has been very enthusiastic towards hydropower
development. Li has been identified closely with the Three Gorges hydropower project. However, it has been
claimed that Li was more negative towards the project at the time when he worked in the Ministry of Electric
Power, which has traditionally been sceptical towards such large-scale projects (personal communication with
Gørild Heggelund 2000).
248 However, Deng Nan – widely regarded as being very competent – survived the 1998 restructuring process, and
kept both her responsibility for China’s Agenda 21 and her position as a Vice-Minister of MOST.
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Part of the reason for CA21 lack of central-level attention the last few years can perhaps also
be ascribed to the rise of Xie Zhenhua, Minister of Environmental Protection and head of the
State Environmental Protection Administration, one of ACCA21’s main competitors within the
realm of environmental technology projects and programmes. Xie is known as being very
capable, and is still young (in his early fifties) compared to many other ministers. Thus, he
could easily advance to become a member of the CCP Central Committee, taking SEPA with
him from deputy ministerial to fully-fledged ministerial status, and perhaps even be promoted
to a more prominent job. Xie is also trusted by Jiang Zemin, a point illustrated by the fact that
he was among the few officials joining Jiang on his first, demanding trips to Japan and the
U.S., and has been representing China in the United Nations. This also underlines the point that
Xie’s position is strong partly because of his and SEPA’s relations with the outside world.
The second indicator of the importance of individuals in project implementation is the value
apparently attached to the relation building between key persons in implementing organisations
on the one hand and organisations on whose jurisdiction the project encroaches on the other.
For instance, although ACCA21 was supposed to have the role of an independent clearing-
house for CA21 and other sustainable development projects, the contact between ACCA21 and
some of the bureaucracies necessary to co-operate with in order to co-ordinate CA21 has been
rather sporadic. Two interviewees from different parts of MOFTEC, for example, state that
they have “very little – or no – direct contact with ACCA21”, and “have not been in contact
with ACCA21 for more than a year”, respectively.249 This could suggest that ACCA21 leaders
have not been able to build relations with key persons in bureaucracies whose accept is most
important for ACCA21 to strengthen its position, for example MOFTEC, SDPC and SEPA.
MOC’s feasibility study (1996:13) maintains that YMSSB, the “local ocean bureau, [the local]
environmental protection [bureau] and other relevant departments all have good co-operative
relationships with each other”. However, part of the reason why the Chinese were not able to
produce domestic funds for the Sino-Norwegian co-operation project was probably YMSSB’s
lack of relations with relevant provincial and local-level actors. The local end user needs to
obtain – and maintain – good relations with and the support of the Chairman of the local
branch of China’s Communist Party (CCP); the director of the local bank and the local
MOFTEC replicate; the local government personalised by the Mayor and/or Vice-Mayor; key
persons in the provincial economic committee; and MOFTEC in Beijing.250 According to a
MOFTEC interviewee,
“[t]he problems arose when it turned out that MOC could not provide the guarantee for the loan from the
Norwegian government. Then Yantai had to turn to local businesses, and to local government, with
whom they had little or no relations (…) The end user of the Yantai project neglected local banks (who
could both appraise the project and be lending institutions), the Provincial Committee of Foreign Trade
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and Economic Co-operation, the provincial Development Planning Committee, and the Provincial
Finance Committee. (...) So the problem was not lack of money, but lack of relations.”251
A key reason why financing for the Yantai project did not appear might therefore be that
YMSSB, being a unit directly subordinate to MOC in Beijing, had not established good
relations with such local and provincial bureaucracies. According to two well-informed
interviewees, when the Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC) stated that it would only accept a
local government guarantee, YMSSB had to apply to local businesses, local banks and the
MOFTEC and SDPC replicates of Shandong Province for credit. These initiatives were
unsuccessful.252 As local and provincial authorities had not been included in project
preparations earlier on, they had no particular interest in or incentives for investing in the
project.253
One of the important aspects of the funding issue seems to have been the relationship – or
perhaps the lack of such – between YMSSB and the local government in Yantai as well as the
Shandong provincial government. Since 1988, the city of Yantai has earned a reputation for a
proactive and long-term environmental policy. According to SEPA, major pollution sources in
or near the city have been closed down, moved outside the centre, or received investment in
environmental protection measures. Therefore, in 1999, SEPA gave Yantai environmental
model city status.254 This title is held by only a handful of Chinese cities. Furthermore, as
mentioned in Section 5.2, there have been several serious oil pollution accidents near Yantai,
and tourism is an important part of the basis for economic growth in the Yantai area. Oil
pollution is just as devastating for tourism as a green image is positive for it. Therefore, few
cities should be better equipped to – and more interested in – following up an initiative for oil
pollution clean-up than Yantai. Still, the project does not seem to have received the necessary
local support. While the failure of the Yantai government to provide a guarantee for the loan to
the Yantai project may be due to either lack of willingness or lack of ability, or both, the above
indicates that the project was not given sufficient priority by the Yantai local government. Of
course, as Yantai is a relatively small city, it may not have the necessary resources available for
investments such as the Yantai project, other commitments taken into account. However,
according to experienced Norwegian interviewees, whether a locality in China can provide a
guarantee or not, very often reflects the priority given to the project locally.255
The Yantai project therefore exemplifies that in order for a project to be implemented
successfully, local stakeholders need to be included in the implementation process at a very
early stage, and feel ownership to the project. We have not focused much on local actors other
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254 SEPA (1999), “China’s Environmental Protection Model Cities – Yantai City”, URL:
http://www.zhb.gov.cn/english/modelcities/index.htm (23 November 2000).
255 Interview B14.
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than YMSSB in this report; however, the role of the local government in Yantai was touched
upon in the empirical documentation. In Section 2.2.2, it was suggested that local authorities
would be more co-operative the more visible and unambiguous the environmental problem in
question is. It is therefore paradoxical that the local government in Yantai has not been more
positively geared towards the project, as the problem it aims to remedy – oil pollution – for a
large part is of a local character. Oil pollution is also a highly visible and tangible form of
pollution, and there have been several major oil spill accidents near Yantai as well as elsewhere
along the Chinese coastline. While local governments in China on this administrative level are
so far not directly accountable toward their constituencies, it is reasonable to believe that they
have an interest in focusing on policies enhancing their popularity.
The local government in Yantai obviously would have an interest in receiving the benefits the
project could lead to in terms of employment, infrastructure, and increased environmental
security. However, as this project was initiated by MOC, the local government has had every
incentive to push costs either to YMSSB, or upwards in the system, to MOC centrally, while
enjoying its benefits. However, as most other central bureaucracies, MOC has been cash-
strapped during the time since project negotiations started, and did not have the ability to
finance the project until after the Sino-Norwegian co-operation had ended.256 The Yantai
project, as has seemingly been the case of many CA21 priority projects, has been subject to the
mercy and the level of commitment of provincial and even local level government actors, as
only these have the necessary funding for implementation (see analytical framework).
However, as these actors were not integrated in the project negotiations and preparations at an
early stage, they have not given Project 6-8 (and other priority projects) priority. The
consequence has been that the Sino-Norwegian co-operation – and thereby large parts of the
capacity building element of the project – was discontinued and that project funding was not
possible to obtain until after the Norwegians had backed out.
However, there are indications that YMSSB successfully employed a relation building strategy
in order to become the site of Project 6-8 in the first place. Informants disagree about the extent
of relation building to obtain CA21 priority projects in general, and the case project in
particular. However, a Chinese interviewee who worked for a large international environmental
consulting company in China at the time the projects in the 1994 Priority Programme were
selected, knowledgeable of both the CA21 process in general and Project 6-8 in particular, said
that “[m]any representatives from different local governments cultivated relations with Chinese
Agenda 21 officials to get projects to their locality”.257 He also claimed some projects were
“packaged” in order to get funding, and after which the project money was spent on completely
different purposes. He exemplified this by the Sichuan EPB, which allegedly sent a list of
approximately 30 projects to ACCA21: “One of the applications was for wastewater treatment
                                                
256 While focusing on the shortage of funds should also be regarded as part of the negotiation tactics on the
Chinese side, MOC’s financial situation was not satisfactory, at least not in the early stage of project
negotiations, as it had recently experienced losses in a number of international co-operation projects.
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for a fruit manufacturing plant. They got money for the project, and spent it on a factory
making fruit drinks. The real interest of this EPB was to make money, not to improve the
environment.”258
However, such allegations are countered by ACCA21 sources. They do not deny that many of
those having proposed projects for the 1994 Priority Programme visited their office, both for
assistance in project formulation and to promote their project, but that “[t]he time from
ministries, agencies and localities sent us project proposals to the selection of the priority
projects was too short to develop good relationships”. Furthermore, according to ACCA21
interviewees, it should be obvious that the 128 projects included in the two CA21 Priority
Programmes have not been accepted because all their proponents had good relations with
ACCA21, as establishing such relations would have required a staff many times as large as
ACCA21’s. ACCA21 sources claim priority was given to “local governments [that]
demonstrated an ability to implement projects, and had expectations as to what the CA21
would bring”.259
Nevertheless, one Norwegian interviewee suggests there were other reasons why Yantai
obtained Project 6-8 than the technical arguments presented by YMSSB and MOC (see Section
5.2). “Why should Yantai get the project?”, he rhetorically asks, and continues: “Dalian is even
more ideally geographically situated [than Yantai], by the Laotieshan international waterway.
The neighbouring city of Qingdao is much larger, and has a much larger part of foreign and
transit trade, and thereby more ship traffic. (…) Nanjing, Xiamen and Shanghai would also be
more natural project sites than Yantai.”260
A third aspect of the importance of individuals and their relationships in policy and project
implementation is the necessity of personal connections in order to obtain information. Some
interviewees claim that the extent of corruption in the environmental technology field is
exaggerated. However, the following quote from the Chinese agent of one of the Norwegian
companies involved in the Yantai project might illustrate how subtle the balance is between
relation building (or guanxi) and corruption:
“Mr. XX from MOC’s PDI was central in getting the project going (…) I don’t like him. Every time you
want him to do something, you have to arrange a banquet, especially in a project like this. We have given
gifts in relation to the project  - a watch, nothing big. Banquets and gifts were quite necessary in a project
like Yantai.”261
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258 Ibid.
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260 Interview B14. An additional argument in support of this view would be that Dalian has experienced more
severe marine oil pollution problems than Yantai. For example, Xu (1998) argues that “[d[ue to the intensive
development of industry, as well as the unfavourable hydrodynamic condition[s], marine environment in Bohai
Bay, especially Dalian Gulf, stays heavily polluted”, and explicitly mentions Dalian as heavily oil-polluted.
261 Interview B13. I have chosen to anonymise the MOC employee in question.
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Another agent, not directly involved in the Yantai project, says, “entertain them [the potential
project partner], give them gifts, invite them to dinners, [and] invite them to Norway. That is
the normal way to do it.” He continues: “With good men who you have relations with, you can
always arrange something. If they are not good men, and you don’t have relations with them,
you can give them money under the table. (…) A deal under the table is possible even if the
project is out for bidding. The customer then decides what he wants, but fakes through the
bidding.”262
Although interviewees do not consider downright corruption as being common (at least not in
relatively small projects like this one), the cultivation of personal contacts is deemed very
important. Its primary function is to access information about the progress of ongoing projects,
and possible new projects in the pipeline. Both before, during and after project negotiations the
Chinese play the information card very strategically. Information may be leaked on purpose, in
order to play competing groups – be they different bidders for a project, or different actors
behind one bid, as the consultants and equipment vendors in the Yantai project – up against
each other to force through an advantageous deal.263 According to one Norwegian interviewee,
“[i]nformation is kept secret – either because it is secret, or because it is said to be. In the growing
socialist market economy, it is to an increasing extent possible to buy information, but there is still a
considerable amount of information to which the only route is personal relations” 264
MOC’s Planning and Design Institute (PDI) is responsible for the technical aspects of the
project on the Chinese side, and is therefore very important in the project implementation
process. It helps the end user to select the best products, and can therefore influence the end
user. It is very common for foreign and Chinese companies alike to keep informed about
ongoing and future projects through paying fees to design institutes.265
The role of technology in organisational competition for resources and prestige: As illustrated
in Section 6.1 above, the division of responsibilities in the field of marine oil pollution is
fragmented. CA21 is a prestigious undertaking. Therefore, in a struggle between two or more
bureaucracies for funding, prestige or about bureaucratic borderlines, getting a project
description accepted in the China’ Agenda 21 Priority Programmes might be a confirmation of
territory. As documented in Section 5.2 above, the Yantai project does not at all fit into the
overall objectives of CA21’s Ch. 12E, the chapter that the description of the Yantai project in
PPCA21 1994 is allegedly based on and thus should be implemented in accordance with. This
could signal that MOC has been able to define which technology to be given priority in the
formulation of priority projects, after the formulation of the CA21 White Paper. This had
perhaps been more difficult if the CA21 authority structure had been horizontally integrated,
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and the central-level agencies in which CA21’s authority was embodied had been organisa-
tionally strengthened. Now, the situation was quite the opposite.
In a policy area with vague and changing “bureaucratic borderlines”, bureaucratic borders may
be defined by the precedence of projects and programmes implemented, rather than rules and
regulations. The Yantai project might therefore have been part of a strategy on the part of
MOC to move bureaucratic boundaries in the field of marine oil pollution, or at least to
reinforce existing bureaucratic borderlines. Revisions of the project underway made it even
more so. While the Yantai project originally was to focus on oil spillage in the port of
Qingdao, it soon turned out that the focus of the project would be oil spillage at sea, in Yantai.
While perhaps partly outside the scope of this report, the role of technology in relations
between Chinese bureaucracies and business representatives on the one hand and other
countries’ representatives on the other, is interesting. At the outset, the Norwegians signalled
that the capacity building component of the Yantai project was crucial. NOSCA offered a total
package including organisational aspects, environmental impact assessment, recommendations
on the selection of countermeasures based on risk analyses, and a training and R&D
programme. NOSCA’s aim was to provide the Chinese with equipment; knowledge about how
this equipment should be used; and an organisational framework within which to operate the
equipment efficiently. In the words of one representative, “[e]xperience from Norwegian work
in this field is that planning, education and organisation of oil spill contingency is essential.
This should not be decoupled from equipment, as capacity building forms the basis for
selecting correct countermeasures in an emergency situation. (…) What makes the Norwegian
concept unique is the linkage between planning and all the other areas.”
The Norwegian project group wanted to gather more experience before hardware was
transferred to the Chinese counterpart. The end user, YMSSB, claimed they had the necessary
background to start using the equipment, as they could base their conclusions on an American
study as well as the Norwegian prefeasibility study. They said that if they received more
concessionary aid, they would buy Norwegian hardware for the money. NORAD replied that a
combination of concessionary aid and soft loan would be provided if the studies could
continue. The concessionary aid would be used for capacity building and the mixed credit for
purchase of technology. This signalled that NORAD was willing to stretch very far to secure
that both competence and technology was included in the project. Indeed, according to
knowledgeable interviewees, this was the first time NORAD’s Industry and Energy
Department and Asia and Latin America Regional Department had co-operated this close on a
project basis.266
Thus, the difference in the emphasis put on capacity building versus equipment does not seem
to have followed national borders; the central bureaucracy of MOC was far more geared
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towards NOSCA’s (and NORAD’s) ideas on capacity building than YMSSB, which lobbied to
channel the foreign funding towards equipment. Norwegian oil spill equipment vendors teamed
up with the local authorities in Yantai.
8.2 Relevant actors’ strategies
In order to ensure a dynamic and holistic understanding of the implementation of environ-
mental technology projects in China, this study should have integrated structure- and more
actor-oriented approaches to a much larger extent than what has been done in the analytical
framework.267 The reason for this is that, on the one hand, an exclusively structure-oriented
approach – as reflected in the independent variables – may easily take on an almost determinis-
tic character, and thus cannot incorporate actors’ actions. On the other extreme, exclusively
actor-oriented approaches may become too voluntaristic and insensitive to structural impetus.
Thus, an analytical framework where influence from structural framework conditions is media-
ted through the strategies of relevant actors may provide a more useful analytical tool for
similar studies in the future.
While framework conditions are defined as necessary conditions for successful implementation
to occur, strategies should be regarded as contributing conditions. Naturally, while the frame-
work condition variables concentrate both on the CA21 administration and the issue area rela-
ted to the case project, strategy variables would focus mainly on the issue area, as they are
assumed to explain the concrete actions of actors under influence from a set of framework
conditions.
The discussion on framework conditions in Ch. 2 was to a large extent based on Jänicke’s
(1995, 1997) articles on capacity for environmental policy and management.268 His distinction
between environmental capacity and the utilisation of this capacity is also relevant for our
purpose, as he considers the strategy of the proponents of a policy or an initiative to be an
essential component of capacity utilisation. Jänicke (1997: 6) defines strategy as “the general
approach to the problem (…) the purposeful use of instruments, capacities, and situative
opportunities to achieve long-term goals”.
Originally, the word “strategy” was used in a military context, and still is very often associated
with such – or with game theory, which itself is often concentrating on “high politics”.269
                                                
267 This discussion is central in the so-called agent-structure debate (see e.g. Giddens 1979, 1984, Wendt 1987,
Dessler 1989, Carlsnaes 1992, Archer 1995, and Wight 1999).
268 While the discussion on environmental (and technological) capacity is highly relevant for this study, a broader
discussion of China’s environmental technology implementation capacity is outside the limits of this thesis.
269 The military origin of the word is confirmed by the fact that it stems from the Greek word for “general”.
However, the growth of business and management studies has increased the focus on competitive strategy, that
is, means to reach the goals set by a company or enterprise.
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However, strategy is no longer confined to the military realm. Organisations also have
strategies – that is, comprehensive plans for action in order to achieve specific objectives
enhancing the organisation’s interest within given framework conditions. In military terms, a
distinction is made between strategy and tactics, where the latter is defined as less
comprehensive actions undertaken in order to support this strategy. As indicated by the second
subtitle in this section (“Tactical translations of technology”), a similar logic is followed – the
tactical translation of technology is part of a strategy on the part of an organisation to reach its
objectives. The main title of the current section (“Relevant actors’ strategies”) is kept in plural
form as the strategy of more than one actor is discussed.
Given that the context of environmental technology project implementation in China is
characterised by horizontal and vertical fragmentation of authority and the agencies
implementing the project are organisationally weaker than their opponents, this might open up
for two sets of strategies; individual-cum-organisational relation building, and the tactical
translation of technology, respectively.
8.2.1 Individual-cum-organisational relation-building
The fragmented authoritarianism approach provides a useful conceptual framework within
which to understand the degree of vertical and horizontal fragmentation characterising the
Chinese policy making system, and the resulting importance of relative organisational strength.
It also succeeds fairly well in explaining how fragmentation leads to lack of co-ordination,
bureaucratic infighting and, consequently, a need for consensus building between actors on
different levels of the political system. However, the approach does not explain how this
consensus building takes place. Lieberthal (1992: 29) largely accepts the criticism directed
towards the fragmented authoritarianism approach that it has made little or no use of the
insights of cultural approaches to the study of Chinese politics. He admits that such theories
may explain “the nature of political alliances, expectations of political behaviour, attitude
towards authority relations, and the fundamental strength of political organisations”. Resear-
chers from countries in the North have been surprised by the extent of personalism in Chinese
decision making processes portrayed by the Chinese “insiders” (Hamrin and Zhao 1995). This
demonstrates the need to enrich the fragmented authoritarianism approach by perspectives
focusing more on the role of personalism and particularistic ties in Chinese politics.
Giddens (1979: 5, 69) has described this interdependence of agent and structure as “the duality
of structure”, in which “the structural properties of social systems are both the medium and the
outcome of the practices that constitute those systems”. However, critics have asserted that the
notion of duality of agency and structure precludes analysing the empirical interplay between
action and structure, since the two entities ontologically presuppose each other (Carlsnaes
1992: 258). In order to transcend this artificial dichotomy between agent and structure and
analyse the dynamic relationship between the two entities, Wight (1999) suggests a three-level
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typology of agency. What he calls Agency1 is described as “freedom of subjectivity”, or a
“self” that (in the words of Wendt (1987: 359)) has a theoretical understanding of activities,
that can reflexively monitor and potentially adapt its behaviour, and can make decisions.
Agency2 refers to the way in which Agent1 is born into a structurally ordered social system and
thus involuntarily acquires certain properties (e.g. black/white, man/woman, poor/rich)
affecting the potential of Agency1 to mobilise social resources. Agent3 refers to “positioned-
practice-places” that agents1 choose to inhabit on behalf of agency2.
270
Let us assume that a person X with his/her unique personality (Agency1), having been formed
by the different Agency2 and Agency3 s/he has experienced so far, is appointed as a leader of
the organisation responsible for implementing the Yantai project. When person X takes over
the position, it is given a uniquely different content, reflecting X’ Agency1, Agency2 and other
experiences in Agency3.
It seems that – at least in the case of China – combining Agencies1, 2, 3 to the benefit of an
organisation (individual-cum-organisational relation building) is an organisational survival
strategy. My argument is that key individuals in China’s bureaucracy, holding what Wight
(1999, see above) calls “positioned-practice places” actively cultivate relations with similar
individuals in organisations central to the maintenance of their organisation’s interests. The
rationale is that, in China’s weakly institutionalised politico-bureaucratic system, relationships
between such key individuals in interacting organisations provide the dynamism crucial for
inter-organisational relations in a situation of horizontal and vertical fragmentation of
authority.
In this way, organisational relations resemble individuals’ relations, in that they are concentric,
like circles formed when one throws a stone into a pond (cf. Fei 1992, and Pye 1995b). Thus,
my argument is that, in contrast to the characteristics of a Weberian-like bureaucracy, in China
an organisation’s relations with other organisations are regarded – both by its members and by
outsiders – as ranging from being very close to being peripheral, and are treated as such (see
Figure 8.1 below). Thus, the use of guanxi to “oil the bureaucratic machinery” not only
characterises the relationship between individual and bureaucracy, but also the relationship
between bureaucrats and bureaucracies at different levels.271
                                                
270 Wight’s typology has much in common with Carlsnaes’ (1992: 254) typology of foreign policy action as
consisting of intentional, dispositional and structural dimensions, respectively. However, it more explicitly
includes a dynamic interrelationship between agent and structure.
271 The use of agent and agency in this thesis is inspired somewhat by actor-network theory, in that the actor
concept is defined to include not only individuals but also organisations. See e.g. Latour’s (1996: 372)
suggestion that “[i]nstead of opposing the individual level to the mass, or agency to structure, we simply follow
how a given element becomes strategic through the number of connections it commands, and how it loses its
importance when losing its connections”. However, the notion held by actor-network theorists that there is no
difference between actor and structure because both are networks, is rejected. So is the notion that everything –
not only human beings or organisations, but living or dead things – may take the role of an actor.
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This argument builds on the informal politics approach, defined by Dittmer (1995a: 10, 1995b:
198) as politics where informal relationships constitute ends in themselves. Dittmer (1995a:
29) suggests that economic reforms have weakened the position of ideology in Chinese
politics, and thereby increased the room for guanxi, as constraints on communication have
been relaxed. However, at the same time, utilitarian, market-economic considerations have
broken down the dichotomy between value-rational and purpose-rational relationships. Among
the results of this development, according to Dittmer, is that the relationship between formal
and informal politics becomes “fluid and ambiguous”; the informal is often absorbed by the
formal, while the formal has informal aspects.272 Dittmer also sees the emergence of a new
“hybrid guanxi”, incorporating elements of purpose- and value-rational relation building,
because of this development.
One of the central topics of the scholarly debate on informal politics has been whether informal
relationships (or factions) should take the position of independent or dependent variable (or
even a combination of the two). Nathan (1973) proposed factions, defined as vertically
organised patron-client networks linked by personal connections (guanxi), as a central unit of
analysis in Chinese politics. He claimed these networks are external to but dependent on the
structure along which they exist. Tsou (1976) argued that structure constrains factions. He
emphasised that formal structure is the precondition for, not a product of, the development of
what he called “informal groups”. Many authors largely regard personal relation building a
result of China’s bureaucratic structure (see e.g. Walder 1986, Oi 1989).
In stating that “personal relations are very nearly the sum total of Chinese politics”, Pye
(1995b: 39) takes a more extreme standpoint, suggesting that some informal ties have a self-
sufficient function independent of formal structure. The fundament for guanxi building,
according to Pye (1995b), is a view of the human being as the centre of several concentric
circles containing family and social relationships spreading out from the self at the centre. This
web of relationships counters the official Weberian rationality of China’s bureaucratic system,
of specialised functions in a hierarchy based on impersonal authority and formal rules and
norms (see also Yang 1959).273
As he believes politics and personalism are almost synonymous, Pye (1995a, 1995b) also
regards the distinction Dittmer makes between formal legal structures and informal power
relationships as irrelevant in a political system characterised by intertwined Party and state
                                                
272 Note that Zhao (1995: 233-234), building on the views of former high-level insiders in Chinese politics, argues
the opposite, namely that “personal and institutional authority has become more distinguishable in Deng
Xiaoping’s China”. Furthermore, Guthrie (1998) argues that economic rationality has started to reduce the
influence of guanxi in Chinese society. The lack of consensus on this point is further accentuated by the fact
that Dittmer (1995b: 202) admits he has reached opposite conclusions on this matter in two different
publications.
273 The reader should observe that Yang’s study is empirically delimited to local administration in China in the
19th and early 20th century.
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hierarchies; secrecy; low degree of institutionalisation; and lack of a legal order.274 According
to Pye, guanxi building is a substitute for legal administrative norms and political interest
articulation in China. Furthermore, Pye (1981: 77ff) claims that informal network building is a
result of a search for security. This search for security, in turn, stems from the fact that conflict
between factions collides with the cultural norm of consensus.
Even though Dittmer (1995b: 198) concludes that there exists a scholarly consensus that
“informal politics is a consequence of the functional inadequacies of formal politics”, most
contributions on informal politics mainly focus on personal relation building as stemming from
the (career and personal security) needs of the individual top-level decision-maker. However,
Dittmer goes some way in suggesting a “conceptual synthesis” between the individual and the
group/organisation as the unit of analysis, giving relationships the central stage. He bases this
synthesis on Liang (1974:94, cited in Dittmer 1995: 9), who argues that Chinese culture is
neither individualistic (geren benwei) nor group-oriented (shehui benwei), but rather based on
relationships (guanxi benwei). This is supported by Tsou (1995: 101-102). He suggests “the
continuum of informal politics” should be joined “to a continuum of formal politics (…) with a
middle zone in which the formal and the informal (…) are intertwined, penetrate each other or
simply overlap”. By proposing the concept of individual-cum-organisational relation building,
Figure 8.1 Concentric circles – an illustration of individual-organisational relation
building
                                                
274 Indeed, this is partly admitted by Dittmer (1995a: 14) when he observed that the distinction between formal
and informal politics is “fluid and ambiguous”
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which is meant to capture how individual and organisational relations mixed in the policy
implementation process in China, I hope to take this debate one step further. The figure on the
previous page is meant to illustrate how the quality of an organisation’s relationships not only
is a product of formal organisational setup, but also to some extent resembles concentric circles
because it depends on individual-cum-organisational relation building.
If an implementing organisation fails to nurse its relations with other organisations having a
potential stake in the implementation of a particular project, these organisations may often have
enough influence over some parts of the implementation process to impede implementation if
they wish.
If successful, on the other hand, such individual-cum-organisational relation building might
“defragment” decision-making by
· minimising the number of actors;
· minimising the number of decision-making arenas (“concentrating the decision“);
· maximising access to information; and
· reducing time spent on decision-making.
This would be true because it is reasonable to believe that when fewer actors have to reach a
consensus, on fewer decision-making arenas, and based on better information, decision-making
goes smoother and faster.
In the case of the Yantai project, a reasonable hypothesis would have been that – given
horizontal and vertical fragmentation and weak implementing organisations – the less
successful implementing agencies were in individual-cum-organisational relation building with
strategic partners, the less likely it would be that the implementation status of the Yantai
project would be positive.
Carving out indicators actually measuring the extent of individual-cum-organisational relation
building will be a challenge. However, the extent of contact between implementing agency and
bureaucratic opponents and the importance attached to the role of individuals in the
implementing process seem to be two starting points in this regard.
The empirical documentation suggests that research on informal politics would benefit from
departing somewhat from the elitist approach followed today (see e.g. Dittmer 1995a, Pye
1995b). Informal relation building seems to take place within and between top layers of lower-
level organisations as well. The empirical chapters have also suggested that there might be
other motivations for informal relation building than the need for quick decisions, secrecy or
discretion – namely to build support for implementation of projects, or at least to ensure that
implementation is not “vetoed” by actors more or less closely related to the implementation
process.
136 Jørund Buen
It is difficult to distinguish the impact of individual-cum-organisational relation building from
that of the organisational framework conditions influencing it when the only basis we have is
the fragmentary empirical evidence in this report. Furthermore, there is not sufficient empirical
evidence to assess the relative importance of this variable for the implementation outcome. Nor
is there a strong enough empirical fundament to speculate on the impact of economic reforms
on guanxi building and informal politics at large. However, the claim that the distinction
between formal legal structures and informal power relationships is irrelevant (Pye 1995b)
seems exaggerated; the character and objectives of such relation building is conditioned by
framework conditions.
8.2.2 Tactical translations of technology
In a situation where the bureaucratic proponents of a given policy are weak, and the structures
of authority in the field are fragmented both by function and territory, room might be opened
for manipulation and creative interpretation of the contents of technology and technology
transfer. Tactical translations of technology might thus become an integrated part of strategies
to win the struggle for power and prestige.
Technical arrangements may (partly) determine the use of technologies, and the way these
technologies are used, may enhance the power of some political actors over others (Winner
1986: 25). Akrich (1992) equates the process of familiarising with – interacting with – a new
technology with a translation process. However, as is the case with traditional forms of
translation, the translator is not only a passive intermediary, but may actively influence
communication.
The social construction of technology (SCOT) model (see e.g. Bijker 1995) acknowledges the
broad understanding of technology on which this report is built. This model may offer many
insights as regards the manipulation of the contents of transferred technology to serve the
interests of different organisations in the countries involved. First, it aims to explain the
development of a technological artefact – or technological change – rather than interaction
between users and readily designed technology (Tjora 1997: 15). In the words of Latour (1987:
258), “[w]e study science in action and not ready made science or technology; (…) we either
arrive before the facts and machines are blackboxed or we follow the controversies that reopen
them.” As the report is centred on the implementation process of China’s Agenda 21, this
dynamic approach would have been very relevant to integrate in the analytical framework.
Secondly, in the SCOT approach, explanations are found – and tested – through case studies,
as is this report. These concentrate on controversies occurring in development of technologies,
involving “different actors (individuals or groups that are capable of acting) or relevant social
groups, which are groups of actors that share a common conceptual framework and common
interests” (Brey 1999: 2). These actors or groups try to shape technology according to their
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own preferences. According to the SCOT model, new technological artefacts have
interpretative flexibility, inasmuch as different relevant actors understand them in different
ways. These understandings may converge into one through processes of closure, and –
subsequently – stabilisation. A technology co-operation project could be seen as a re-
innovation of the technological content (see below), and thus could be analysed as a process of
closure and stabilisation.
The perspectives of the actors involved in technology development each constitute a
technological frame. Therefore, a third point, closely linked to the argument above is that the
perspectives of different actors – not only in each of the two or more countries involved in an
international environmental technology co-operation project but also within each of these
countries – could be analysed as technological frames. A technological frame can be described
as a social structure comprising the elements influencing interactions within relevant social
groups and lead to the attribution of meanings to technical artefacts. This structure is at the
same time constituted by the actions and interactions of relevant actors, and acting back on
these actions and interactions, thus disciplining the actors.275
A technological frame enables its members by providing tools needed for action: goals, ideas,
key problem-solving strategies, current theories, tacit knowledge, testing procedures, design
methods and criteria, exemplary artefacts etc. However, simultaneously, a technological frame
constrains the actions of its members through creating a structure by actions and interactions,
which in turn will constrain further thinking, actions and interactions (Bijker 1995: 194-95).276
A criterion for successful international environmental technology co-operation projects
according to the SCOT model could therefore be that processes of closure and stabilisation
have taken place both among actors within each of the socio-technological systems taking part,
and – subsequently – between representatives from both systems. As indicated in above, the
Yantai project seems to have been a clash between two different technological frames – one
directed towards sociotechnical solutions (involving capacity building), the other focusing
more on technological fix.
Fourth, by contending that social processes can affect the success of a particular technology,
and that the degree of success therefore may vary from one socio-cultural context to another,
                                                
275 This seems to be inspired by the agent-structure debate (see Section 8.2 above) .
276 The technology historian Thomas Hughes (1987: 86-90) claims technology develops differently in different
geographic areas because of differences in technological style, formed by differences in geography, historical
experiences and political values. However, the influence of politics and power on technological style is absent
in Hughes’ description.
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the SCOT model also seeks to counter asymmetrical analysis of technological change.277
Bijker (1995) contends that too many technological success stories are told, and too little effort
has been put in to learn from the experience of the less successful technologies. Within this
perspective, the fact that the implementation process of the Yantai project has been fraught
with problems – while still being implemented – makes it analytically interesting. Just as much
can be learned from unsuccessful or partly successful attempts to make use of new technology
as from technological success stories. To understand technology development and change,
Bijker argues, it is not sufficient to treat “successful technology“ as an independent variable in
identifying mechanisms behind technological success stories. Technology, says Bijker, should
also take role of the dependent variable, and its development should be explained by
employing the same variables as are employed in explaining unsuccessful technologies. The
SCOT approach does not consider the fact that a technology “works” as an explanation in
itself; rather, the functioning of an artefact is regarded as being a result of socio-technological
development. Machines work because relevant social groups accept them (Bijker 1995: 270),
under certain social conditions.
The fifth reason why the SCOT model seems to be a useful tool for understanding relevant
actors’ tactical translation of technology, is that it gives room for an actor-oriented approach, as
well as structures that empower or constrain relevant actors, in much the same way as the
concept of framework conditions outlined above. Proponents of the SCOT model emphasise
the need to link micro-level case studies of technological development to the understanding of
macro-level socio-political conditions for this development. They have nevertheless been
criticised of producing a large number of case studies without being able to generalise from
these studies, or, in the words of Winner (1992), “going into the black box and not coming out
again”.278 Because of this, it has been argued that the SCOT approach still is most suitable for
analysing particular technology development processes (Olsen 1995: 125). However, attempts
for generalisation outside this realm have been made, most prominently by Bijker (1995).
Sixth (as briefly touched upon above), the implementation of projects to disseminate
environmental technology invented and developed in one social, cultural and organisational
context into another, could be regarded as a re-innovation or re-construction process. The fact
that the SCOT approach so far 1) has largely been employed in – and is based on case studies
from – the North and 2) has focused on the development of new technologies and/or
technological change, rather than aspects related to technology co-operation (Leseth 1996)
                                                
277 It should be noted here that there are many facets of social constructivism. Actor-network theory (mentioned
above) studies stabilisation processes of technical objects as resulting from the building of networks of human
actors and natural and technical phenomena. It regards technology as developing within actor-networks,
whereas SCOT regards society as the context where technology develops (Winner 1991). Actor-network
theorists employ a principle of generalised symmetry, meaning that any element (social, natural, or technical)
plays a similar role in explaining in the stabilisation of a technology (see e.g. Brey 1999, Callon and Latour
1992).
278 The black box is commonly used in engineering textbooks as a way of simplifying complex technical processes
so that further design work can proceed (Winner 1991: note 2, p. 23).
Beyond nuts and bolts 139
might therefore not constitute a problem. The reason is that international technology co-
operation in fact may be regarded as part of technology development, as technology in a sense
must be re-innovated (Olsen 1995: 45ff, 125) to be implemented in a new setting. As the focus
of this study is on the implementation, in a country in the South, namely China, of
environmental technology co-operation projects based on technology that has already been
developed in the North, it is not self-evident that the SCOT approach is a useful analytical tool.
However, since the framework conditions for its use are so different, the technology has to be
“developed anew” when transferred to China. Thus, what at the outset seemed to be an
argument against employing the SCOT approach could instead be regarded as a means of
testing its scope in a new setting.279
In her attempt to apply the SCOT model to the study of the transfer of Norwegian
environmental technology to China, Leseth (1996) finds that it makes a valuable, but not
satisfactory contribution to the understanding of the technology co-operation process. She
argues that the model “show[s] signs of having a Euro-American bias“, and that it therefore
“should not be applied to technology transfer projects in China without being adapted to the
local context” (Leseth 1996: 55). An interesting possibility, therefore, is to integrate the SCOT
model with theories of Chinese views on science and technology, of which an attempt has been
made below.
The current Chinese paradigm of technological optimism – or scientism – regards science and
technology as core values (Furth 1970, Hua 1995, Bøckman 1998). It is often assumed that
there is a single best technological solution – a technological fix – to a problem, and that this
solution will work out fine regardless of the context.
“Scientistic” thinking has been a central line of thought in the debate as to how China is to
become a modernised society (Bøckman 1998). In its most extreme form, scientism is founded
on the beliefs that science is unified, that there are no limits to science, and that science is
successful in prediction, explanation and control (Hua 1995: 15). It is also characterised by the
application of scientific concepts to areas outside their own sphere of relevance (Furth 1970:
14).
Scientism has been influenced by orthodox Marxism and utopianism. However, its roots can be
traced in two other directions as well: to Chinese political culture, and to the relationship to and
influence from the Soviet Union. In treating all aspects of social relations as an inseparable
whole where there is only one legitimate source of truth, scientism bears elements of China’s
holistic Confucian tradition and its monistic political tradition (Hua 1995: 33,142-143).
                                                
279 Nevertheless, comparative case studies of different phases of the technology development process can and
should be conducted in order to ameliorate the SCOT model’s bias towards the industrialised North (see Ch.
9.2).
140 Jørund Buen
Another ideological forerunner for scientism was the movement to strengthen China from its
backward position and free it from further attempts for colonisation in the latter part of the 19th
century. This movement coincided with the growing influence of social Darwinism. Darwinism
provided a justification for the hierarchical social structure in Chinese society, as well as an
international framework within which to understand China’s position and potential (Furth
1970: 227). Thus, the growth of science and technology was seen as a precondition not to loose
out completely in what has been – and partly is – perceived as the zero-sum game of
international politics.
Hua (1995: 7) identifies technological determinism as a separate strand of scientism, and
claims that it has been strengthened in the Post-Mao period. In 1978, when Deng Xiaoping
took power in China, the position of science and technology in official Marxist ideology was
soon moved from superstructure to economic base. This not only de-politicised the role of
science and technology, but also legitimised that the modernisation of science and technology
had to take precedence over the three other modernisations initiated by Deng Xiaoping (of
agriculture, industry, and national defence, respectively) (Hua 1995: 1).
The large number of technocrats in the Chinese bureaucracy has also prepared the ground for
an emphasis on technological fix.280 The Chinese leadership has also been – and is – influenced
by the former Soviet technocratic model of development, characterised by a focus on heavy
industry, infrastructure and electrification. This influence came about both because cadres
educated at Soviet universities gradually have replaced professional revolutionaries in the top
leadership, and through Sino-Soviet technology co-operation projects.281
Ho (1997: 102-103) writes that, as China had difficulties absorbing new technology during the
early 1980s, Chinese policy makers gradually started to define technology more broadly to
encompass organisational and management skills and know-how rather than just engineering in
a narrow sense. However, he continues, “Chinese managers and bureaucrats continued to place
a higher value on ‘hardware’ (equipment and machinery) than ‘software’ (codified and tacit
knowledge)”. Incremental technological improvements are regarded as uneconomical. This is
rooted in a desire to minimise the technological gap to the North within as short a period as
possible.
As bureaucratic authority is fragmented in China, many agencies may potentially obtain the
responsibility for implementing a particular project, and all seek to position themselves in
order to acquire this responsibility. In situations where competition for public funds is fierce,
and projects require the commitment of large public funds as well as a considerable number of
public and private actors, an objective means of comparing possible solutions is in demand.
                                                
280 This expression connotes a narrow understanding of technology, not the broad definition employed in this
study.
281 Personal communication with Harald Bøckman, University of Oslo, 19 March 1999.
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Technology is often given this role. Tangible technological solutions are less controversial than
changes in management and/or behaviour, and may therefore be resorted to in order to avoid
conflict. Thus, a reasonable hypothesis could be that the less successful agencies implementing
an environmental technology project are in tactically interpreting the technology to be used in a
project in ways that suit their own organisational interests, the less likely it is that the
implementation status of the project will be positive.
In measuring how successful implementing agencies have been in tactically translating
technology, a starting point could be to focus upon whether or not the dominating
interpretation of the following has moved in a direction that has increased their organisational
strength:282
· what kind of technology that the project has aimed to implement;
· who the intended user of the technology has been;
· in which context the technology has been supposed to be used, and how.
8.3 Summary and conclusion
Three (not mutually exclusive) categories of factors have contributed to explaining the
implementation status of the Yantai project. The first category of factors has consisted of those
contributing to the discontinuation of the Sino-Norwegian technology co-operation. The
planning and foreign financing bureaucracies have neither been integrated in CA21 at large or
the Yantai project as such and therefore have not given priority to the project. This made it
impossible for the implementing agency to provide funding and approval of its repayment
capabilities in time, which led to the cancellation of the co-operation project. The highly
negotiated central-local relationship regarding responsibilities for project funding and the fact
that the project had not been anchored among the authorities on lower administrative levels
probably also contributed to the funding problems. YMSSB’s lack of relations with possible
funding sources probably did so as well.
The second category has consisted of those factors having influenced the technological profile
of the project: the lack of co-ordination between the CA21 administration and the
implementing agency (MOC), and the relative strength of MOC compared to its opponents in
the issue area of marine oil pollution. Perhaps the tactical translation of technology by MOC or
the differing technological frames among the actors implementing the project could also have
been included here.
                                                
282 In terms of personnel, jurisdiction, and national and international organisational linkages, respectively, cf.
Section 2.2.3.
142 Jørund Buen
The third category has been composed of those factors that render a comprehensive and co-
ordinated follow-up of the Yantai project rather unlikely. That includes the lack of co-
ordination between the CA21 administration and implementing agencies; the lack of co-
ordination of Local Agenda 21 initiatives and CA21 priority projects; the lack of a CA21
administrative structure on lower administrative levels; the separate agenda of YMSSB and its
rivalry with other harbours for the Yantai project; and the relative organisational strengthening
of the environmental bureaucracy, which had been ostracised from the CA21 process.
As employing structural variables arguably succeeded only partly in establishing clear causal
linkages to indicators of implementation effectiveness, it has been suggested to integrate
relevant actors’ strategies in the analytical framework as well. The main reason is that in order
to be able to establish clear-cut causal mechanisms from independent to dependent variables,
the analytical framework needs to be dynamic in the sense that it incorporates both structures
and the actions of actors influenced by these structures. The conclusions are summarised in the
revised analytical model on the next page. The dotted lines in the model indicate that there are
interrelationships between independent variables as well as a feedback relationship from the
dependent variable to the independent variables (actors’ actions are influenced by structures,
but these actions also change these structures). This report only focuses on the relationships
between variables that are marked by solid-drawn lines.
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Figure 8.2 Revised analytical model integrating organisational framework conditions and
relevant actors’ strategies
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“Changes will take place when things come to a
dead end, and breakthroughs can be expected
when there is no way out”
Chinese aphorism
9 Conclusions and theoretical implications
This chapter consists of two parts: conclusions and recommendations, and theoretical impli-
cations. The first part starts by summing up the most important findings of the study, as regards
the influence of organisational framework conditions on the implementation of environmental
technology projects in China, exemplified by CA21 Project 6-8 in Yantai. A short note on the
prospects of China’s Agenda 21 follows. Third, a number of factors central for successful
implementation of environmental technology projects in China are suggested. Following this is
a short reminder of the implications China’s Western development strategy and its World
Trade Organisation (WTO) accession might have for the implementation of environmental
technology projects in China. Fifth, implications of the Yantai project for greenhouse gas
abatement projects in China and other countries in the South as part of the Clean Development
Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol are suggested. The final point is some thoughts on what
implications new types of environmental technology will have for the organisation of
development aid, inspired by the Yantai project.
The second part of the chapter, focusing on theoretical implications of the study, will first
discuss its implications for research on environmental technology policy implementation in
China. Secondly, the possibilities of linking research on international environmental commit-
ments and domestic environmental technology politics is explored, based on the agent-
structure debate.
9.1 Conclusions: The 21 Agendas
The main question this report set out to answer was how organisational framework conditions
within the People’s Republic of China influence the implementation of environmental techno-
logy projects in the country. This was illustrated through a case study of the implementation
status of a project for prevention and control of oil spills, included in China’s Agenda 21.
The argument was the following: the more horizontally and vertically fragmented authority is
among the governmental actors involved in the implementation of the Yantai project, the less
likely it is that the implementation status of the Yantai project is positive. Given that authority
is fragmented horizontally and vertically: the weaker the agencies implementing the Yantai
project are compared to organisational opponents of the project, the less likely it is that the
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implementation status of the Yantai project is positive. The empirical documentation and
analysis conducted in the report strengthened these hypotheses, with some modifications.
While not integrated in the analytical framework, a linkage has been suggested between the
prevalence of horizontal and vertical fragmentation of authority, relative organisational
weakness of implementing agencies, and two types of actor strategies. In this way, the analy-
tical framework comes closer to establishing clear-cut causal mechanisms from independent to
dependent variables in the sense that it incorporates both structures and the actions of actors
influenced by these structures.
It has been suggested that the less successful implementing agencies are in individual-cum-
organisational relation building with strategic partners, and in tactically translating the
technology to be used in the project to suit their own organisational purposes, the less likely it
is that the implementation status of the Yantai project is positive. It was also concluded that, in
order to be able to establish clear-cut causal mechanisms from independent to dependent
variables, the analytical framework needs to be dynamic in the sense that it incorporates both
structures and the actions of actors influenced by these structures.
CA21 Project 6-8 was on its way to being implemented at the time the case study ended in
mid-1999. However, the implementation status of the Yantai project was judged as being sub-
optimal according to the criterion of implementation effectiveness, as four aspects of the
implementation process had deviated substantially from the expected effect and/or planned
outputs. Below, these will be reiterated, and the particular aspects of the organisational
framework conditions and actors’ strategies believed to influence them are pointed out.
The first sub-optimal aspect of aspect of CA21 Project 6-8 was the discontinuation of the Sino-
Norwegian technology co-operation. This is mainly explained by the lack of integration of
planning and foreign financing bureaucracies in CA21 at large and the Yantai project in
particular, and the subsequent lack of priority given to the project by these bureaucracies. The
central-local dimension of the fight for foreign funding probably also contributed to making
Sino-Norwegian co-operation more difficult. YMSSB’s lack of relations with possible local
funding sources, especially local authorities, could also have been an important problem in this
regard.
YMSSB’s excessive focus on technical aspects of technology co-operation contributed to a
reduced focus on capacity building in the project. This narrowing of the project’s focus from
technology towards technicalities was also an indirect reason why the Sino-Norwegian co-
operation ended prematurely.
Lack of co-ordination between CA21 administration and the implementing agency (MOC), as
well of ACCA21’s lack of capacity to follow up the project locally was important factors
causing a change in the technological (and geographic) profile of CA21 Project 6-8. The
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relative organisational strength of MOC compared to its opponents in the issue area of marine
oil pollution was an important reason why the project was implemented at all despite the
problems of horizontal and vertical fragmentation of authority. Other contributing factors could
be the tactical translation of technology by MOC, and/or the differing technological frames
among the actors implementing the project.
A comprehensive and co-ordinated follow-up of the Yantai project is rather unlikely. Some of
the reasons are that co-ordination between the CA21 administration and implementing agencies
has been and is limited; that there is a lack of co-ordination between Local Agenda 21
initiatives and CA21 priority projects; and that CA21 lacks an administrative structure on
lower administrative levels. Other contributing factors have been the separate agenda of
YMSSB and its rivalry with other harbours for the Yantai project, as well as the relative
organisational strengthening of the environmental bureaucracy, which has been ostracised from
the CA21 process. Furthermore, at an operative level, the responsibilities in an emergency
situation between YMSSB directly under the central government, and the local government,
seem unclear.
This picture is rather disturbing, both seen from the point of view of domestic sustainable
development policy and foreign environmental aid. Horizontal and vertical fragmentation of
authority within the decision making apparatus of the recipient society contributes to a
situation where many Sino-foreign technology co-operation projects might fail in terms of
capacity building, sustainability and replicability – which are among the most important
success criteria for such projects. However, the negative values on these variables seem
difficult to get to grips with, as they are caused by a host of different structural characteristics
of bureaucracies and the relationships between these bureaucracies. In this situation, there may
well be as many agendas as there are actors, cf. “the 21 agendas”, the title of this section.
It seems that, in the fight for foreign funding and the prestige related to foreign-funded
projects, many central-level bureaucracies promote themselves as having a much broader scope
of authority than what is actually the case. They offer a long list of projects to be implemented,
while in practice they neither have the funds to contribute the domestic share of these projects,
nor the authority to implement them. 283 They therefore depend on the support from other
bureaucracies centrally, and the co-operation of provincial and local-level subsidiaries and
local governments. Many of these actors compete for the same type of projects and have their
own list of projects to be implemented. The result is that many projects listed by central
bureaucracies for implementation are never implemented.
Another interesting element revealed by the analysis is that implementation might be more
slow in a situation where important and established actors are left out of formulation and
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implementation processes, than if all relevant actors are given an opportunity to have their say
at an early stage.
The Yantai project is not a success story. However, it is not a tragedy either; after all, at least
some parts of the original project have been implemented, which for example is much more
than what can be said about the other CA21 projects in which Norwegian business and
government agencies were involved. It is likely that these characteristics make the Yantai
project more or less representative for Sino-foreign environmental technology co-operation
projects, although it should be emphasised that a large number of successful Sino-foreign
environmental technology projects have been or are being implemented.
9.1.1 Prospects for China’s Agenda 21
Paradoxically enough, China’s Agenda 21 has seemingly never been lower on the agenda of
China’s decision-makers than now, just after the turn of the 21st century. The scope for cross-
sectoral co-ordination through CA21 seems reduced, as the position of both bureaucracies
supposed to share leadership over CA21 (MOST and SDPC) has been weakened, together with
the position of some of the leading personalities behind CA21. Rivalling programmes have
been initiated. In the future, CA21 is likely to be regarded as one in a large number of
initiatives whose aim is to compete for foreign funding, rather than the initiative.
The 1998 government restructuring led to a relocation and reshuffling of many of the
departments and individuals working with Agenda 21 earlier. Furthermore, although this is
hard to assess at this point, it is likely that CA21 activities were among those given low priority
when cuts in responsibilities and staff had to be done as part of the restructuring. The result
was that the Agenda 21 activity in China this year was lower than previous years, and that new
responsible departments and individuals have had to use the period up until today to
consolidate their activity. Much as a result of the 1998 restructuring, MOST and SDPC are
currently discussing how to build upon the Agenda 21 concept, in what may be called a “20
Years Action Plan”. There are also reportedly plans for a ten-year anniversary CA21 confe-
rence in 2002. It remains to be seen whether this occasion results in a (re-)strengthening of the
CA21 bureaucracy and/or improvements to some of the factors that have negatively influenced
its implementation so far.
Furthermore, it is important to notice that the CA21 has made a considerable contribution in
terms of opening new channels of communication in questions of sustainable development,
between actors that had previously had no formal contact whatsoever. It is therefore reasonable
to believe that CA21 – both on a general level and in terms of the technologies and strategies
related to each of the priority projects implemented – has influenced the structures in which it
was introduced. It is also generally agreed that many good projects have been funded through
CA21.
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The Agenda 21 catchword is “Think globally and act locally!”. For a process with such a
purpose, China’s Agenda 21 has been very top-heavy, in the sense that it has been formulated
by central government actors and is supposed to be implemented locally. This is a paradox, as
it does not exactly encourage the genuine public participation promoted in Agenda 21.
However, China’s top-down approach has had the advantage that local agencies have been
given a clear signal that CA21 is a priority, and the authority to implement initiatives
(primarily Local Agenda 21s, but also other priority projects) on their own (Gan L. 1999: 321,
Finamore 1998: 4). It should also be noted that several local Agenda 21s have been established
because of local initiatives – in villages in Henan and Yunnan, some of China’s poorest regions
(Gan L. 1999: 321). Furthermore, researchers seem to have been integrated more in decision
making on sustainable development through CA21 than has usually been the case in China
before.284
It must be assumed that quite a number of the CA21 projects have not been successfully
implemented – a number of them probably never even reached the implementation stage.
However, this is not necessarily only a negative thing; many of the projects should never have
been included in the Priority Programmes anyway. The fact that many projects were revised in
1996 suggests that CA21 has increased Chinese bureaucracies’ understanding of project
planning and communication. CA21 has contributed to raise the environmental awareness of
ordinary people. It has also increased dialogue between Chinese sustainable development
actors and international (business, government and non-government) expertise. Furthermore,
ACCA21 is a far more professionally driven organisation now than when it was established in
1993. Not only is it trying to attract international business through its Centre for Environ-
mentally Sound Technology Transfer, but also has the operative responsibility of China’s
ambitious Local Agenda 21 programme. However, the following outburst from the leader of
one of the emerging quasi-governmental environmental organisations in China suggests CA21
has so far not managed to make use of this resource:
“Why should we participate in China’s Agenda 21? We have not been invited, and if we were invited, we would
have declined. We have no interest in coming to a party only to end up sitting in a corner watching the other guests.
China’s Agenda 21 is one of the illusions of the spoiled children of the Party bosses, who walk straight into top-level
administrative positions. It has nothing to do with us.”285
CA21 has also contributed to an increased understanding on the part of Chinese authorities of
the seriousness of environmental problems on the part of Chinese decision-makers. Before the
formulation of CA21, the official view was that China was a developing country and
environmental problems only could be solved when China had reached a higher stage of
development. However, after the Rio summit and the formulation of CA21, the official view
was that the environment and development challenges must be met in parallel. CA21 also
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seems to have resulted in environmental criteria being introduced into economic and
development plans to a somewhat larger extent than before (Gan L. 1999: 319).
9.1.2 Success factors
The hypotheses on which the conclusions in this report are based were formulated
“negatively”, that is, it was expected that the more prominent the phenomenon described by a
particular variable was, the less likely it would be that the Yantai project was successfully
implemented. However, formulated in a “positive” manner, these hypotheses may also form
the basis for a set of domestic organisational success factors for implementation of
environmental technology projects in China, even though they should not be regarded as a
definite list.
· Horizontal co-ordination: Most or all bureaucracies whose jurisdiction is close to or
covering the issue area are brought into the implementation process at an early stage
(see below for details).
· Vertical co-ordination: Lower-level satellites are integrated in the implementation
process at an early stage, and dialogue opened with local and provincial-level
authorities within (at least) the areas of planning, financing, and foreign economic co-
operation.
· Organisationally strong implementing agencies: The competence, jurisdiction, number
of personnel and financial resources of the implementing agency or agencies is larger
than that of possible bureaucratic rivals in the project’s issue area. Or even better: the
project or programme is safely within the jurisdiction of the bureaucratic actor claiming
responsibility for implementation.
· Individual-cum-organisational relation building is actively used by implementing
agencies to “defragment” or “concentrate” decision-making, by minimising the number
of actors and decision-making arenas, maximising access to information, and reducing
the time spent on project preparation and implementation.
· There is a high degree of consensus on what technology should be implemented through
the project, where, and by which bureaucracy. This consensus needs to be refreshed
several times during the implementation process in order to decrease the scope for
tactical redefinitions of technology in the interest of particular bureaucracies.
 In addition, the following recommendations are made:286
Hold consensus conferences: Environmental technology co-operation must be based on the
needs of countries in the South in order to be effective (OECD 1994: 9). As many stakeholders
as possible should be included in the definition of these needs. This is perhaps even more
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important in the case of China, due to the serious vertical and horizontal fragmentation of
authority, and ensuing institutional infighting. Consensus conferences involving all relevant
stakeholders in a particular environmental technology project should be held as early as
possible in the project planning and implementation process.287 Here, all actors should be given
the opportunity to voice their interpretations of what kind of technology that is to be at the
centre of technology co-operation, how this technology matches their needs, and how they
perceive their role in the distribution of implementing responsibilities. While consensus may
often not be reached, vetoing and technological manipulation may be reduced through
consensus conferences, as may the risk for a protracted and disjointed implementation process.
Co-ordinate capacity-building and technology co-operation: Chinese decision-makers as well
as bi- and multilateral aid agencies should make more effort to secure the follow-up of
capacity-building and/or pilot projects. Focus should be moved from the details of technology
transfer towards the linking of the knowledge and organisational components of such transfer
with actual utilisation of transferred equipment in a Chinese setting, and extensive co-operation
between Chinese and foreign key competence from an early stage. Projects focusing on
capacity building for comprehensive, integrated planning, preferably in (issue) areas characte-
rised by interregional and interministerial disputes, should be initiated, in co-operation with
foreign donors. Perhaps it is a good idea to concentrate development aid on programmes rather
than projects, like many countries in the North seem to be doing now. However, if this is done
in China, support should perhaps be earmarked for specific purposes – especially capacity
building within the bureaucratic unit administering the programme in question, as these units
are established in parallel with the preparations of the programme.
Work through non-state environmental organisations: Although this is perhaps still politically
difficult, the growing role of China’s (non-)state environmental organisations as mediators,
meeting arenas and co-ordinating agents in interministerial and interregional projects should be
taken more seriously. Initiatives integrating China’s own environmental organisations in
policy-making and strengthen their administrative capacity would perhaps also create a
stronger internal pressure for political reforms in China – hopefully this will happen so
gradually that the organisations are allowed to work undisturbed.
                                                                                                                                                         
286 An earlier version of this paragraph has been published in Buen (2000a, b).
287 The reader should be aware that the term “consensus conference” often describes a new form of technology
evaluation where lay people prepare questions and ask a panel of experts about one or several controversial
scientific or technological subjects, assess experts’ responses, reach a consensus about the subject, and report
the conclusions at a press conference (see e.g. Sclove 1999 or Guston 1999 for more details on consensus
conferences). Here, the expression is used somewhat differently.
152 Jørund Buen
9.1.3 Towards avoidance technology
In the introduction, the international stalemate on North-South technology co-operation was
discussed. It is therefore interesting to reassess this issue in the light of the report’s
conclusions. If other case studies of other Agenda 21 projects for international environmental
technology co-operation yield similar conclusions as this study, the technology transfer
strategy evident in Agenda 21 and Earth Summit + 5 should be reassessed.
The first point that should be reassessed is the emphasis on advanced technology. As
mentioned in the introduction, on both occasions the necessity and value of transferring
advanced environmental technology from North to South was emphasised, claiming such
technology promises the largest environmental and economic benefits. However, the advanced
research and development of environmental technology has shifted from control and
remediation/restoration technologies via monitoring and assessment technologies towards
avoidance technologies (technologies that avoid the production of environmentally hazardous
substances or alter human activities in ways that minimise damage to environment). This
means that environmental technologies are becoming increasingly complex, costly, and
codified, and require cross-disciplinary competencies in order to function properly.
In the field of marine oil pollution, this could for example mean that focus would be put on
how to reduce oil consumption, how to reduce oil transport, and how to prevent oil spills,
rather than on oil spill clean-up. In sum, this suggests that non-technical aspects of technology
will become increasingly important. Factors inhibiting implementation of environmental tech-
nology projects are probably even more prominent in other countries in the South. Thus, rather
than transferring the most advanced technology to these countries, a technological co-operation
strategy based on thorough assessments of each recipient country’s capacity for utilisation of
environmental technology, and gradually building up capacity from this level onwards, might
yield better results for recipient countries.
There are a number of problems hampering the practical implementation of such a strategy.
The first is the reluctance of countries in the South towards settling for “second-best
technology”. This has characterised all discussions on environmental technology transfer and
co-operation related to international environmental negotiations the last decades, including
Agenda 21, the climate negotiations, and the negotiations on the implementation of the
Montreal Protocol. China has been among the most outspoken on these matters (see e.g.
Tangen, Heggelund and Buen 2001).
The second problem is that of proprietary technology. The rollback of the state in the North
throughout the recent decades renders direct public interference in private sector technology
development and commercialisation difficult. Nevertheless, countries in the South push for
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easing the intellectual property rights in the realm of environmental technology, in the name of
sustainable development.288
Given that tangible technology and property rights to technology are central requirements on
the part of countries in the South, a strategy coupling the attainment of these objectives with
momentum in the implementation process and the sustainability and repeatability of pilot
projects would be beneficial for both parties. A system close to that of extended producer
responsibility could be introduced in environmental aid. Environmental technology companies
exporting hardware to countries in the South could get favourable aid conditions if and only if
they agree to follow a long-term programme of several projects in different areas under
different conditions, and including capacity building, developed by both countries taking part
in the technology co-operation. Another objective of such a mechanism should be to ensure
close co-operation between those companies or research institutions responsible for capacity
building on the one hand and hardware vendors on the other. However, this also depends on
co-operation within development aid bureaucracies in the North, between departments
responsible for industrial involvement in development aid projects, and between departments
in charge of capacity building projects, respectively.
There is a worldwide trend towards reductions in overseas development aid (ODA), both in
absolute terms and as a percentage of funding for technology transfer and co-operation projects
in countries in the South (IPCC 2000). However, some countries in the South have succeeded
in attracting a growing amount of foreign direct investment. China is currently a global number
two when it comes to attracting this kind of financing. Of course, the large absolute numbers
are no surprise, given China’s size, and just a portion of this investment is related to
environmental technologies. Nevertheless, future research on North-South environmental
technology co-operation should focus far more on the increasing role of private actors.
9.2 Theoretical implications: Domesticating international theories, or
internationalising domestic ones?
As noted in the introduction, this study is directed towards explaining the empirical phenome-
non of the (lack of) implementation of environmental technology projects in China. Never-
theless, a few theoretical reflections follow.
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9.2.1 Reflections on the study of implementation
As touched upon in section 2.1, taking one authoritative decision as an empirical point of
departure in this study would have made little sense. The project has been part of a larger
programme, in which many different organisations have taken part.
The effectiveness criterion employed in this report is closely related to criteria employed in
decision-oriented approaches. However, as mentioned in Chs. 3 and 4, measuring the corre-
spondence between goals and local arrangements would not have given a sufficiently nuanced
picture, as the deviation from original goals may very well have positive implications on other
indicators of successful implementation – perhaps even on other facets of implementation
effectiveness.
As documented through the discussion on vertical fragmentation, viewing environmental
policy implementation only from the perspective of the centre is insufficient. Lower-level
governmental actors are economically powerful, and have their own agenda. Furthermore, as
will be documented in the next chapter, it is insufficient only to concentrate only on formal
relations of authority, as informal relations across organisational boundaries to a certain extent
may affect policy implementation.
9.2.2 Implications for research on environmental technology policy implementation in
China
This section contains several suggestions for enriching research on environmental technology
project implementation in China. They could be summarised in (i) the need to include other
categories of framework conditions in analyses; (ii) the emergence of quasi-governmental
structures in the environmental sector because of government streamlining; and (iii) the need to
“globalise” the social construction of technology (SCOT) model.
Other categories of framework conditions should be integrated in analysis: The empirical
results of the report suggest that further studies on factors influencing the implementation of
environmental technology projects in China should focus not only on organisational framework
conditions but integrate such perspectives with institutional, cognitive, technological and –
especially – economic framework conditions.
The Yantai project is a good illustration of the importance of including cognitive-informational
framework in analyses of environmental technology policy implementation in China. Although
environmental consciousness in China has grown the last decades (see Sections 9.1.1 and
9.1.2), the participative aspects of CA21 have not been very prominent. Nor has public
participation characterised the Yantai project; the combination of the fact that the project did
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not explicitly include public consultation and low environmental consciousness locally has
meant that there has been no public pressure to implement the project.
A major reason why many of the interviewees emphasised the importance of economic factors
for the outcome of the Yantai project may be a narrow understanding of technology and of the
complex process of transferring technology from one context to another. Nevertheless, the
empirical evidence clearly shows that the vague division of responsibility and widespread
insecurity related to China’s ongoing economic reforms has affected the fate of the Yantai
project. Lack of financial capacity on the part of implementing agencies was also an important
factor inhibiting further Sino-Norwegian co-operation. In particular, the increasingly active
role of the banking and financial system should be focused upon. The Yantai project was also
the story of a central government agency that had yet to be accustomed to a reality where loans
were given on commercial rather than political terms, and where economic power lies with
local actors rather than the central government.
Commitment by local authorities is essential for environmental technology projects to succeed
in China. The problem, however, is that it is exactly at the local level that the alleged
contradiction between environmental protection and economic growth has become most
obvious. The challenge is to understand better the contradictions between economic goals of
local and provincial governments with national environmental goals, and to carve out ways and
means to reconcile these goals.
The study has indicated that there is a need to enrich the fragmented authoritarianism approach
by perspectives focusing more on the politics of particularism, that is, the role of personalism
and particularistic ties in Chinese politics. If such perspectives are neglected, theories of
Chinese politics easily become static, as the actor perspective is missing and only structures are
left to analyse. Furthermore, such analyses should not be restricted to the top layers of the
Chinese decision making hierarchy.
Restructuring of central government – the role of centres and GONGOs: ACCA21 is only one
of a steadily increasing number of centres more or less closely affiliated to the governmental
structure in the environmental field. This development is another consequence of the gradual
transformation of many government agencies to market actors – with Chinese characteristics.
The objectives of the 1998 restructuring of the central government were to reduce the staff of
the central government bureaucracy by fifty per cent, to separate government functions from
those of the market, and (closely related to the latter objective) to separate co-ordinating and
policy-making functions from those related to implementation. The trimming of government
continues on top level, and is planned on lower governmental levels as well. It would be very
interesting to examine to what extent the reductions in manpower are real or only on paper.
The environmental bureaucracy is a very interesting case in point, as it was awarded more
responsibilities because of the restructuring process. Has the restructuring process made the
remaining government officials work twice as much as before? Probably not, as they draw on
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the growing environmental non-state sector affiliated to the government agencies. Establishing
new centres and government-organised NGOs (GONGOs) is both a way of gradually slimming
the bureaucracy, attracting foreign funding, and helping formulate and implement policies.
What centres seem to lack in terms of seniority, they often regain by being competent, efficient
and entrepreneurial, and have many international contacts. Government funding for the newly
established centres is to be gradually reduced to nothing the next three to five years. Thus, the
fight for foreign funding will be even tougher in the future.
“Globalising” the SCOT model: While the report focused on differing interpretations of
technology among the Chinese bureaucracies involved in the Yantai project, the discontinued
Sino-Norwegian co-operation also exemplified that representatives from different socio-
cultural settings might interpret a particular technology in different ways. In the terminology
used by the social construction of technology (SCOT) model, this implies that a technology
transferred to a new socio-political context is destabilised; the technological “black box” is
reopened for interpretation. In other words, there is a considerable scope for interpretative
flexibility in technology co-operation projects. While this renewed interpretative flexibility
may be utilised strategically position in bureaucratic struggles, but it also opens a window of
opportunity. As Bijker (1995) notes, people belonging to more than one relevant social group
might see an artefact in new and unconventional ways, because more than one technological
frame is integrated. This signals that more pathbreaking environmental technology ideas and
technologies in the future might originate from the re-innovation processes emerging from
North-South environmental technology co-operation.
However, as mentioned in Section 8.2.2, the SCOT model has been developed almost exclu-
sively on the basis of case studies of technology development and change in the Western
Hemisphere. Therefore, in order to be a fruitful theoretical tool for analysing North-South
technology co-operation, the model needs to be adapted to framework conditions and strategies
prevalent in countries in the South, through more case studies like the one conducted in this
report. These case studies need to take into account two factors. First, technology development
and change is not necessarily a once-and-for-all linear process towards stabilisation. Second,
technology development and change might just as well take place elsewhere than in the
industrialised North. In fact, it might even be more probable that such change happens there.
9.2.3 Closing remarks
In the methodological chapter, a number of reasons why this project was chosen were men-
tioned. However, there was one more: while the Norwegian business and government
representatives have regarded the Yantai project as a failure, the Chinese do not. What can we
learn from this?
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First, different actors participating in international technology co-operation might define
implementation success very differently. This should serve as a reminder to consultants,
business representatives and development aid bureaucracies in the North that success should
primarily be measured according to whether project or programme objectives have been
fulfilled, and whether the problem motivating the programme or project is actually being
solved. Both the problem and the objectives against which to measure successful implemen-
tation should be firmly anchored in the host country, and relevant localities in that country.
Second, there is no such thing as an objective “core” of a technology co-operation project.
Technology – and thereby project implementation success – has more dimensions to it than
merely the technical, and these dimensions may take on different forms in different contexts.
Technology is more than nuts and bolts.
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